The fact that his employer also required him to occasionally do other, non-supervisory tasks does not change the fundamental nature of his work.”); Elias v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-18-00200-TUC-RCC (DTF), 2019 WL 4296779, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 11, 2019) (“The data entry work, being 70%, was the fundamental nature of the work.

However, district courts generally consider the “fundamental nature” of the work at issue, focusing on how much time a plaintiff spends doing the tasks claimed to support a composite-job finding. Dora L. v. Kijakazi, 2021 WL 4502722, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2021) (citing Stacy v. Colvin, 825 F.3d 563, 570 (9th Cir. 2016)); Elias v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 2019 WL 4296779, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 11, 2019) (“Here, the work had a comparable job in the national economy because the fundamental nature of the work resembled that of a data entry clerk.”)

Dora L. v. Kijakazi, No. 2:20-CV-01493-SP, 2021 WL 4502722, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2021) (citing Stacy v. Colvin, 825 F.3d 563, 570 (9th Cir. 2016)); Elias v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV 18-00200-TUC-RCC (DTF), 2019 WL 4296779, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 11, 2019) (“Here, the work had a comparable job in the national economy because the fundamental nature of the work resembled that of a data entry clerk.”)

When confronted with similar factual records, district courts in the Ninth Circuit and elsewhere have upheld administrative decisions against arguments that a claimant's past relevant work was really a composite job. See, e.g., Dora L. v. Kijakazi, 2021 WL 4502722, at *13-14 (medium lifting requirements in a job generally performed with light exertion did not render the job composite where the lifting requirements were “incidental to the main job” and the claimant failed to present any evidence tending to show that the requirements constituted “a significant part of her job”); Elias v. Comm'r, 2019 WL 4296779, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 11, 2019) (those job responsibilities which were performed 70 percent of the time constituted “the fundamental nature of the work”); King v. Comm'r, 2019 WL 643715, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 2019) (“even though Plaintiff testified that her past relevant work as a management trainee had some duties relating to stocking merchandise, she has not established that her main duties included those of a stock clerk and a management trainee”); Driskill v. Colvin, 2014 WL 3734309, at *8 (W.D. Wash. July 28, 2014) (“Her job as actually performed did include stocking and cleaning, duties that are not mentioned in the DOT description of the waitress job, but there is no evidence that these duties constituted a significant portion of her work rendering the DOT's definition inapplicable”). Furthermore, although Plaintiff argues for a finding that her past relevant work was a compo

A court or litigant may cite to unpublished Ninth Circuit opinions issued on or after January 1, 2007. U.S. Ct. App. 9th Cir. R. 36-3(b); Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a). See Elias v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., Civ. No. 18-00200-TUC-RCC, 2019 WL 4296779, at *3 (D. Ariz. Sept. 11, 2019)("POMS is not binding on the ALJ."); James v. Saul, Civ. No. 19-cv-5881-KS, 2020 WL 3491565, at *10 (C.D. Cal., June 25, 2020) (HALLEX and POMS "are not binding on ALJs and are not legally enforceable by federal courts."). While the Court agrees that medical experts should not present their testimony before a claimant testifies, to the extent that constituted legal error in this case, it was harmless.

Plaintiff's argument that SSR 13-2p establishes a requirement that the ALJ is required to explain his decision in light of the factors set out in POMS and/or the HALLEX also has been rejected by district courts in the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., Jeanne E.[ v. Saul, No. 6:18-CV-01722-SB,] 2020 WL 602279, at *5 (D. Or. Feb. 7, 2020); Hanh L. v. Comm'r, 2019 WL 5858187, at *5 ("SSR 13-2p, which Plaintiff cites in support of the argument that POMS is binding on Agency adjudicators ... is inapplicable here and does not change this Court's application of Lockwood."); Martinez v. Colvin, No. 6:14-cv-01703-MC, 2016 WL 270911, at *5 (D. Or. Jan. 20, 2016); Kathleen S., 2020 WL 353602, at *7; Elias v. Comm'r, No. CV-18-00200-TUC-RCC (DTF), 2019 WL 4296779, at *3 (D. Ariz. Sept. 11, 2019); Hollen v. Comm'r, No. 15-2357, 2017 WL 1075194, at *8-*9 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2017).Id.

Plaintiff's argument that SSR 13-2p establishes a requirement that the ALJ is required to explain his decision in light of the factors set out in POMS and/or the HALLEX also has been rejected by district courts in the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., Jeanne E., 2020 WL 602279, at *5; Hanh L. v. Comm'r, 2019 WL 5858187, at *5 ("SSR 13-2p, which Plaintiff cites in support of the argument that POMS is binding on Agency adjudicators . . . is inapplicable here and does not change this Court's application of Lockwood."); Martinez v. Colvin, No. 6:14-cv-01703-MC, 2016 WL 270911, at *5 (D. Or. Jan. 20, 2016); Kathleen S., 2020 WL 353602, at *7; Elias v. Comm'r, No. CV-18-00200-TUC-RCC (DTF), 2019 WL 4296779, at *3 (D. Ariz. Sept. 11, 2019); Hollen v. Comm'r, No. 15-2357, 2017 WL 1075194, at *8-*9 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2017). The Court adopts the reasoning of these cases and concludes POMS and the HALLEX do "not carry the force of law and, therefore, the Court need not 'review allegations of non-compliance with it.'"

Moreover, the contention that SSR 13-2p overrides the holdings of Roberts and Lockwood has been rejected by other district courts in this Circuit, including another court in this district. See Elias v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 2019 WL 4296779, at *3 (D. Ariz. Sept. 11, 2019); Hanh L. v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 2019 WL 5858187, at *5 (D. Or. July 23, 2019), Report and Recommendation Adopted by 2019 WL 5858182 (D. Or. Sept. 3, 2019); Hollen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2017 WL 1075194, at *8-*9 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2017); Martinez v. Colvin, 2016 WL 270911, at *5 (D. Or. Jan. 20, 2016). Indeed, in Hollen, 2017 WL 1075194, at *8-*9, the Southern District of California case, the plaintiff likewise was arguing that the ALJ had erred by failing to follow a HALLEX procedure for procuring testimony from a medical expert and that Lockwood no longer was binding as it was decided prior to SSR 13-2p.