This court has held that proceedings instituted three and one-half weeks, and even four weeks after seizure, were "prompt" under this section. See Eleven Automobiles v. State, 384 So.2d 1129 (Ala.Civ.App. 1980). As to Milstid's second issue, we note that ยง 20-2-93 does not provide or require a timetable as to when hearings on petitions for forfeiture are to be held.
The official comment to Section 32-8-39(d) states that: "a certificate of title is only prima facie evidence of ownership, which can be contradicted by other evidence." Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Fulmer, 376 So.2d 748 (Ala.Civ.App. 1979); (bill of sale from seller who did not have any title in vehicle was insufficient to overcome prima facie evidence of ownership established by certificate of title); City Car Sales, Inc. v. McAlpin, 380 So.2d 865 (Ala. 1980); (bill of sale insufficient to overcome unbroken chain of title); Eleven Autos. v. State ex rel. Graddick, 384 So.2d 1129 (Ala.Civ.App. 1980); (as to pre-1975 vehicles, evidence of a sale to an individual and that individual's exercise of control and dominion over the vehicle is sufficient to establish ownership); Congress Finance Company v. Funderburk, 416 So.2d 1059 (Ala.Civ.App. 1982) (rebuttal of prima facie evidence of ownership not overcome); Murray v. Dempsey, 521 So.2d 1345 (Ala.Civ.App. 1988) (rebuttal of prima facie evidence of ownership proved). The case at bar is replete with evidence attempting to establish ownership.
This is not conclusive proof, however, and the ownership of the vehicle may be proved by other evidence. Eleven Automobiles v. State ex rel. Graddick, 384 So.2d 1129 (Ala.Civ.App. 1980); Crowley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 591 So.2d 53 (Ala. 1991). In Crowley, the Court noted:
See Woods v. Reeves, supra (four years is not prompt); Reach v. State, supra (four weeks is prompt, but eight months is not prompt); $1,113.77 United States Currency v. State, 606 So.2d 151 (Ala.Civ.App. 1992) (seven months is not prompt); Adams v. State ex rel. Whetstone, supra (four weeks is prompt, but 10 weeks is not prompt); Eleven Automobiles v. State ex rel. Graddick, 384 So.2d 1129 (Ala.Civ.App. 1980) (four weeks is prompt); Winstead v. State, 375 So.2d 1207 (Ala.Civ.App. 1979), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 1209 (Ala. 1979) (three and one-half weeks is prompt). Mr. Lightfoot's money was retained for 23 1/2 months and his car for approximately 15-18 months, and no forfeiture action was ever brought in any court.
However, a certificate of title is not conclusive evidence of ownership, because ownership can be established by other evidence. See Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Fulmer, 376 So.2d 748 (Ala.Civ.App. 1979); City Car Sales, Inc. v. McAlpin, 380 So.2d 865 (Ala.Civ.App. 1979), cert. denied, 380 So.2d 869 (Ala. 1980); see, also, Murray v. Dempsey, 521 So.2d 1345 (Ala.Civ.App. 1988); Congress Finance Corp. v. Funderburk, 416 So.2d 1059 (Ala.Civ.App. 1982); Eleven Automobiles. v. State ex rel. Graddick, 384 So.2d 1129 (Ala.Civ.App. 1980). Therefore, of necessity, the absence of ownership indicated by the absence of a certificate of title, as in this case, can be rebutted by other evidence of ownership. For example, ownership or a transfer of ownership can be established by evidence of a party's taking possession of the vehicle; by evidence of a bill of sale that manifests an intent to sell and transfer the vehicle and to grant dominion and control over it; and by evidence of a transfer of money for the vehicle.
In fact, the statute places an affirmative duty on the State to institute a forfeiture proceeding promptly. We are aware that the Court of Civil Appeals has held that a proceeding instituted approximately four weeks after seizure meets the promptness requirement, Eleven Automobiles v. State ex rel. Graddick, 384 So.2d 1129 (Ala.Civ.App. 1980), but we hold that a proceeding brought after eight months does not. REVERSED AND JUDGMENT RENDERED.
Wood Chevrolet Co. v. Bank of the Southeast, 352 So.2d 1350 (Ala. 1977). See also Ledbetter v. Darwin Dobbs Co., 473 So.2d 197 (Ala.Civ.App. 1985); Eleven Autos v. State ex rel. Graddick, 384 So.2d 1129 (Ala.Civ.App. 1980). The certificate of title only "establishes prima facie title in the person whose name appears on the certificate.
Stated differently, this Court will not overturn a trial court's factual findings in an ore tenus case if there is any evidence to support those findings. Eleven Automobiles v. State, 384 So.2d 1129 (Ala.Civ.App. 1980). See, also, Cherokee Ins. Co. v. Frazier, 406 So.2d 881 (Ala. 1981); Cougar Min. Co. v. Mineral Land Min. Consultants, Inc., 392 So.2d 1177 (Ala. 1981).
PER CURIAM. Affirmed on the authority of Eleven Automobiles v. State, 384 So.2d 1129 (Ala.Civ.App. 1980). See, also, United States v. $36,125.00 in U.S. Currency, 510 F. Supp. 303, 305 (E.D.La. 1980); and United States v. One 1970 Ford Pick-Up Truck, 537 F. Supp. 368 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
Specifically, there was testimony from the mother that Robert exerted virtually complete dominion and control over the vehicle." "It was the duty of the trial court to resolve any conflict in the testimony."); see also Eleven Autos. v. State, 384 So. 2d 1129, 1130 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980).We note that Betty makes no argument, supported by legal authority, that this court may ignore the plain meaning of the term "owner" as used in ยง 20-2-93(h), that that term is ambiguous, or that that term must be broadly defined in some manner that would include her as the owner or an owner of the Tahoe, as a matter of law. Betty does cite Jester v. State, 668 So. 2d 822 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995), as purportedly presenting an analogous factual context.