Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
Superior Court County Ct. No. CIV245126 of Ventur Ken W. Riley, Judge
Richard Michael Elinski, in pro. per., for Appellant.
Law Offices of Alan E. Wisotsky, Alan E. Wisotsky and Dirk DeGenna, for Respondents.
PERREN, J.
Richard Michael Elinski got into an argument with the manager of the complex where he rented a condominium. The manager called the police, who arrested Elinski for suspected drug use. Elinski sued the County of Ventura, Ventura County Sheriff's Department, Senior Deputy Julie Novak and Deputy Edward Beauvais for false arrest, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy and violation of civil rights. The trial court granted summary judgment as to all defendants on all causes of action.
Elinski also sued Palm Colony Homeowners Association, Karen Vaughn, the association's manager, and Sheriff Robert Brooks. The trial court sustained the demurrers of those parties to all causes of action. In a prior unpublished opinion, we affirmed the judgment of dismissal as to those parties. (Elinski v. Palm Colony Homeowners Association (June 17, 2008, B200632).)
On appeal, Elinksi makes numerous arguments concerning the summary judgment procedure and contends that his civil rights and state law tort claims were improperly decided on summary judgment. We affirm.
This statement of facts is taken from our prior opinion in this matter. (Ante, fn. 1.)
On August 23, 2005, Elinski drove into the parking area near his residence at the Palm Colony Condominiums in Camarillo and saw his roommate arguing with two of the complex's security guards, who were threatening to tow the roommate's car from one of the designated guest parking spaces. After Elinski came to the aid of his roommate, one of the guards summoned Vaughn, the resident manager, to the scene. According to Elinski, Vaughn "proceeded to castigate, malign and humiliate [Elinski] in the presence of the guards, the roommate and the woman that [Elinski] was planning to meet subsequently, by saying he was a mere 'renter.'" Vaughn also "egregiously slandered" Elinski by stating that he and his roommates had gotten over $2,000 in parking tickets, when in fact the tickets totaled $150. Elinski responded by yelling back that she was tactless, undiplomatic and wholly classless.
Approximately 90 minutes later, Elinski went to Vaughn's office and requested an application for a parking permit. Vaughn "rudely and boisterously" responded that there was a waiting list for permits and that she did not need to speak with him. She also said that the owner of the condominium Elinski rented was "very upset" about the situation. Vaughn then ordered Elinski out of the office, locked the door, and yelled, "I'm calling the Cops!"
Elinski returned to his condominium and continued preparing a letter to the owner regarding the parking problem. About 45 minutes later, Ventura County Sheriff's Deputy Julie Novak knocked on his front door and asked him about the dispute with Vaughn. Elinski stepped outside the front door and said that he never threatened Vaughn. Deputy Edward Beauvais arrived in another patrol car shortly thereafter. Both officers examined Elinski's eyes and told him they believed he was under the influence of drugs. Deputy Novak took his pulse and told him it was 140, which led her to believe he was under the influence. Elinski was placed under arrest and transported to the police station. He was released after a urinalysis indicated there were no drugs in his system.
Elinski filed a complaint, then a first amended complaint against Palm Colony Homeowners Association, Karen Vaughn, the association's manager, the County of Ventura, the Ventura County Sheriff's Department, Deputies Novak and Beauvais, and Sheriff Robert Brooks. The court sustained the demurrers of the association, Karen Vaughn and Sheriff Brooks. (Ante, fn. 1.) Subsequently the court granted summary judgment to the remaining defendants. This appeal challenges the summary judgments in favor of the public entity defendants.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
"We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. [Citation.] We make 'an independent assessment of the correctness of the trial court's ruling, applying the same legal standard as the trial court in determining whether there are any genuine issues of material fact or whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' [Citation.] A defendant moving for summary judgment meets its burden of showing that there is no merit to a cause of action by showing that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action. [Citation.] Once the defendant has made such a showing, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or as to a defense to the cause of action." (Moser v. Ratinoff (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1216-1217.)
Elinski's argument that California's summary judgment procedure is unconstitutional was not raised in the trial court and is devoid of merit. (See, e.g., Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Const. Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 70 [summary judgment procedure does not violate a litigant's constitutional right to a jury trial].)
Summary Judgment on the Tort Claims Was Proper
Elinski's briefs contain no coherent argument or citation to authority supporting his contention that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on his claims for false arrest, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy. As his briefs contain no reasoned argument or legal authority to support his contentions, we treat his claims as waived. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793; Jones v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 92, 99; Stokes v. Henson (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 187, 196.)
Summary Judgment on the Civil Rights Claim Was Proper
Elinski's arguments concerning the alleged civil rights violations, while more lengthy, are no more substantial than his arguments concerning the tort claims and can be disposed of summarily. Where, as here, the evidence shows that the police officers had lawful cause to arrest and used no unnecessary force, the arrest cannot support a claim of violation of civil rights. Allegations that the police engaged in "Un-American conduct" and were "Rogue Deputy Sheriffs" are insufficient to show a civil rights violation. (See, e.g., Caballero v. City of Concord (9th Cir. 1992) 956 F.2d 204, 206 ["'An officer's evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable [arrest] . . .'"].) The fact that Elinski did not have drugs in his system at the time of the arrest is of no consequence in determining the validity of the arrest. "The Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested. If it did, [42 U.S.C. §] 1983 would provide a cause of action for every defendant acquitted—indeed, for every suspect released." (Baker v. McCollan (1979) 443 U.S. 137, 145.)
As the arrest was lawful, respondents were immune from liability. (See, e.g., Venegas v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 32 Cal.4th 820, 840-841 [without a showing that a reasonable officer would believe his conduct was clearly unlawful, deputies are immune from liability].)
Elinksi's argument that the urine test he took at the police station was unconstitutional also is without merit. Requiring an arrestee to submit to a urine test is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (United States v. Edmo (9th Cir. 1998) 140 F.3d 1289, 1291.)
Appellant's Objections to the Court's Determination of Undisputed Facts Are Without Merit
Elinksi contends the trial court made numerous errors in ruling on the evidence and his objections to respondents' evidence. Elinksi's arguments for the most part are of little assistance to this court. The trial court found that respondents were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law based on governmental immunities and on facts that either were not disputed by Elinski or disputed without evidentiary support. No further discussion is required.
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover costs on appeal.
We concur: GILBERT, P.J., YEGAN, J.