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concluding that "the rule does not require a venue to be the location of the `most substantial' or even the `more substantial' part of the events"
Summary of this case from United States Schools of Golf, Inc. v. Biltmore Golf, Inc. (S.D.Ind. 2005)Opinion
1:03-cv-00520-LJM-WTL
March 19, 2004
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS OR TRANSFER
This matter is before the Court on a motion by defendants, Gerald R. Crabtree ("Dr. Crabtree") and Jorge Plutzky ("Dr. Plutzky") (collectively "Defendants"), to dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction and improper venue, or in the alternative, to transfer the action to the Northern District of California. For the reasons discussed herein, Defendants' motion is DENIED.
I. FACTUAL HISTORY
Plaintiff, Eli Lilly and Company ("Lilly"), located in Indianapolis, Indiana, owns patents for inventions relation to human protein C and its uses (the "Patents"). The Patents are U.S. Patent Nos. 4,775,624; 5,151,268; and 5,270,040. Dr. Crabtree is a professor in the School of Medicine in the Department of Pathology at Stanford University in Palo Alto, California. Deposition of Gerald Crabtree, M.D. ("Dr. Crabtree Dep.") at 9-10. Dr. Crabtree also lives in California. Id. Dr. Plutzky is an assistant professor of the School of Medicine of Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and is a cardiologist and Director of the Vascular Disease Prevention Program at Brigham and Women's Hospital in Boston, Massachusetts. Declaration of Jorge Plutzky, M.D. ("Dr. Plutzky Decl") ¶ 2. Dr. Plutzky also lives in Massachusetts. Id. In the 1980s, Dr. Plutzky accepted a one-year appointment to work with Dr. Crabtree in Dr. Crabtree's Maryland lab. Id. ¶ 4. At that time, Dr. Crabtree was a Senior Investigator at the National Institute of Health ("NIH") in Bethesda, Maryland. Declaration of Gerald R. Crabtree, M.D. ("Dr. Crabtree Decl.") ¶ 3.
In the early 1980's, Dr. Nils Bang, a Lilly scientist, approached Dr. Crabtree at a scientific conference at which Dr. Crabtree had spoken. Id. ¶ 5. Dr. Bang wanted to discuss the uses and isolation of human protein C. Id. At another scientific conference during the early 1980s, Dr. George Long, another Lilly scientist, told Dr. Crabtree that Lilly was having difficulty isolating the human clone of protein C. Id.Later, Dr. Long called Dr. Crabtree at the NIH lab in Maryland to discuss potential approaches to isolating human protein C, and the two doctors agreed that Dr. Crabtree would collaborate with Lilly on that and related issues. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. Lilly characterizes the agreement as an "informal" agreement for Dr. Crabtree to provide Lilly with his consulting services. Opposition to Motion to Dismiss or Transfer ("Opp.") at 5. The agreement provided for Defendants to use the probes received from Lilly, work to isolate human protein C genes, and then report the results to Lilly exclusively. Dr. Crabtree Dep. at 20; Dr. Plutzky Dep. at 35.
Defendants worked on the isolation project in Maryland. Dr. Crabtree Dep. at 48. Defendants had telephone conversations with Dr. Long in Indianapolis concerning the research. Dr. Crabtree Dep. at 6-8; Dr. Plutzky Dep. at 9, 19. In 1983, Dr. Crabtree visited Lilly in Indianapolis for a "conventional scientific presentation." Dr. Crabtree Dep. at 9-12. During the visit, Dr. Crabtree discussed with some Lilly employees the "possibility of trying to identify and clone Protein C." Id. at 11-12. In 1984, Dr. Plutzky, at Dr. Crabtree's direction, sent some DNA material containing human protein C to Dr. Long at Lilly. Dr. Crabtree Dep. at 112-13. Also in 1984, Lilly scientist Dr. Sheila Little spent two weeks at Dr. Crabtree's lab in Maryland to learn methods of expressing human protein C. Id. at 77-78, 85-87. Dr. Crabtree traveled to Lilly, at Dr. Bang's invitation, to discuss protein C. Id. at 51.
