Opinion
TTDCV186013936S
11-30-2018
Andrea ELDRIDGE v. TOWN OF STAFFORD PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Sicilian, J.
In this administrative appeal, the plaintiff, Andrea Eldridge, challenges a decision of the Stafford Town Planning and Zoning Commission (commission), granting the application of Foster Hill Farm, Karl and Kim Milikowski (collectively, the applicant), for a special use permit to allow a "roadside market" of 1, 200 square feet for the seasonal sale of plants on its property at 21 Stafford Street, Stafford, Connecticut. The plaintiff owns abutting property at 27 Stafford Street, Stafford, Connecticut. She charges that in granting the permit the commission abused its discretion and acted illegally and improperly in several ways.
FACTS
The facts as reflected in the administrative record are as follows:
The parties agree, and the court finds, that the plaintiff is aggrieved and has standing to bring this appeal.
The application sought a special permit to use a portion of an existing structure on the applicant’s property, along with surrounding area, together totaling 1, 200 square feet, as a "roadside market" under section 3.16H of the Town of Stafford Zoning Regulations (regulations). Record at 25-26, 141. Section 3.16 of the regulations governs "accessory buildings." Record at 25-26. The applicant’s property is in a "residential district" as that term is used in the regulations. Notice of the application and scheduled public hearing was mailed to the plaintiff in accordance with the regulations. Record at 118, 174-75. The commission held the public hearing on January 23, 2018. Record 164-65, 183-97. Neither the plaintiff nor anyone else raised any concerns about or objections to the application during the public hearing. Only one member of the public raised a question, and that was whether the applicant would be increasing the size of its existing building. The commission’s chairman responded that the applicant was "not adding on to the barn according to their application." Record at 184-96.
Following the hearing, the commission discussed the application and approved it by a unanimous, voice vote. Record at 199-205. The minutes of the January 23, meeting reflect the questions and comments made during the public hearing, the discussions of the commission, and the commission’s decision, stated as follows: "Gene Julian made a motion to approve the Special Use Permit application for Karl Milikowski (Foster Hill Farm), 21 Stafford Street, Map 54, Lot 13.3, Zone AA to establish a 1, 200 sq. ft. Farm Market in accordance with the zoning regulations. Ron Houle seconded the motion. All were in favor." Record at 164-72.
The regulations provide that "Agriculture" is a permitted "Main (Principal)" use, as of right and without a permit, in a residential district. Record at 129 (Regulations, § 4.2). Agriculture is also permitted as of right, without a permit, as an accessory use in a residential district. Record at 131 (Regulations § 4.3). The regulations define "Agriculture" to include "direct sale of any agricultural or horticultural commodity as an incident to ordinary farming operations" and provide that the term "farm" "includes farm buildings, and accessory buildings thereto, nurseries, orchards, ranges, greenhouses, hoop houses and other temporary structures or other structures used primarily for the raising and, as an incident to ordinary farming operations, the sale of agricultural or horticultural commodities." Record at 11 (Regulations § 2.1). The regulations define "Farm" as "A tract of land used principally for agriculture, with or without an associated single-family dwelling." Record at 14 (Regulations § 2.1).
The regulations define a "Roadside Stand" as: "A direct marketing operation up to eight hundred (800) square feet that is seasonal in nature and features on-farm produced as well as locally produced agricultural products and handmade crafts. At least fifty percent (50%) of the agricultural products must be raised on the property where the stand is located or on other parcels owned or leased by the proprietor. The stand can be within a temporary structure or an already existing structure. All crafts must be produced on the property where the stand is located." Record at 18 (Regulations § 2.1).
The regulations define a "Roadside Market" as: "A direct marketing operation with or without a permanent structure that offers outdoor and/or indoor commerce. Greenhouses or pick-your-own areas are not included in the size. Such an operation features on-farm produced as well as locally produced agricultural products, enhanced agricultural products, and handmade crafts. At least fifty percent (50%) of the agricultural products must be raised on the property where the stand is located or on other parcels owned and/or leased by the proprietor. All crafts must be produced on the property where the market is located." Record at 18 (Regulations § 2.1).
