Opinion
No. 5326.
March 6, 1930.
APPEAL from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, for Canyon County. Hon. B.S. Varian, Judge.
Action for the appointment of a receiver and to enforce a claim. Judgment for plaintiff. Affirmed.
T.A. Walters and Walter Griffiths, for Appellants.
A court has no power in the absence of express statutory authorization to appoint a receiver for a corporation, and the consent of the corporation cannot confer such jurisdiction. (14a C. J., p. 941, sec. 3158; Elliott v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County, 168 Cal. 727, 145 P. 101; Hitchcock v. American Pipe Co., 89 N.J. Eq. 410, 105 Atl. 655; Barber v. Mexico International Co., 73 Conn. 587, 48 Atl. 758; Vila v. Grand Island Electric Light etc. Co., 68 Neb. 222, 110 Am. St. 400, 4 Ann. Cas. 59, 94 N.W. 136, 97 N.W. 613, 63 L.R.A. 791; Hollins v. Brierfield Coal etc. Co., 150 U.S. 371, 14 Sup. Ct. 127, 37 L. ed. 1113; Bergman Clay Mfg. Co. v. Bergman, 73 Wn. 144, 131 P. 485.)
An order appointing a receiver must be supported by sufficient facts alleged in the complaint and sufficient findings made by the court showing the jurisdiction of the court in the particular case, and also sufficient grounds for making the order. Mere controversies or dissention among the directors or stockholders, or a failure to elect officers, are not grounds for the appointment of a receiver. (14a C. J., p. 945, sec. 3159; Prudential Securities Co. v. Three Forks etc. R. Co., 49 Mont. 567, 144 P. 158.)
Charles F. Reddoch, Wm. M. Morgan, J.B. Eldridge, Thomas E. Buckner, Scatterday Stone and Barber Barber, for Respondent.
This court has repudiated the old doctrine of the California and other eases relied upon by the appellant, that a receiver will not be appointed for a corporation at the instance of a private party. ( Gibbs v. Morgan, 9 Idaho 100, 72 Pac. 733; Hall v. Nieukirk, 12 Idaho 33, 118 Am. St. 188, 85 Pac. 485; Utah Assn. of Credit Men v. Budge, 16 Idaho 751, 102 P. 390, 691; Riley v. Callahan Min. Co., 28 Idaho 525, 155 P. 665; Commercial Trust Co. v. Idaho Brick Co., 25 Idaho 755, 139 P. 1004.)
It is common practice to appoint receivers of corporations when insolvent at the instance of private litigants and contract creditors. (C. S., sec. 6817; Hall v. Nieukirk, supra; Idaho Fruit etc. Co. v. Great Western Co., 17 Idaho 273, 105 P. 562; Exchange Nat. Bank v. Northern Idaho Co., 24 Idaho 671, 135 P. 747; John V. Farwell Co. v. Craney, 29 Idaho 85, 157 P. 383; Smith v. Solomon Valley Dredging Co., 147 Wn. 69, 264 P. 1009; Davis v. Edwards, 41 Wn. 480, 84 P. 22.)
The late work of Clark on Receivers, sec. 187, subd. a, p. 212, sustains the doctrine of these cases.
Where a simple contract creditor sues a corporation for a judgment and asks for the appointment of a receiver and the answer of the corporation admits the debt due and its insolvency and its inability to pay, and a receiver is appointed, another creditor cannot raise the question that the creditor who obtained the appointment of the receiver was not a judgment creditor even in jurisdictions where that rule is rightly enforced, and consent does not prove or show collusion or fraud. (14a C. J., p. 962, sec. 3181; United States v. Butterworth-Judson Corp., 269 U.S. 504, 46 Sup. Ct. 179, 70 L. ed. 380; Northwestern Nat. Bank v. Mickelson-Shapiro Co., 134 Minn. 422, 159 N.W. 948; Enos v. New York O. R. Co., 103 Fed. 47; Citizens Bank Trust Co. v. Union Mining Gold Co., 106 Fed. 97.)
