Opinion
5-20-0251
03-23-2022
TIMOTHY W. ELKINS JR., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CARITAS FAMILY SOLUTIONS and CAROLYN YINGER, Defendants-Appellees.
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Madison County. No. 18-L-1005 Honorable Thomas W. Chapman, Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE WELCH delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Boie and Justice Cates concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
WELCH JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: The trial court did not err in dismissing the plaintiff s pro se amended complaint where he failed to state a claim for a violation of his constitutional rights and where the defendants were entitled to absolute immunity by virtue of their roles in the juvenile court proceedings.
¶ 2 The plaintiff, Timothy Elkins Jr., pro se filed a five-count complaint in the circuit court of Madison County against the defendants, Carolyn Yinger and Caritas Family Solutions (Caritas), arguing that they violated his constitutional rights in juvenile proceedings involving his minor children where he was denied parenting time with the children. Thereafter, on January 31, 2020, the trial court dismissed his pro se complaint without prejudice, finding that the defendants were entitled to absolute and qualified immunity from civil liability by virtue of their roles in the juvenile court proceedings, and the plaintiff's vague allegations failed to state a claim. On February 20, 2020, the defendant appealed the court's order dismissing his pro se complaint.
¶ 3 On February 28, 2020, this court entered an order giving the plaintiff 14 days to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the trial court's January 31 order was a dismissal without prejudice that granted the plaintiff leave to replead. On March 9, 2020, the plaintiff filed a response to the show cause order and an amended pro se complaint in the trial court. On March 11, 2020, this court dismissed his appeal. On August 6, 2020, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's amended pro se complaint with prejudice. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the court's dismissal of the plaintiff's amended pro se complaint.
Although the caption of the plaintiffs initial pro se complaint listed both Yinger and Caritas as the defendants, the caption of his amended complaint only identified Yinger as a defendant. However, throughout his amended complaint, he makes references to "the defendants."
¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 5 The plaintiff is currently an inmate at the Dixon Correctional Center in Dixon, Illinois. He is serving a six-year sentence for the involuntary manslaughter of his son, who was two months old. Caritas is a child welfare and family services agency that works with the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) to oversee cases, arrange services, and assist parents in making the necessary changes to correct the conditions that brought their children into the foster care system. Yinger is employed as a caseworker at Caritas.
¶ 6 After the death of his youngest child, the plaintiff's remaining eight children were placed into DCFS's custody and became the subject of juvenile cases in the Madison County circuit court. Yinger was the caseworker assigned to these cases; she supervised the plaintiff's visits with the minor children and monitored his compliance with court mandated counseling and drug and alcohol rehabilitation programs.
¶ 7 On July 26, 2018, the plaintiff filed his initial pro se five-count complaint against the defendants. Specifically, in his complaint, he asserted the following: (1) Yinger violated his right to equal protection under the fourteenth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. XIV) by failing to follow the DCFS's procedures, being deceptive to the juvenile court, and coercing him into pleading guilty to involuntary manslaughter; (2) Caritas and Yinger violated his fifth and thirteenth amendment rights (U.S. Const., amends. V, XIII) by discriminating against him based on his gender because his wife was allowed to visit the children, even though she was also charged with the same crime and was on probation; (3) Caritas and Yinger violated his right to freedom of speech under the first amendment (U.S. Const., amend. I) by suspending his visits and not allowing him to participate in custody hearings; (4) Caritas and Yinger violated the eighth amendment's provision against cruel and unusual punishment where he was unable to visit his children (U.S. Const., amend. VIII); and (5) Caritas and Yinger violated his rights to freedom of speech and religion under the first amendment (U.S. Const., amend. I) because he was unable to share his religious beliefs with his children. In the complaint, the plaintiff sought an injunction ordering Caritas and Yinger to allow him telephone contact and supervised visits with the children, compensatory damages in the amount of $87,000, and punitive damages in the amount of $27,000.
¶ 8 On October 22, 2018, Caritas and Yinger filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint pursuant to sections 2-615 and 2-619 (a) (9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619(a)(9) (West 2016)) on the basis that the plaintiff's claims were legally deficient because Caritas and Yinger were merely following the trial court's orders regarding suspension of his parenting time rights. On November 1, 2018, the plaintiff filed a pro se motion to deny the motion to dismiss, in which he contended that Yinger reported false information to the juvenile court so that his visits with his children would be suspended.
