Where, as here, state constitutional language is contrary to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the invalid language should not nullify the valid provisions, City of Spencer v. Rayburn, 1971 OK 38, ¶ 6, 483 P.2d 735, 737, if they are severable. Elk City v. Johnson, 1975 OK 97, ¶ 12, 537 P.2d 1215, 1217. Unless we determine that the valid provisions are dependent upon and inseparably connected to the invalid provision or that the valid provisions standing alone are incomplete and incapable of being executed, they are severable.
Where, as here, state constitutional language is contrary to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the invalid language should not nullify the valid provisions, City of Spencer v. Rayburn, 1971 OK 38, ¶ 6, 483 P.2d 735, 737, if they are severable. Elk City v. Johnson, 1975 OK 97, ¶ 12, 537 P.2d 1215, 121. Unless we determine that the valid provisions are dependent upon and inseparably connected to the invalid provision or that the valid provisions standing alone are incomplete and incapable of being executed, they are severable.
See, e.g., City of Oklahoma City v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Dept. of Labor, 1995 OK 107, 918 P.2d 26, 31, (an entire act was unconstitutional regardless of a severability clause therein); Ethics Commission v. Cullison, 1993 OK 37, ¶¶ 25-28, 850 P.2d 1069, 1077-1078, (some sections of a House Joint Resolution were severable but others were not); Tulsa Exposition Fair Corp. v. Board of County Commissioners of Tulsa County, 1970 OK 67, 468 P.2d 501, 507, (because a statutory population classification was "an integral part of the Act" it was not severable from the rest of the Act, and the entire Act was unconstitutional).See, e.g., Ethics Commission v. Cullison, 1993 OK 37, ¶¶ 25-28, 850 P.2d 1069, 1077-1078, (some sections of a House Joint Resolution were severable but others were not); Elk City v. Johnson, 1975 OK 97, 537 P.2d 1215, 1217, (remainder of Okla. Const. Art. 10 § 35 remained valid after excision of invalid portion); Semke v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Motor Vehicle Commission, 1970 OK 15, 465 P.2d 441, 446, (§ 562a of the Act [47 O.S. 1961 § 561-568[47-561-568]] was severable from the portions requiring a State license for advertising and selling new or unused motor vehicles, and thus the latter portions were valid). ¶ 8 The severability analysis includes both a facial challenge to the language used in a statute or constitutional provision as well its applications.
rospective-operation approach in announcing a new rule, see Harness v. Myers, 143 Okla. 147, 288 P. 285, 289-290 [1930]; Oklahoma County v. Queen City Lodge No. 197, I.O.O.F., Okla. 131, 156 P.2d 340, 358 [1945]; Gibson v. Phillips University, 195 Okla. 456, 158 P.2d 901, 903 [1945]; Board of Equalization v. Tulsa Pythian Benev. Ass'n., 195 Okla. 458, 158 P.2d 904, 906 [1945]; Yarbrough v. Okla. Tax Comm., 200 Okla. 402, 193 P.2d 1017, 1021 [1948], aff'd., 334 U.S. 841, 68 S.Ct. 1510, 92 L.Ed. 1765; Curtis v. Barby, Okla., 366 P.2d 616, 621 [1961]; Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., Okla., 394 P.2d 515, 520 [1964]; Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Penick, Okla., 401 P.2d 514, 517 [1965]; American-First Title Trust Co. v. Ewing, Okla., 403 P.2d 488, 496 [1965]; Irwin v. Irwin, Okla., 433 P.2d 931, 934 [1965]; Hughes v. City of Woodward, Okla., 457 P.2d 787, 790 [1969]; Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., Okla., 521 P.2d 1353, 1368 [1974]; Brickner v. Gooden, Okla., 525 P.2d 632, 638 [1974]; Elk City v. Johnson, Okla., 537 P.2d 1215, 1217 [1975]; Keel v. MFA Ins. Co., Okla., 553 P.2d 153, 159 [1976]; Scott v. Bradford, Okla., 606 P.2d 554, 559 [1980]; Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Oklahoma County Excise Bd., Okla., 618 P.2d 915, 921 [1980]; Wilsey, Bennett Co. v. Grant, Okla., 632 P.2d 382, 386 [1981] and Oklahoma Ed. Ass'n, Inc. v. Nigh, Okla., 642 P.2d 230, 239 [1982]. See also Annot., Prospective or Retroactive Operation of Overruling Decision, 10 A.L.R.3d 1371, 1388, 1394 [1966].