This case has been before this court on two previous occasions involving a motion to dismiss the appeal ( 279 Pac. 713), wherein one of the appellants, Brown, was eliminated and the appeal of Kollenborn permitted to stand on the order of the court disallowing his claim and allowing other claims to which he objected. On motion to strike the brief and transcript and to limit the appeal ( 283 P. 1040), it was indicated that the limiting of the appeal should be disposed of upon the merits, now presented.
Appellant's assignments of errors may be summed up in two contentions; first, that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to appoint a receiver, and second, that there is no evidence to sustain the order of the court allowing respondent's claim. No assignment of error is based upon the disallowance of appellant's claim.
Appellant did not object in the court below to the appointment of a receiver, nor file anything in opposition thereto, but, on the contrary, after the appointment of the receiver filed his claim.
Appellant urges that a receiver may not be appointed in this state for a corporation. This court has, however, held to the contrary. (C. S., sec. 6817; Hall v. Nieukirk, 12 Idaho 33, 118 Am. St. 188, 85 P. 485; Idaho Fruit Co. v. Great Western Co., 17 Idaho 273, 105 P. 562; Exchange Nat. Bank v. Northern Idaho etc. Co., 24 Idaho 671, 135 Pac. 747; John V. Farwell Co. v. Craney, 29 Idaho 85, 157 Pac. 383; see, also, Scattergood v. American Pipe Co., 249 Fed. 23; Hitchcock v. American Pipe Co., 89 N.J. Eq. 440, 105 Atl. 655; Smith v. Solomon Valley Dredging Co., 147 Wn. 69, 264 P. 1009; Davis v. Edwards, 41 Wn. 480, 84 P. 22; Clark on Receivers, 2d ed., sec. 187, subd. a, p. 212.)
Appellant also urges that the complaint was insufficient. The complaint in effect alleged that the defendant was indebted to the plaintiff in a large sum; that the only asset defendant possessed was the right to levy and collect assessments; that there were two boards of directors contending for control; that the assessments levied by one board had been ordered discharged by the other; that the Federal Reclamation Service, with the acquiescence of one of the boards, was threatening to take over valuable rights of defendant without compensation; that defendant was unable to meet its obligations or obtain a loan to pay the same; that unless a receiver was appointed the property rights of the defendant would be wasted and the deadlock and turmoil would continue and prevent the functioning of the defendant.
The answer of the defendant, the Payette-Boise Water Users' Association, admitted all the allegations of the complaint and joined in the request for the appointment of a receiver.
The allegations were sufficient to authorize the appointment of a receiver. ( Gibbs v. Morgan, 9 Idaho 100, 72 Pac. 733; Tompkins v. Catawba Mills, 82 Fed. 780; Powers v. Blue Grass Bldg. Loan Assn., 86 Fed. 705; Jasper Land Co. v. Wallis, 123 Ala. 652, 26 So. 659; Boyle v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. 671, 170 P. 1140, L.R.A. 1918D, 226, and note; Eureka Coal Co. v. McGowan, 72 Colo. 402, 212 P. 521; Nelson v. United Elevators Co., 115 Kan. 567, 223 P. 814; Bowen v. Bowen-Romer Flour Mills, 114 Kan. 95, 43 A.L.R. 238, and note, 217 P. 301; Adams v. Farmers' Bank, 167 Ky. 506, 180 S.W. 807; Boothe v. Summit Coal Min. Co., 55 Wn. 167, 19 Ann. Cas. 1255, 104 P. 207.)
There is sufficient evidence in the record to justify the allowance by the court of respondent's claim. This disposition of the cause renders it unnecessary to pass upon appellant's request in re diminution of the record.
The judgment is affirmed. Costs awarded to respondent.
Budge, Lee and McNaughton, JJ., and Koelsch, D.J., concur.
Petition for rehearing denied.