¶ 9 On June 19, 2019, Caritas and Yinger filed a supplemental memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss, in which they contended that the plaintiff's parenting time with his children was suspended due to his inexcusable behavior and inappropriate interactions with them during a June 26, 2017, visit; the juvenile court had entered an order revoking his supervised visits as long as he remained incarcerated; his parental rights to his two oldest children were being terminated; and his six youngest children were being returned to their mother's custody and any parenting time would be at her discretion, but any parenting time would remain supervised. On December 27, 2019, the plaintiff filed a response to the motion to dismiss, arguing that the defendants failed to follow procedures, he did not have access to services, and the allegation that he engaged in detrimental behavior that resulted in the suspension of his visits was false.
¶ 10 On January 31, 2020, the trial court entered an order granting the motion to dismiss, finding that the defendants were either "qualifiedly or absolutely immune." The court made the following findings, in pertinent part: (1) if the plaintiff was claiming that Yinger initiated or participated in the initiation of the juvenile proceedings against him, she was immune from those claims as social workers performing prosecutorial duties were entitled to absolute immunity; (2) if Yinger convinced him to plead guilty, she would be entitled to immunity as her role as a child welfare worker was functionally comparable to that of a prosecutor; (3) if Yinger caused the juvenile court to suspend his parenting time with his children, she would be entitled to absolute immunity with respect to any actions undertaken in the execution of the juvenile court's orders, and she would also be entitled to absolute immunity when acting in her advisory role making recommendations to the juvenile court; (4) if the plaintiff failed to object to the adjudicatory or dispositional orders, he should not be able to file this action to challenge orders that he previously agreed to; (5) if the plaintiff was complaining about Yinger's testimony in the juvenile court proceedings, social workers who testify in court are entitled to witness immunity; and (6) the plaintiff's complaint failed to adequately state a claim because it made vague allegations and did not plead specific facts to give the defendants fair notice of the alleged claims and the grounds upon which they rest. The court gave the plaintiff 21 days to replead.
¶ 11 On February 20, 2020, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal of the trial court's order. On February 28, 2020, this court entered an order, giving the plaintiff 14 days to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the basis that the trial court's January 2020 order was a dismissal without prejudice that granted him leave to replead. On March 9, 2020, the plaintiff filed a pro se amended complaint in the trial court. In the complaint, the plaintiff asserted that Yinger intentionally reported false information to deprive him of his constitutional rights (to separate him from his children). He alleged that Yinger's actions deprived him of his "first amendment rights of freedom of speech, free exercise of religion, eighth amendment ban against cruel and unusual punishments, and the fourteenth amendment equal protection of the law, due process." He also asserted that Yinger's intentional actions resulted in the loss of his rights to have contact with his children, practice his religion with his children, and associate with his children; and her actions caused him severe mental and physical injuries and was a violation of the fourteenth amendment (violation of his due process and equal protection rights). He sought similar relief as that sought in his initial complaint except that he did not request injunctive relief.
¶ 12 On March 11, 2020, this court dismissed the plaintiff's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. On July 17, 2020, Caritas and Yinger filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to sections 2-615, 2-619(a)(9), and 2-1005 of the Code (id. §§ 2-615, 2-619(a)(9), 2-1005), in which they contended that the amended complaint suffered from the same fatal and insuperable legal deficiencies as the initial complaint that was dismissed by the trial court. On August 6, 2020, the court entered an order dismissing the plaintiff's pro se amended complaint with prejudice based on the reasoning of its January 31, 2020, order. The plaintiff appeals.
¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 14 This case was decided on the defendants' combined motion to dismiss filed pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code (id. § 2-619.1). Section 2-619.1 allows a party to combine a section 2-615 motion to dismiss based on a plaintiff's substantially insufficient pleadings with a section 2-619 motion to dismiss based on certain defects or defenses. Id.; Edelman, Combs & Latturner v. Hinshaw & Culbertson, 338 Ill.App.3d 156, 164 (2003). When ruling on a motion to dismiss under either section 2-615 or section 2-619, the court accepts all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of the nonmoving party. Edelman, Combs & Latturner, 338 Ill.App.3d at 164. Our review of motions to dismiss brought under both sections 2-615 and 2-619 is de novo. Id.
¶ 15 A section 2-615 motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Patrick Engineering, Inc. v. City of Naperville, 2012 IL 113148, ¶ 31. To survive a section 2-615 motion to dismiss, a complaint must be both legally and factually sufficient. Edelman, Combs & Latturner, 338 Ill.App.3d at 167. A motion to dismiss under section 2-619 admits the sufficiency of the complaint but asserts a defense outside of the complaint that defeats it. Patrick Engineering, Inc., 2012 IL 113148, ¶ 31. Section 2-619(a) (9) provides for an involuntary dismissal where the claim is barred by another affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim. Id.
