ELK CITY v. JOHNSON

4 Citing cases

  1. Wilson v. Fallin

    2011 OK 76 (Okla. 2011)   Cited 5 times
    Holding that three decades after Baker v. Carr , the United States Supreme Court in Growe was clear that state courts may exercise jurisdiction over legislative redistricting and that federal courts should defer to state action over questions of state redistricting by state legislatures and state courts

    Where, as here, state constitutional language is contrary to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the invalid language should not nullify the valid provisions, City of Spencer v. Rayburn, 1971 OK 38, ¶ 6, 483 P.2d 735, 737, if they are severable. Elk City v. Johnson, 1975 OK 97, ¶ 12, 537 P.2d 1215, 1217. Unless we determine that the valid provisions are dependent upon and inseparably connected to the invalid provision or that the valid provisions standing alone are incomplete and incapable of being executed, they are severable.

  2. Wilson v. Fallin

    2011 OK 76 (Okla. 2011)

    Where, as here, state constitutional language is contrary to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the invalid language should not nullify the valid provisions, City of Spencer v. Rayburn, 1971 OK 38, ¶ 6, 483 P.2d 735, 737, if they are severable. Elk City v. Johnson, 1975 OK 97, ¶ 12, 537 P.2d 1215, 121. Unless we determine that the valid provisions are dependent upon and inseparably connected to the invalid provision or that the valid provisions standing alone are incomplete and incapable of being executed, they are severable.

  3. Local 514 Transport Workers Union of America v. Keating

    2003 OK 110 (Okla. 2003)   Cited 12 times
    Answering that severability analysis would not apply and holding that “whether to apply severability analysis ... [was] a matter of state law”

    See, e.g., City of Oklahoma City v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Dept. of Labor, 1995 OK 107, 918 P.2d 26, 31, (an entire act was unconstitutional regardless of a severability clause therein); Ethics Commission v. Cullison, 1993 OK 37, ¶¶ 25-28, 850 P.2d 1069, 1077-1078, (some sections of a House Joint Resolution were severable but others were not); Tulsa Exposition Fair Corp. v. Board of County Commissioners of Tulsa County, 1970 OK 67, 468 P.2d 501, 507, (because a statutory population classification was "an integral part of the Act" it was not severable from the rest of the Act, and the entire Act was unconstitutional).See, e.g., Ethics Commission v. Cullison, 1993 OK 37, ¶¶ 25-28, 850 P.2d 1069, 1077-1078, (some sections of a House Joint Resolution were severable but others were not); Elk City v. Johnson, 1975 OK 97, 537 P.2d 1215, 1217, (remainder of Okla. Const. Art. 10 § 35 remained valid after excision of invalid portion); Semke v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Motor Vehicle Commission, 1970 OK 15, 465 P.2d 441, 446, (§ 562a of the Act [47 O.S. 1961 § 561-568[47-561-568]] was severable from the portions requiring a State license for advertising and selling new or unused motor vehicles, and thus the latter portions were valid). ¶ 8 The severability analysis includes both a facial challenge to the language used in a statute or constitutional provision as well its applications.

  4. Harry R. Carlile Trust v. Cotton Petroleum

    1986 OK 16 (Okla. 1987)   Cited 66 times
    In Carlile Trust, the Oklahoma Corporation Commission, unlike the Kansas Corporation Commission, had the authority to order compulsory pooling. It did so. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held compulsory pooling affected significant property interests of every interest owner in the Hugoton Field, and held the Commission violated due process by relying on publication notice when the interest owners' names and addresses were readily available.

    rospective-operation approach in announcing a new rule, see Harness v. Myers, 143 Okla. 147, 288 P. 285, 289-290 [1930]; Oklahoma County v. Queen City Lodge No. 197, I.O.O.F., Okla. 131, 156 P.2d 340, 358 [1945]; Gibson v. Phillips University, 195 Okla. 456, 158 P.2d 901, 903 [1945]; Board of Equalization v. Tulsa Pythian Benev. Ass'n., 195 Okla. 458, 158 P.2d 904, 906 [1945]; Yarbrough v. Okla. Tax Comm., 200 Okla. 402, 193 P.2d 1017, 1021 [1948], aff'd., 334 U.S. 841, 68 S.Ct. 1510, 92 L.Ed. 1765; Curtis v. Barby, Okla., 366 P.2d 616, 621 [1961]; Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., Okla., 394 P.2d 515, 520 [1964]; Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Penick, Okla., 401 P.2d 514, 517 [1965]; American-First Title Trust Co. v. Ewing, Okla., 403 P.2d 488, 496 [1965]; Irwin v. Irwin, Okla., 433 P.2d 931, 934 [1965]; Hughes v. City of Woodward, Okla., 457 P.2d 787, 790 [1969]; Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., Okla., 521 P.2d 1353, 1368 [1974]; Brickner v. Gooden, Okla., 525 P.2d 632, 638 [1974]; Elk City v. Johnson, Okla., 537 P.2d 1215, 1217 [1975]; Keel v. MFA Ins. Co., Okla., 553 P.2d 153, 159 [1976]; Scott v. Bradford, Okla., 606 P.2d 554, 559 [1980]; Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Oklahoma County Excise Bd., Okla., 618 P.2d 915, 921 [1980]; Wilsey, Bennett Co. v. Grant, Okla., 632 P.2d 382, 386 [1981] and Oklahoma Ed. Ass'n, Inc. v. Nigh, Okla., 642 P.2d 230, 239 [1982]. See also Annot., Prospective or Retroactive Operation of Overruling Decision, 10 A.L.R.3d 1371, 1388, 1394 [1966].