Section 2.1 of the regulations defines "Accessory Building, or Use" as: "A building, or use customarily incidental to the principal building, or to the principal use of the land." Section 3.16 of the Regulations addresses "Accessory Buildings." It permits, as an accessory building, a "temporary roadside stand under one hundred and fifty (150) square feet" without any permit or approval and a "roadside stand ... less than eight hundred square (800) feet" if permitted by the Zoning Enforcement Officer (ZEO). A marketing operation measuring 800 square feet or larger is defined as a "roadside market" and requires a special permit. Record at 25-26 (Regulations § 3.16F-H).
Importantly, the regulations reflect a policy to encourage and preserve agricultural use of town property. Section 7.3 of the regulations states: "Stafford is fortunate to have come from a long history of farming with some farmland deeded to their current family owners by the King of England. Prime farmland soils are limited in amount in town and most of Stafford soils are poor and rocky. Nonetheless, the remaining farmland is agriculturally productive promoting a visually attractive environment for people, animals, plants, and wildlife. For these reasons and in order to preserve our remaining farmland, it is the intended purpose of the Zoning Board of the Town of Stafford to allow agricultural use and activities within the boundaries of current regulations. We intend to do this, while at the same time, being considerate of neighboring residents and complying with town agencies." Record at 81.
Additional facts will be referenced in the discussion below
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Appellate Court has instructed that this court’s review of the commission’s decision to grant the special permit at issue must be "guided by DeBeradinis v. Zoning Commission, 228 Conn. 187, 635 A.2d 1220 (1994). In that case, our Supreme Court held that ‘[c]onclusions reached by the commission must be upheld by the trial court if they are reasonably supported by the record. The question is not whether the trial court would have reached the same conclusion, but whether the record before the agency supports the decision reached. The action of the commission should be sustained if even one of the stated reasons is sufficient to support it. The evidence, however, to support any such reason must be substantial. This so-called substantial evidence rule is similar to the sufficiency of the evidence standard applied in judicial review of jury verdicts, and evidence is sufficient to sustain an agency finding if it affords a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred.’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 198-01, 635 A.2d 1220; see also Pinchbeck v. Planning & Zoning Commission, [ 69 Conn.App. 796, 796 A.2d 1208, cert. denied, 261 Conn. 928, 806 A.2d 1065 (2002)] at 800, ... (proper standard of trial court review of coastal site plan is whether decision supported by substantial evidence). When the zoning body fails to state reasons for its decision on the record, the reviewing court has a duty to search the entire record before it to find a basis for the board’s decision. Gagnon v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Commission, 213 Conn. 604, 608, 569 A.2d 1094 (1990)." Hescock v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 112 Conn.App. 239, 248-49, 962 A.2d 177 (2009).
"The decision of a zoning authority will be disturbed only if it is shown that it was arbitrary, illegal or an abuse of discretion. Beit Havurah v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 177 Conn. 440, 444, 418 A.2d 82 (1979). Furthermore, we have held that a ‘zoning board is comprised of laymen whose responsibility is to protect the interest of the individual property owner by granting a variance when the zoning regulations impose a hardship on the property owner of the nature described by the General Statutes. In searching the record, the trial court may rely on any reason culled from the record which demonstrates a real or reasonable relationship with the general welfare of the community in concluding that the board’s decision should be upheld.’ (Citation omitted.) Stankiewicz v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 15 Conn.App. 729, 732-33, 546 A.2d 919 (1988), aff’d, 211 Conn. 76, 556 A.2d 1024 (1989). Our role therefore is to determine whether the board acted arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion and not to indulge in a hypertechnical examination of whether the board complied with all the minute requirements of its regulations. ‘[C]ourts must be scrupulous not to hamper the legitimate activities of civic administrative boards by indulging in a microscopic search for technical infirmities in their action.’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 206 Conn. 554, 573, 538 A.2d 1039 (1988)." Hescock v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 112 Conn.App. 253-54.
II. DISCUSSION
The issue before the commission was a relatively narrow one. The regulations state that agriculture is a permitted use as of right in residential districts and define "agriculture" and "farming" to include "direct sale of any agricultural or horticultural commodity as an incident to ordinary farming operations." The regulations permit the "direct marketing operation" of a "temporary roadside stand" of less than 150 square feet as of right and of a "roadside stand" of less than 800 square feet upon approval of the ZEO, without commission involvement. The question for the commission was, therefore, focused on whether the additional 400 square feet of selling area contemplated by the application beyond the allowed size of a "roadside stand" was appropriate. The plaintiff does not argue that the proposed roadside market would interfere with the use and enjoyment of the neighboring properties and community or would be detrimental to the town and its residents. Her appeal is grounded on arguments that the commission failed strictly to comply with technical standards set forth in the regulations. The plaintiff advances four, principal arguments: (1) that the regulations do not permit retail sales in a residential district; (2) that the commission failed to follow its own rules regarding the content of an application for a special use permit; (3) that the commission failed to make express findings with respect to considerations listed in the regulations as pertinent to a special permit; and (4) that the commission’s deliberations were improper.