¶ 16 In this case, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's amended complaint, in part, based on section 2-615 because the plaintiff's vague and conclusory allegations were insufficient to state a claim. Illinois is a fact-pleading jurisdiction. Id. ¶ 40. In a complaint, a plaintiff may not rely on mere conclusions of law or fact unsupported by specific factual allegations. Pooh-Bah Enterprises, Inc. v. County of Cook, 232 Ill.2d 463, 473 (2009). Conclusions of fact will not suffice to state a cause of action regardless of whether those conclusions generally inform defendants of the nature of the claim against them. Edelman, Combs & Latturner, 338 Ill.App.3d at 167. Instead, under Illinois fact pleading, the pleader is required to set out ultimate facts that support the cause of action. Id.
¶ 17 In his pro se amended complaint, the plaintiff made the following allegations: (1) Yinger intentionally reported false information to deprive him of his constitutional rights; (2) Yinger's actions deprived him of his "first amendment rights of freedom of speech, free exercise of religion, eighth amendment ban against cruel and unusual punishments, and the fourteenth amendment equal protection of the law, due process"; (3) Yinger's intentional actions resulted in the loss of his rights to have contact with his children, to practice his religion with his children, and to associate with his children; and (4) Yinger's actions caused him severe mental and physical injuries and was a violation of his due process and equal protection rights. However, the amended complaint provides no factual allegations to support his assertions. Specifically, the complaint does not describe the acts that he was complaining about; he does not describe what allegedly false information Yinger reported to the juvenile court, when the alleged acts occurred, or how they allegedly resulted in him being deprived of his constitutional rights. Even liberally construing the plaintiff's pro se amended complaint (see Murillo v. Page, 294 Ill.App.3d 860, 864 (1998)), his conclusory allegations are not sufficient to state a cause of action as they are devoid of any factual support.
¶ 18 Moreover, the plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts establishing the elements of a claim brought under 42 U.S.C § 1983. To state a section 1983 claim, which allows for a civil action for deprivation of rights, a plaintiff must allege that defendants deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and that defendants acted under color of state law. Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1009 (7th Cir. 2000). Under the traditional definition of acting under color of state law, a defendant in a section 1983 action must have exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988).
¶ 19 Here, the plaintiff's pro se amended complaint does not contain any factual allegations establishing that Yinger, in her capacity as a Caritas caseworker, was acting under the color of state law when she allegedly reported false information to the juvenile court. Also, simply identifying various amendments under the Constitution and asserting that Yinger's actions deprived him of his rights under those amendments is not sufficient to state a claim under section 1983. In other words, the plaintiff failed to allege with any specificity the alleged rights under the Constitution or the laws of the United States of which he was allegedly deprived by Yinger or Caritas. Thus, we conclude that the plaintiff's conclusory allegations are not sufficient to state a cause of action, and the trial court properly dismissed his amended complaint under section 2-615.
¶ 20 We next consider whether the trial court properly granted the defendants' motion to dismiss based on immunity. Section 1983 does not impose liability on judges, prosecutors, and other persons acting under color of law who are preforming official functions in the judicial process. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 334 (1983). This immunity has been extended to witnesses. Id. Also, "Illinois courts have liberally protected the principles of absolute privilege of witnesses." McNall v. Frus, 336 Ill.App.3d 904, 907 (2002). Witnesses enjoy absolute privilege from civil suit for statements made during judicial proceedings. Id. Further, social workers and similar public officials are entitled to absolute immunity in child custody cases because they formulate and present recommendations to the juvenile court as well as take other steps to present the case for decision by the court. Millspaugh v. County Department of Public Welfare of Wabash County, 937 F.2d 1172, 1176 (7th Cir. 1991). Absolute privilege embraces actions required or permitted by law in the course of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings as well as actions that are necessarily preliminary to those proceedings. Parrillo, Weiss & Moss v. Cashion, 181 Ill.App.3d 920, 928 (1989). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held that the dividing line between absolute and qualified immunity is whether the injury depends on a judicial decision. Millspaugh, 937 F.2d at 1175. Where there would be no loss if not for the judge's acts, then the prosecutor or witness who induces the judge to act has absolute immunity. Id.
¶ 21 Here, the claims in the plaintiff's pro se amended complaint are based on Yinger intentionally reporting allegedly false information about him to the juvenile court, which resulted in him losing parenting time with his minor children. As a social worker who was taking the requisite steps to present the case for decision by the juvenile court, Yinger was entitled to absolute immunity. Moreover, it is undisputed that the juvenile court, not Yinger, revoked the plaintiff's supervised parenting time while he remained incarcerated. Even if the court's decision was, at least in part, based on allegedly false information presented by Yinger, that decision was ultimately the juvenile court's responsibility. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's pro se amended complaint.
¶ 22 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 23 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Madison County dismissing the plaintiff's pro se amended complaint.
¶ 24 Affirmed.