In 1984, Dr. Crabtree moved his lab from Maryland to Stanford University. Dr. Crabtree Decl. ¶ 9. He remained a paid consultant of Lilly's, working on Interleuken-2 cell signaling, T-cell proliferation, and on gene expression. Declaration of Robert A. Gadski ("Gadski Decl.") ¶ 6. After sequencing the clones Dr. Plutzky had sent Lilly, Lilly transmitted the sequences to Dr. Crabtree's lab at Stanford. Dr. Crabtree Dep. at 33, 58. Dr. Plutzky used these sequences to verify some of Defendants' work. Dr. Plutzky Dep. at 33-34. Dr. Plutzky's lab notebooks either are with Dr. Plutzky in Massachusetts or at Dr. Plutzky's counsel's office in Georgia. Id. at 7.
In 1985, Lilly and Stanford entered into a contract whereby Dr. Crabtree's lab would investigate the use of novel mammalian host-vector systems to express protein C efficiently and continue Interleuken-2 research. Pltf's Ex. M, "Stanford Agreement," App. B. The contract, to which Dr. Crabtree was not a party, states that it "shall be construed and the rights of the parties determined in accordance with the laws of California." Id. § 7.05.
It does not appear that Dr. Crabtree's Interleukin-2 research was related to the human protein C project.
Dr. Crabtree visited Lilly in Indianapolis in 1985, at Lilly's invitation to attend the opening of a new molecular biology building. Dr. Crabtree Dep. at 48. In 1986, Dr. Crabtree visited Lilly again, to give a presentation on his Interleukin-2 research. Id. at 16, 49-50. While visiting Lilly, Dr. Crabtree also spoke with individuals at Lilly regarding his protein C research. Id. at 16-17. Also during this visit, Dr. Crabtree met with Dr. Steve Zuckerman of Lilly to discuss additional Interleukin-2 research proposals. Id. at 73. This meeting and the resulting proposal prompted Lilly to renew its contract with Stanford, for the purpose of continuing Dr. Crabtree's Interleukin-2 cell research. Dr. Crabtree Dep. at 46, 75-76. Dr. Crabtree may also have visited Lilly in Indianapolis in 1990. Declaration of Andrew Glasebrook ¶ 6. Dr. Crabtree engaged in as many as fifteen or twenty telephone calls with Lilly scientists in Indiana. Dr. Crabtree Dep. at 66.
Dr. Plutzky traveled to Lilly in November, 2002, to present research unrelated to human protein C. Dr. Plutzky Dep. at 36. Leading up to that visit, Dr. Plutzky met with Lilly scientists at various scientific meetings. Id. at 38. Dr. Plutzky continued to work with Dr. Crabtree on the human protein C project after Dr. Crabtree moved to California. Dr. Plutzky Decl. ¶ 6. Dr. Crabtree worked on the human protein C research until 1989. Dr. Crabtree Decl. ¶ 14.
Defendants and Dr. Long, along with others, jointly authored at least two articles for publication on the topic on human protein C. Dr. Crabtree Dep. at 53, 60. The joint writing process included passing drafts back and forth via fax and mail. Id. at 53-54. Dr. Plutzky wrote the draft of the second article, and sent copies to Dr. Crabtree and Dr. Long for comment. Dr. Plutzky Dep. at 50-52. Defendants also drafted an unpublished manuscript, listing Dr. Long as a co-author. Dr. Crabtree Dep. at 66-67. Finally, Defendants and Dr. Long collaborated on a presentation on the human protein C research in December 1984. Id. 68-70.
Defendants first learned of the Patents in 2001, when Lilly's legal counsel called Dr. Crabtree to seek his help with an interference proceeding concerning whether Lilly was the first to discover the human protein C gene. Dr. Crabtree Decl. ¶ 15. Dr. Crabtree then called Dr. Plutzky to inform him of the Patents, as well as John Schwartz, Stanford's former general counsel. Id. In July 2002, Defendants corresponded with Lilly regarding their belief that they should be listed as inventors on the Patents. Id. ¶ 17. In that letter, Defendants stated: "We brought this information to the attention of Lilly more than a year ago . . . and had hoped for an honest, ethical consideration by Lilly without the necessity of initiating formal proceedings." Pltf's Ex. C. Lilly responded by requesting more documentation to support Defendants' claim. Dr. Crabtree Dec. ¶ 18. In April, 2003, the parties began settlement negotiations. Id. 20. The parties negotiated a confidentiality agreement so that settlement offers and positions could be freely exchanged "to resolve potential disputes." Declaration of John Schwartz ("Schwartz Decl.") ¶ 6.