A. Retail Sales Are Not Prohibited
Notwithstanding the clear designation of "agriculture" as both a permitted principal and a permitted accessory use of property within a residential district, and the unambiguous inclusion of "direct sale [of] any agricultural or horticultural commodity as an incident to ordinary farming operations" within the definition of "agriculture," the plaintiff argues that the applicant’s property is not a "farm" and, therefore, that retail sales on the property are prohibited. The court disagrees.
The plaintiff’s argument appears to focus on the definition of "Farm" in the regulations: "A tract of land used principally for agriculture, with or without an associated single-family dwelling." She argues that the principal use of the property at issue is residential and, therefore, the principal use cannot be "agriculture" or "farming" and, therefore, the property cannot be a "farm." As a result, she argues, the sale of agricultural commodities cannot be "incident to ordinary farming operations" and, therefore, is not permitted in a residential district. The plaintiff ignores that "agriculture" and "farming" are defined to mean the same thing, Record at 11 (Regulations § 2.1) and that "agriculture" is expressly permitted as a principal use of property within a residential district. The clear import of these definitions is that "farming," defined as a synonym for "agriculture," is permitted as of right in a residential district and that the retail sale-of agricultural and horticultural commodities is, therefore, also permitted as a defined aspect of "agriculture" and "farming." The separate definition of "farm" does not evidence a contrary intention. First, the definition of "agriculture" and "farming" does not incorporate or reference the separate definition of "farm." It permits sale of products as an incident to "farming operations" where "farming" and "agriculture" are defined to mean the same thing and are permitted as both a principal and an accessory use within a residential district. The plaintiff’s argument that sales cannot be incident to "farming operations" because the property is not a "farm" is, therefore, contrary to the plain terms of the regulations. In other words, whether the applicant’s property is a "farm" is not determinative of whether retail sales are permitted.
Further, even if it were necessary for the property to be a "farm," the definition in the regulations does not exclude the applicant’s property. That definition refers only to a "tract" of land used principally for farming. A "tract" is simply "an indefinite stretch of land." Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, Eleventh Ed. (2005) at 1324. The whole of the applicant’s property need not be a "farm" for the property to include a "farm." A portion of the property would be a "tract" and such a portion used principally for agriculture would be within the definition of "farm."
In short, the court cannot conclude that the commission acted arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion in determining that the regulations permit retail sale of agricultural products incident to a permitted agricultural use in a residential district.
B. Regulations Relating to Commercial Districts Are Not Applicable
The plaintiff argues that the commission’s approval of the special use permit is flawed because the commission did not make findings required by § 5.11 of the regulations. A plain reading of the regulations establishes that § 5.11 is inapplicable to the special permit at issue here. Article V of the regulations, which includes § 5.11, sets forth rules relating to "commercial districts." Record at 40-64. There is no dispute that the property involved in this case is in a residential district. Record at 29-36. The plaintiff’s argument that the application is for agricultural use, that agriculture is a permitted use in a commercial district, and that the operation of a farm market involves retail sales and is, therefore, a commercial use implicating Article V, is unavailing. Agriculture is a permitted use in both residential and commercial districts. Article V applies to commercial districts and not to activities within residential districts, which are governed by Article IV. Section 5.11 is inapplicable to the application at issue.
C. The Record Adequately Supports The Commission’s Action
Article III, titled "General Regulation," and Article VIII, titled "Administration and Enforcement," apply to this application. Section 3.16H sets forth specific requirements for the "roadside market" sought by the applicants. Section 8.10 sets forth requirements for special use permits.
