Elfelt v. Cooper

12 Citing cases

  1. Marshall v. Marshall

    921 F. Supp. 641 (D. Minn. 1996)   Cited 2 times

    The second is nearly identical to the facts presented here and is on all fours with this Court's rationale. In Elfelt v. Cooper, 168 Wis.2d 1008, 485 N.W.2d 56 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 908, 113 S.Ct. 1251, 122 L.Ed.2d 650 (1993), the IRS had filed a tax lien on the husband's portion of jointly held homestead property. The IRS subsequently sold that portion following a § 6331 administrative levy proceeding.

  2. O'Hagan v. United States

    86 F.3d 776 (8th Cir. 1996)   Cited 37 times
    Holding that section 7421 "prohibits federal courts from entertaining any action filed to restrain the assessment or collection of taxes"

    At least one court, in addition to the district court in the present case, has held that the IRS cannot convey a property right that could not have been conveyed under the applicable state law. Elfelt v. Cooper, 485 N.W.2d 56 (Wis. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 908 (1993). In a case factually similar to the one before us, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that because the tax delinquent spouse would not have been able to convey his interest in the homestead property under Wisconsin law, "the IRS, which merely steps into [the tax delinquent spouse's] shoes, also cannot convey any interest of the jointly held spousal homestead without either [the innocent spouse's] consent or court action."

  3. United States v. Librizzi

    108 F.3d 136 (7th Cir. 1997)   Cited 13 times
    Holding that the value of a federal tax lien was not fixed at the dollar value of the taxpayer's interest in the property at the time of his death

    Once state law has been used to determine the nature and existence of a property interest, further state law is inoperative, and the tax consequences thenceforth are dictated by federal law. Elfelt v. Cooper, 485 N.W.2d 56, 61 (Wis. 1992) (citations omitted). Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Rodgers that "once a lien has attached to an interest in property, the lien cannot be extinguished (assuming proper filing and the like) simply by a transfer or conveyance of the interest."

  4. Weber v. Weber

    176 Wis. 2d 1085 (Wis. 1993)   Cited 13 times
    Regarding interpretations of federal rules of civil procedure to comparable state rules of civil procedure

    Cumps v. Kiyo, 104 Wis. 656, 662, 80 N.W. 937 (1899). See also Elfelt v. Cooper, 168 Wis.2d 1008, 1021, 485 N.W.2d 56 (1992) ( quoting Cumps). Consistent with this statement of policy, this court in Glinski v. Sheldon, concluded that "the legislature, by the enactment of sec. 706.04, did not intend to defeat the raising of the homestead defense in an action based upon the real estate contract" and consequently exempted the homestead signature requirement from the scope of sec. 706.04. Glinski, 88 Wis.2d 509, 522, 276 N.W.2d 815 (1979). See also State Bank of Drummond, 93 Wis.2d at 157.

  5. Wilson v. Trisco

    726 N.W.2d 357 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006)

    ¶ 29 In enforcing discovery requirements, "[t]he imposition of sanctions pursuant to sec. 804.12, Stats., is discretionary with the trial court." Elfelt v. Cooper, 163 Wis. 2d 484, 498, 471 N.W.2d 303 (Ct.App. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 168 Wis. 2d 1009, 485 N.W.2d 56 (1992) (citation omitted). We review whether discovery sanctions are appropriate under an erroneous exercise of discretion standard.

  6. Wilson v. Trisco

    726 N.W.2d 357 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006)

    ¶ 29 In enforcing discovery requirements, "[t]he imposition of sanctions pursuant to sec. 804.12, Stats., is discretionary with the trial court." Elfelt v. Cooper, 163 Wis. 2d 484, 498, 471 N.W.2d 303 (Ct.App. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 168 Wis. 2d 1009, 485 N.W.2d 56 (1992) (citation omitted). We review whether discovery sanctions are appropriate under an erroneous exercise of discretion standard.

  7. Nettesheim v. S.G. New Age Products, Inc.

    2005 WI App. 169 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 14 times

    As tenants in common, the owners of Outlot 1 have the right to sell their interests outright. See, e.g., Elfelt v. Cooper, 168 Wis. 2d 1008, 1023, 485 N.W.2d 56 (1992). They also, as New Age asserts, have the right to sell or convey fractional parts of their undivided interest in the whole property.

  8. CVW, Ltd. v. Stress ex rel. Stress

    230 Wis. 2d 450 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 1 times

    In applying the Internal Revenue Code, as we must here, "state law determines the nature of the legal interest which the taxpayer had in the homestead property," and "[o]nce state law has been used to determine the nature and existence of a property interest, further state law is inoperative, and the tax consequences thenceforth are dictated by federal law." Elfelt v.Cooper, 168 Wis.2d 1008, 1019-20, 485 N.W.2d 56, 61 (1992). In Wisconsin, the general rule of priorities is that "the lien of a judgment is superior to all conveyances . . . and liens on the debtor's land which are made or accrue after the judgment lien has been attached."

  9. Forest County v. Goode

    215 Wis. 2d 218 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 9 times

    Upon finding the relevant facts, a court properly exercises discretion when it applies those facts to the appropriate law, and reaches a reasoned result. See Elfelt v. Cooper, 163 Wis.2d 484, 498-99, 471 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Ct.App. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 168 Wis.2d 1008, 485 N.W.2d 56 (1992). "However, where it has been clear that the offending building or structure could not be utilized for any purpose permitted in the pertinent zoning district, relief has been extended to include an order for the removal of the building or structure."

  10. In re Marriage of Taylor

    Case No. 95-3034 (Wis. Ct. App. Jul. 31, 1996)

    If the record is sufficient, we can decide as a matter of law whether a reasonable attorney should have known that the action was without a proper basis in law. Elfelt v. Cooper, 163 Wis.2d 484, 501, 471 N.W.2d 303, 310 (Ct.App. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 168 Wis.2d 1008, 485 N.W.2d 56 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1251 (1993). The standard is an objective one: whether the attorney knew or should have known that the position taken was frivolous as determined by what a reasonable attorney would have known or should have known under the same or similar circumstances.