Lilly alleges that at the time it filed its Complaint, Defendants had threatened Lilly with a lawsuit seeking to be named as co-inventors of the Patents, and for damages. Compl. ¶ 14. Lilly claims that Mr. Schwartz told Lilly's patent counsel that Lilly's time to negotiate had run out, and that Defendants had no choice but to file a lawsuit. Declaration of Brian Barrett, Esq. ("Barrett Decl.") ¶ 16. Defendants deny they threatened litigation. Supplemental Declaration of John Schwartz ¶ 3. Defendants claim that Mr. Schwartz informed Lilly's counsel that Defendants were not threatening litigation. Schwartz Decl. ¶ 7, 9. On May 7, 2003, Lilly refused to counter Defendants' demand. Dr. Crabtree Decl. ¶ 20. Lilly had filed this declaratory action on April 11, 2003, and served Defendants on August 6, 2003. Lilly primarily seeks a judgment that the designated inventors on the Patents are the true inventors and that Defendants should not be named as inventors on the Patents. Compl. ¶ 24. Defendants filed a suit against Lilly in the Northern District of California on August 12, 2002, in which they seek to be added as inventors to the Patents. Pltfs' EX.B.
II. STANDARD
Defendants seeks to dismiss this case pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(b)(3), or in the alternative, seek to have the action transferred to the Northern District of California, where Defendants' lawsuit is pending against Lilly.The party asserting subject-matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving it exists. United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 946 (7th Cir. 2003). The Court will accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the Complaint and draw all reasonable conclusions in favor of the plaintiff. See Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698, 701 (7th Cir. 2003). On a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, it is appropriate for the Court to look beyond the jurisdictional allegations of the Complaint and consider other evidence the parties have submitted. Id.
Likewise, when a defendant challenges personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating jurisdiction exists. Health Mgmt. Prof'ls, Inc. v. Diversified Bus. Enters., Inc., 882 F. Supp. 795, 797 (S.D. Ind. 1995). A court may receive and consider affidavits and other documentary evidence when making a ruling regarding jurisdiction. RAR, Inc. v. Turner Diesel, Ltd., 107 F.3d 1272, 1275 (7th Cir. 1997); Nelson v. Park Indus., Inc., 717 F.2d 1120, 1124 (7th Cir. 1983). However, the Court must accept as true all of a plaintiff's undenied factual assertions and resolve in its favor any disputes regarding relevant facts. See RAR, Inc., 107 F.3d at 1275; Neiman v. Rudolf Wolff Co., 619 F.2d 1189, 1191 (7th Cir. 1980).
Plaintiffs also bear the burden of proving the venue is proper, where a defendant has moved for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3). Better v. MacDermid, Inc., No. EV 01-210-C H/H, 2002 WL 31045377, *1 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 9, 2002). The Court may consider evidence outside the Complaint. Id. Again, the Court will take as true all of the plaintiff's allegations that are not disputed by Defendants' evidence, and will resolve all factual dispute in favor of the plaintiff. Id.
III. DISCUSSION
A. SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION
Defendants argue that the Court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction because no "case of actual controversy" existed at the time Lilly filed its Complaint. The Declaratory Judgment Act, under which Lilly brought this suit, states: "In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, . . . any court of the United States . . . may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration." 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (a).
When determining whether an actual controversy exists, the question is whether there is a controversy between parties with adverse legal interests "of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant issuance of a declaratory judgment." In re VMS Sec. Litig., 103 F.3d 1317, 1327 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)). A court will not abuse its discretion to exercise jurisdiction over a complaint for declaratory relief, where the plaintiff had a reasonable apprehension that it would be sued. See id.; Dainippon Screen Mfg. Co, Ltd. v. CFMT, Inc., 142 F.3d 1266, 1273 (7th Cir. 1998). The Court should view the facts as they existed at the time the Complaint was filed, looking at the totality of the circumstances. See In re VMS Sec. Litig., 103 F.3d at 1327.