In addition to the requirements that a special permit be obtained and that a public hearing on the permit be held, Section 3.16H limits an accessory building operated as a roadside market to a maximum size of 1, 200 square feet, requires that the market be set back from the street a minimum twenty-five feet, requires a minimum of one parking space per 200 square feet of selling space, and requires either buffers of plant materials at least ten (10) feet wide and reaching six feet high in five years which create a continuous visual barrier or a solid fence at least six feet tall. Record at 25-26. The record is adequate to support the commission’s conclusion that these requirements were met.
The record includes a drawing showing more than the six required parking spaces, record at 144, and reflects a colloquy during the public hearing confirming that the proposed parking is adequate. Record at 186-87. The drawing also shows that the proposed roadside market is set back 300 feet from the road, and is supplemented by an aerial photograph and a survey map of the property. Record at 144-45, 147, 149. The hearing transcript reflects that the commissioners concluded that the proposal met the setback requirement. Record at 187. The applicant indicated that the roadside market would be more than fifty (50) feet from the boundary of their nearest neighbor’s property and that the applicant would add to screening that was already in place, including by constructing a wood structure eight to nine feet tall, thereby satisfying the commissioners’ questions regarding the adequacy of the buffers under the regulation. Record at 187-91. The ZEO said at the hearing that he "drove and took a look" at the property and he did not raise any concerns about the requirements of § 3.16H.
Notwithstanding this substantial evidence supporting the commission’s conclusion that the requirements of § 3.16H were satisfied, there remains the question whether the commission’s approval is flawed for failure expressly to address the findings required for a special use permit under § 8.10 of the regulations. Section 8.10 provides that the commission "shall make a finding" that each of several listed standards is met.
The applicant concedes that the commission did not expressly state findings on each of the standards set forth in § 8.10. But while the regulations require the commission to "make" such findings, they do not unambiguously require the commission to do so expressly. Even if they did, that would not end the inquiry. As noted above, when the zoning body fails to state reasons for its decision it is this court’s "duty to search the entire record before it to find a basis for the board’s decision." Hescock v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 112 Conn.App. 249.
The applicant argues that there is evidence in the record to support each of the findings required by § 8.10. At the outset, the applicant, citing Bethlehem Christian Fellowship, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 73 Conn.App. 442, 807 A.2d 1089 (2002), argues that the court’s task is a narrow one because the allowance of a roadside market by special permit under the regulations creates "a conclusive presumption ... that the use per se cannot adversely affect the zone in which it is to be conducted." However, to the extent that it applied to special use permits, Bethlehem Christian Fellowship has been overruled by Cambodian Buddhist Society of Connecticut, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 285 Conn. 381, 941 A.2d 868 (2008). There, the court stated: "[t]his court has limited the application of these principles [regarding a conclusive presumption] ... to site plan approvals and subdivision applications that involve uses that are permitted as of right within the zoning district." Cambodian Buddhist Society of Connecticut, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 285 Conn. 432 (citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). "In contrast, when a use is not allowed as of right, but only by special exception, the zoning commission ‘is required to judge whether any concerns, such as parking or traffic congestion, would adversely impact the surrounding neighborhood.’ ... The reason for this requirement is that, although such uses ‘are not as intrusive as commercial uses ... they do generate parking and traffic problems that, if not properly planned for, might undermine the residential character of the neighborhood.’ ... Thus, there is no presumption that a specially permitted use, or the traffic that it will generate, necessarily is compatible with any particular neighborhood within the zoning district ... To the extent that language in Bethlehem Christian Fellowship, Inc. indicates otherwise, we expressly disavow it." Id., 432-33 (citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted).
Therefore, there is no presumption limiting the court’s inquiry. The court must search the record for evidence supporting the commission’s conclusion that the criteria set forth in § 8.10 are satisfied. Applying the deference properly accorded to the commission, the court concludes that the commission did not act illegally, arbitrarily or in abuse of its discretion and, therefore, that its decision must be upheld. See Hescock v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 112 Conn.App. 253-54.
There was an adequate basis for the commission’s conclusion that the "location and size of the use, the nature and intensity of the operations connected with it, the size of the lot in relation to it, and the location of the lot with respect to streets giving access to it are such that it will be in harmony with the appropriate and orderly development of the district in that it is located." Record at 118 (Regulations § 8.10A.5). The survey, drawings and aerial photograph submitted in support of the application depict a roadside stand with selling area limited to 1, 200 square feet, set back some 300 feet from the street (i.e., 275 feet more than the twenty-five feet minimum requirement). Record at 144-47. The record also reflects that the applicants proposed to use an existing building on the site without addition or expansion. Record at 194-95. The record contains information reflecting that the proposed roadside market would be at least fifty feet from the closest, abutting property line and that there would be a substantial buffer, in compliance with § 3.16H, between the roadside market and the adjacent property. Record at 187-90. Thus, there was substantial evidence supporting the commission’s conclusion that the roadside market would not hinder the use or impair the value of adjacent properties. § 8.10A.6.
The drawing submitted in support of the application showed the location of a driveway and parking spaces and provided substantial evidence on which the commission could conclude that those facilities were adequate. Record at 118 (Regulations § 8.10A.7). The drawings and the testimony at the public hearing reflect that there would be no changes to the existing building or other changes that would threaten destruction of natural resources or pollution of water bodies, or that would change the shape, size, and topographic and natural character of the site. Record at 118 (Regulations § 8.10A.8). The application did not contain anything that would interfere with or implicate in any way the type and density of adjacent development or the character of the neighborhood. Record at 118 (§ 8.10A.9). Because there were no changes to any buildings or their location, the application raised no issue regarding "a harmonious grouping" of buildings "compatible with surrounding structures" under § 8.10A.10. Record at 118.
While there was no discussion at the public hearing or in the commission’s deliberations regarding traffic, the court cannot say that the commission’s conclusion that the application was "in accordance with the zoning regulations," record at 167, was arbitrary, illegal or an abuse of discretion. The regulations require parking for only six cars for a 1, 200 foot farm market. Record at 25 (§ 3.16H). Giving deference to the conclusions of the lay commissioners, that record evidence is adequate to support the conclusion that the expected volume of cars would not raise disqualifying traffic or safety issues under § 8.10A.11.
Section § 8.10A.12 requires a subjective determination that the proposal is "of a superior site and architectural design." The commission had before it the applicant’s drawings and survey map, as well as the applicant’s description of the intended use of the site, and, therefore, had a basis on which to make that subjective determination.
Finally, the application did not propose any new water supply or sanitation facilities and, therefore, did not implicate § 8.10A.13.
While the commission could certainly have made a more clear record by expressly addressing each of the criteria listed in § 8.10, a search of the record while giving appropriate deference to the commission and while seeking to be "scrupulous not to hamper the legitimate activities of civic administrative boards," reveals substantial evidence supporting the commission’s conclusion that the application was "in accordance with the zoning regulations."
D. Plaintiff’s Other Challenges
The plaintiff argues that the application was defective because it failed to meet the detailed requirements for a site plan set forth in § 8.3 of the regulations. Record at 115-16. Here, again, the plaintiff asks the court to reject the commission’s conclusion on the ground that the commission did not require precise adherence to the minute details of the regulations’ requirements. However, the regulations grant the ZEO discretion to "excuse compliance with the requirements for specific information otherwise required on the plot plan where such compliance is not necessary to determine that zoning or other code regulations are met." Record at 116. As described above, the drawings, survey maps, and aerial photograph submitted by the applicant, record at 144-49, provide a substantial basis for the commission to assess and determine whether the proposed roadside market met the requirements of § 3.16H. In this circumstance, where the application was limited to use of an existing building and immediately adjacent area totaling 1, 200 square feet of a parcel of more than thirty-three acres, and where the regulations permit the operation of a smaller stand, including retail selling, as of right, the court cannot conclude that the commission acted illegally or arbitrarily in relying on what the applicant concedes was an "informal" site plan, particularly where that plan and the testimony at the public hearing made clear that the proposed roadside market met the requirements specifically stated in § 3.16H. To conclude otherwise would be to "to hamper the legitimate activities of civic administrative boards by indulging in a microscopic search for technical infirmities in their action." Hescock v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 112 Conn.App. 254.
The plaintiff also argues that the commission "ignored" the requirement, contained in the regulations’ definition of "roadside market," that at least fifty percent (50%) of the agricultural products [sold at the market] must be raised on the property where the stand is located." Record at 18 (Regulations § 2.1). That argument is misplaced. The requirement is not an application issue but an enforcement issue. The commission issued a special use permit for a roadside market. To be in compliance with that permit, at least fifty percent of the agricultural products offered at the market must be raised on the property. The applicant would be in violation of the permit, and subject to enforcement action, if it fails to meet that requirement.