Lilly alleges in its Complaint that Defendants had threatened Lilly with a lawsuit to be named as co-inventors on the Patents. Compl. ¶ 14. Specifically, Defendants first approached Lilly with the claim that they should be named as inventors. Dr. Crabtree Decl. ¶ 17. Then Defendants sent Lilly's counsel a letter stating that they had hoped for an amicable resolution without having to resort to legal proceedings. Pltfs' Ex. C. The parties attempted to negotiate a resolution. However, at some point, Defendants informed Lilly's counsel that Lilly's time had run out, and that Defendants would have no choice but to file a lawsuit against Lilly. Barrett Decl. ¶ 16.
Although Defendants dispute that they specifically threatened litigation, the Court must resolve factual conflicts in favor of Lilly. Viewing the totality of the circumstances at the time the Complaint was filed, Lilly was reasonable in its apprehension that Defendants would file a lawsuit against it. The parties had adverse legal interests, as is demonstrated by their attempts to negotiate, and Defendants showed a willingness to assert their legal position in court. An actual, immediate controversy existed that gives the Court subject matter-jurisdiction over the dispute.
B. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
The Court has diversity jurisdiction over this case only if the Indiana state courts would have jurisdiction. See Wilson v. Humphrey (Cayman) Ltd., 916 F.2d 1239, 1243 (7th Cir. 1990). The determination of personal jurisdiction involves two steps. First, the Court must determine whether the state's "long-arm jurisdiction" statute allows jurisdiction and, second, whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process. NUCOR Corp. v. Aceros Y Maquilas De Occidente, S.A., 28 F.3d 572, 580 (7th Cir. 1994). Indiana's jurisdiction statute is Indiana Rule of Procedure 4.4(A). Rule 4.4(A) designates eight bases for a defendant's contacts that would allow the Court to move to the constitutional inquiry. Ind. R. Civ. P. 4.4(A). Rule 4.4(A) was amended effective January 1, 2003, to include the following: "[A] court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitutions of this state or the United States."
The parties disagree as to whether the amendment to Rule 4.4(A) applies retroactively. The Seventh Circuit has not had occasion to decide this question. See Purdue Research Found, v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 779-80 (7th Cir. 2003) (declining to decide the question of retroactivity). However, the Indiana Court of Appeals has decided that the amended rule did not apply to a case that was filed before January 1, 2003. Saler v. Irick, 800 N.E.2d 960, 965 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003). The court noted that generally a new rule will apply only to cases filed after the rule is announced. Id. (citing Sneed v. Associated Group Ins., 663 N.E.2d 789, 795 (Ind.Ct.App. 1996). Because this case was filed after January 1, 2003, the amended rule applies.
Thus, this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants to the limit allowed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Jurisdiction requires that Defendants have had "minimum contacts with [Indiana] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend `traditional notions of fair play and sabstantialjustice.'" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). A defendant's contacts must be purposeful and create a "substantial connection" with the forum state. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985).
Thus where the defendant "deliberately" has engaged in significant activities within a State, . . . or has created "continuing obligations" between himself and the residents of the forum, . . . he manifestly has availed himself of the privilege of conducting business, and because his activities are shielded by "the benefits and protections" of the forum's laws it is presumptively not unreasonable to require him to submit to the burdens of litigation in that forum as well.Id. at 475-76. (citations omitted).
Specific jurisdiction exists when the litigation arises from the business conducted in the forum state. Specific jurisdiction comports with due process where the defendant, from his activities in the forum state, should have anticipated being haled into court in that state and "purposefully availed" himself of the "privilege of conducting activities" in Indiana. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). It must be the activity of the defendant in the forum state that creates jurisdiction, not the conduct of the plaintiff or a third party. See Purdue Research Found., 338 F.3d at 780. Defendants argue that they did not have contacts of the character, quality or consistency required to establish jurisdiction.
Lilly does not argue that the Court has general jurisdiction over Defendants.