The plaintiff also argues that the commission’s deliberations were fatally corrupted because a commission alternate, who was not entitled to vote, "participated in the deliberations." The alternate’s challenged comment, made after the close of the public hearing, was to the effect that the commission represents the whole town and if the roadside market were to be open late and there were lights that affected a neighbor "it’s our business ..." The plaintiff is correct that the participation of an unseated alternate in the commission’s deliberations was improper. See Komondy v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 127 Conn.App. 669, 686, 16 A.3d 741 (2011). However, that does not mean that the commission’s decision must be reversed. The plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate that the participation of the alternate in deliberations resulted in "material prejudice." Id., 689. "Among the factors relevant to that inquiry is a determination of whether the participation impacted the board’s decision-making process. See Weiner v. Zoning Commission, [Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV-94-006607-S (May 22, 1995, Pickett, J.) (14 Conn.L.Rptr. 245) ] (Concluding that unseated alternate ‘had a profound effect upon the deliberation’). Also relevant is the frequency and severity of the unseated alternate’s participation." Id. In Komondy, the alternate not only participated extensively in the public hearing on the application before the board, she participated even more fully in the board’s deliberations by advocating her views on the application at length, making at least twenty separate statements. Id., 674-75. Even on that record, the court held that the plaintiff had not met her burden to demonstrate error in the board’s decision.
In this case, the alternate’s improper participation consisted of a single statement that, to the extent that it was at all significant, raised a caution regarding the application and not an argument in support of what became the commission’s conclusion. The plaintiff has not met her burden to demonstrate that she suffered material prejudice from that single, improper comment that was, if anything, cautionary regarding, rather than supportive of, the commission’s conclusion.
The plaintiff also attacks as improper a comment made by the ZEO after the close of the public hearing. That comment was made during an exchange among commission members regarding the applicant’s hours of operation and whether there was any issue regarding lighting. Record at 199-202. The chairman asked the ZEO whether the site plan contained any lighting, and the ZEO confirmed that it did not. Other members suggested that it would be unusual for a roadside market to be open after dark, and the chairman indicated that because there was no lighting shown on the site plan, he assumed that the stand would be operating only during daylight hours. The ZEO confirmed that "[w]e have to go by the plan." Record at 201. In response to a direct question, the ZEO said "they were never open after dark."
The plaintiff is correct that there was no evidence in the application, the site plan, or the testimony during the public hearing regarding hours of operation or lighting. But the transcript of the deliberations indicates that the commissioners considered the issue and, before the ZEO made his comment, the chairman and another commissioner indicated their expectation that the stand would operate during daylight. Record at 200-02. The commissioners considered whether it was necessary to put a condition limiting hours of operation on the grant of the permit, but ultimately approved the permit without such a condition. Record at 199-204. Here, again, the commission’s process was informal and imperfect, but the plaintiff has not demonstrated that the imperfections had a material impact on the commission’s decision to grant the permit. It was within the commission’s purview to determine whether concerns about hours of operation or lighting rose to a level that merited the attachment of conditions to the special use permit. The record reflects that the commission considered those issues and did not attach conditions. It is not the court’s role to second guess the commission, or to require of a lay commission a level of legal precision that would frustrate the duly-constituted commission’s good faith effort to promote and protect the interests of the community it serves.
Finally, the plaintiff argues that the ZEO’s issuance of a cease and desist order to the applicant in 2016, based on a finding that retail sales were not permitted under a prior version of the regulations somehow prevents the commission from granting the application under the current regulations. The plaintiff’s argument appears to be simply a restatement of her argument that retail sales are not permitted in a residential zone. See Brief of Andrea Eldridge, dated June 22, 2018, at 14. That argument is without merit. See Section III. A, above.
III. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that the commission’s conduct of the required public hearing and its own deliberations was less formal and precise than would be ideal, and that the commission failed to explain its reasons for concluding that the application met the requirements of the regulations. However, the commission did not act arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion. Following the direction to "be scrupulous not to hamper the legitimate activities of civic administrative boards by indulging in a microscopic search for technical infirmities in their action," Hescock, supra, 112 Conn.App. 253-54, the court concludes that the commission’s decision to approve the application "in accordance with the zoning regulations" is adequately supported in the record. The plaintiff’s appeal is dismissed.