1. Dr. Crabtree
By his long-term collaboration with Lilly and his purposeful interaction with Lilly, Dr. Crabtree established the minimum contacts necessary to give this Court jurisdiction over him Dr. Crabtree had an informal consulting agreement with Lilly, whereby he and Dr. Plutzky would receive probes from Lilly, work to isolate human protein C genes, and then report the results exclusively to Lilly. Dr. Crabtree Dep. at 20; Dr. Plutzky Dep. at 35. Dr. Crabtree engaged in numerous telephone conversations with Lilly scientists regarding his research, and traveled to Indianapolis at Lilly's invitation to discuss protein C. Dr. Crabtree Dep. at 6-8, 51, 66. Dr. Crabtree also spoke with Lilly scientists about his human protein C research on two other visits to Indianapolis, although the purpose of those visits appears to be unrelated to the protein C work. See id. at 9-12, 16-17.
By virtue of his exclusive collaboration agreement with Lilly, and the activities Dr. Crabtree engaged in to further that collaboration, Dr. Crabtree essentially "created `continuing obligations' between himself and Lilly. See Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475-76. Defendants argue that Dr. Crabtree's contacts were not created deliberately, but rather that Lilly initiated the relationship between itself and Dr. Crabtree. Lilly scientists may have first requested Dr. Crabtree's assistance and may have offered the invitations to visit Indianapolis, but in light of Dr. Crabtree's response it would be unfair to characterize the relationship as "unilateral."
Defendants also argue that Dr. Crabtree never engaged in business or provided services in Indiana. However, Dr. Crabtree's agreement with Lilly is an arrangement for him to provide research and reporting services to Lilly in Indianapolis. Certainly Dr. Crabtree benefitted from conducting activities within Indianapolis and for his activities conducted elsewhere that serviced the Indianapolis resident. After Dr. Crabtree moved his lab to California he continued his work with Lilly on the human protein C. Dr. Crabtree received sequences from Lilly of the clones he and Dr. Plutzky had created, and Dr. Plutzky used these sequences to verify the Defendants' work. Dr. Crabtree Dep. at 33, 58; Dr. Plutzky Dep. at 33-34. Later, pursuant to a contract between Lilly and Stanford, Dr. Crabtree continued his protein C work for Lilly. Pltf's Ex.M.
Compounding these contacts, Dr. Crabtree also collaborated with Dr. Long on articles for publication on the topic of human protein C. Dr. Crabtree Dep. at 53, 60. The collaborative writing process included passing drafts back and forth via fax and mail. Id. at 53-54. Dr. Crabtree also worked with Dr. Long on a human protein C research presentation. Id. at 68-70.
With minimum contacts established, the Court must also look at whether exercise of jurisdiction would comport with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320. Some of the factors to consider under this standard are: "the burden on the defendant, the forum States' interests in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff's interests in obtaining convenient and effective relief, the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared interest of the states in furthering substantive social policies." Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 472. In balancing these factors, courts routinely apply a "sliding scale approach," evaluating the fairness factors in light of the strength of the minimum contacts. Anderson v. Sportmart, Inc., 57 F. Supp.2d 651, 661 (N.D. Ind. 1999).
Dr. Crabtree's contacts with Indiana are strong enough to tip the balance in favor of jurisdiction. Defendants have failed to demonstrate that litigation in Indiana would shoulder them with an unreasonably heavy burden. In fact, Dr. Plutzky is in Massachusetts, so it seems Indiana, being closer, would be even less burdensome for him than California. Lilly's claims are federal, so no particular state has a stronger interest in the litigation than any other. As discussed below in relation to venue, Dr. Crabtree and Stanford are the only witnesses located in California. Dr. Plutzky's lab notebooks are located either in Massachusetts or Georgia. Dr. Plutzky Dep. at 7. The fairness factors set forth in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzuwicz "rarely will justify a determination against personal jurisdiction." Purdue Research Found., 338 F.3d at 781 n. 10. It is appropriate for this Court to exercise its jurisdiction over Dr. Crabtree in this case.
2. Dr. Plutzky
By nature of his agreement to collaborate with Lilly on the very project that became the subject of the Patents at issue in this case, Dr. Plutzky also established the minimal contacts with Indiana necessary for this Court to have jurisdiction over him. Dr. Plutzky took part in the research and in the reporting of results exclusively to Lilly. Dr. Plutzky sent Lilly DNA material containing human protein C. Dr. Crabtree Dep. at 112-13. Dr. Plutzky then used Lilly's sequencing of this material to verify Defendants' research. Dr. Plutzky Dep. at 33-34. Dr. Plutzky also engaged in telephone conversations with Lilly scientists regarding the human protein C research. Id. at 9, 19. Like Dr. Crabtree, Dr. Plutzky engaged in a relationship with Lilly that created ongoing mutual obligations. Dr. Plutzky purposefully engaged in activities directed toward Lilly in Indiana. Dr. Plutzky also participated in the collaborative writing process of the articles and presentation on the human protein C research. Dr. Crabtree Dep. at 53, 60, 68-70.Dr. Plutzky's lack of physical presence in Indiana related to the human protein C research is not fatal to this Court's litigation. See Purdue Research Found., 338 F.3d at 781. "A substantial amount of business is transacted solely by mail and wire communications across state lines, thus obviating the need for physical presence within a State in which business is conducted." Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476. For many of the same reasons this Court has jurisdiction over Dr. Crabtree, is has jurisdiction over Dr. Plutzky.
C. VENUE
Having established that this Court has both subject-matter and personal jurisdiction in this case, the Court must also address Defendants' argument that the Southern District of Indiana is not the proper venue. Defendants request, if the Court does not dismiss the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction or improper venue, for transfer to the Northern District of California.
Where jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity, a case may be brought in "a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). With this rule as guidance, Indiana is a more appropriate venue than California. First, the Complaint is for a declaration that Defendants should not be listed as inventors on the Patents, and that Lilly scientists are the sole inventors of the patents. Lilly drafted the applications for the Patents in Indianapolis. Pltf's Ex. O at 6. To support its claim that Lilly scientists are the sole inventors, Lilly will have to demonstrate that all the contributions to the Patents were made by Lilly scientists, which contributions would have been made in Indianapolis. Further, the property that is the subject of this suit, the Patents, is located in Indianapolis. See Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1994) discussing Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1975) (explaining that the holding in Honeywell can be and has been read to mean that "the situs of the injury is the situs of the intangible property interest, which is determined by where the patent owner resides").
It is true that if Defendants' work contributed to the Patents then some of the events giving rise to the claims occurred outside of Indiana. However, it cannot reasonably be said that a "substantial part" of the events occurred in California. It is not apparent that any more activity occurred in California, after Dr. Crabtree moved his lab there in 1984, than occurred in Maryland. Even if a "substantial part" of the events took place in California, the rule does not require a venue to be the location of the "most substantial" or even the "more substantial" part of the events. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 cmt. ("The fact that substantial activities took place in district B does not disqualify district A as proper venue as long as "substantial" activities took place in A, too.").
Finally, Defendants argue that "for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interests of justice" the Court should transfer venue to California. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The decision to transfer is within the Court's sound discretion. Coffey v. Van Dorn Iron Works, 796 F.2d 217, 219 (7th Cir. 1986). Dr. Plutzky is located in Massachusetts, so California would not be any more convenient of a forum for him than Indiana. As for the convenience of witnesses, aside from Dr. Crabtree, the only witness that appears to be located in California is Stanford. As discussed, for Lilly to present it's prima facie case that the total contributions to the Patents came from Lilly scientists, it will primarily, if not completely, rely on witnesses in Indiana. Defendants consistently have argued that the parties' disputes should be litigated in California so that all the parties' claims can be consolidated in one case. However, most, if not all, of Defendants' alleged injuries can be redressed in the Southern District of Indiana as counter-claims. See Pltf's Ex. B. Of the ten causes of action Defendants have brought against Lilly in California, only one relates specifically to California law. Id. Defendants have not shown that the Northern District of California is a more appropriate forum than this Court.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court has found that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over this declaratory action, and that the Court may properly exercise personal jurisdiction over each Defendant. Further, the Southern District of Indiana is the appropriate venue for this case. Defendants' motion to dismiss or to transfer is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.