Eldridge v. Mowry

13 Citing cases

  1. Wilson v. Shea

    194 Cal. 653 (Cal. 1924)   Cited 16 times
    In Wilson v. Shea, 194 Cal. 653, 657-58, 229 P. 945 (1924), the California Supreme Court followed Mabb in refusing to allow an action for reformation of a contract to substitute the name of an undisclosed principal for that of his agent.

    [3] It would seem upon both reason and authority that in an action by one who alleges himself to be an undisclosed principal to a contract in writing for the purchase and sale of real estate, both of the parties who appear therein as principals and to have acquired as such certain rights and to have assumed as such certain liabilities with relation to each other should be made parties to an action for the reformation of such agreement, whereby their relation as the apparent principals thereto are sought to be materially affected, or, as in this case, entirely severed. [4] The appellant, however, contends that he is entitled to maintain this action to enforce said agreement as the real property in interest under the provisions of section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure and under the authority of Eldridge v. Mowry, 24 Cal.App. 183 [ 140 P. 978], and of certain cases from other jurisdictions. There can be no doubt as to the correctness of the rule embodied in said section of the code and as declared in these cases, but said rule has no application to a case of this character wherein the plaintiff is not merely seeking to enforce a contract in writing executed by his alleged agent as a principal thereto, but is seeking the reformation of such written contract so as to materially change not only the parties thereto but the substance of the agreement itself and the apparent obligations of those who appear upon the face of such written contract to be the principals thereto.

  2. Geary St., Etc. R. R. Co. v. Rolph

    189 Cal. 59 (Cal. 1922)   Cited 33 times

    See, also, Story on Agency, sec. 446; 2 Mechem on Agency, sec. 1710.) The following cases in this state enforce or announce this rule: Ellis v. Crawford, 39 Cal. 526; Thomas v. Moody, 57 Cal. 219; Goss v. Helbing, 77 Cal. 190 [19 P. 277]; Puget S. L. Co. v. Krug, 89 Cal. 244 [26 P. 902]; Ferguson v. McBean, 91 Cal. 72 [14 L. R. A. 65, 27 P. 518]; Bergtholdt v. Porter B. Co., 114 Cal. 689 [46 P. 738]; Schader v. White, 173 Cal. 445 [ 160 P. 557]; McKee v. Cunningham, 2 Cal.App. 688 [ 84 P. 260]; Walton v. Davis, 22 Cal.App. 459 [ 134 P. 795]; Eldridge v. Mowry, 24 Cal.App. 186 [ 140 P. 978]. It has been said in some cases that this rule does not prevail when, at the time the contract is entered into, the principal is known.

  3. Schader v. White

    173 Cal. 441 (Cal. 1916)   Cited 29 times

    Appellants' second objection is that of lack of mutuality in the contract, herein arguing that because Mrs. Schader had not herself signed the executory contract she could not have compelled specific performance, and therefore it was inequitable to decree specific performance against her. But it is sufficient, in addition to what has been said herein, to add that as an undisclosed principal she could sue or be sued. ( Eldridge v. Mowry, 24 Cal.App. 183, [ 140 P. 978]; Walton v. Davis, 22 Cal.App. 456, [ 134 P. 795]; Ford v. Williams, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 287, [ 16 L.Ed. 36]; Pomeroy on Specific Performance, 2d ed., sec. 89; 31 Cyc. 1416.) The third and fourth propositions advanced by appellants may be considered together.

  4. Wallace v. Sinclair

    114 Cal.App.2d 220 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952)   Cited 20 times

    The court properly received much testimony relating to that matter. The finding upon that issue is binding upon the reviewing court. ( Eldridge v. Mowry, 24 Cal.App. 183, 188 [ 140 P. 978].) [13] Where the extent of an employee's authority is not clearly defined by a writing or when such a writing is ambiguous, testimony will be received for the purpose of deriving a determination as to whether the employee was servant or agent.

  5. McDonald v. Gravenstein Etc. Assn

    42 Cal.App.2d 329 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941)   Cited 4 times

    In view of the foregoing, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the view of respondents that appellant can be held liable under the rule that: "A party is presumed to have assented to all the terms of a written contract when he signs it." ( Eldridge v. Mowry, 24 Cal.App. 183 [ 140 P. 978].) Appellant has received the benefit of a considerable amount of the supplies furnished for the proper care of his property.

  6. Marr v. Postal Union Life Insurance Co.

    40 Cal.App.2d 673 (Cal. Ct. App. 1940)   Cited 61 times
    Establishing factors by which a parent corporation may be liable for the torts of a subsidiary

    The fact that a corporation has no real or independent business of itself, of course, is of some importance in determining whether it is used simply as a conduit through which to conduct the business of another. ( Eldridge v. Mowry, 24 Cal.App. 183, 185 [ 140 P. 978]; Clark v. Millsap, supra.) It is further in evidence that while T.J. Olsen was vice-president and a director of the Underwriters and in active charge of its affairs, he received no compensation from the Underwriters for these services until about May, 1935, which was subsequent to the transaction now before us. From December, 1934, to June, 1935, Olsen was paid a salary of $200 per month by the insurance company of which he was controller, while his duties consisted of looking after the interests of the insurance company in the properties acquired by the Underwriters.

  7. Buckley v. Shell Chemical Co.

    32 Cal.App.2d 209 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939)   Cited 16 times
    In Buckley v. Shell Chemical Co., 32 Cal.App.2d 209, 89 P.2d 453, 454, the court held that the provision that the vendor "shall not be held responsible for productiveness and, or, quality" of its crop completely negatived any warranty. The words "shall not be responsible" are those of the stipulation of the parties in the present case.

    "Appellants' second objection is that of lack of mutuality in the contract, herein arguing that because Mrs. Schader had not herself signed the executory contract she could not have compelled specific performance, and therefore it was inequitable to decree specific performance against her. But it is sufficient, in addition to what has been said herein, to add that as an undisclosed principal she could sue or be sued. ( Eldridge v. Mowry, 24 Cal.App. 183 [ 140 P. 978]; Walton v. Davis, 22 Cal.App. 456 [ 134 P. 795]; Ford v. Williams, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 287 [16 L.Ed. 36]; Pomeroy on Specific Performance, 2d ed., sec. 89; 31 Cyc. 1416.)" To the same effect are Dabney v. Edwards, 5 Cal. (2d) 1 [ 53 P.2d 962, 103 A.L.R. 822]; Cowan v. Tremble, 111 Cal.App. 458 [ 296 P. 91].

  8. General Mill Lbr. Co. v. Robertson

    126 Cal.App. 118 (Cal. Ct. App. 1932)   Cited 4 times

    [2] As to the proof bearing on the question whether H.L. Robertson was an independent contractor on the cost-plus or other basis, or the agent and representative of Arabelle Siemsen in the matters involved herein, we have by reason of the contention of appellant carefully read the record, and while we find presented a situation somewhat unusual in the way of contract, nevertheless it is apparent that the question to be answered in this aspect by the trial court was a mixed question of law and fact under all the evidence in the case ( Luckie v. Diamond Coal Co., 41 Cal.App. 468 [ 183 P. 178]), and we think the evidence is sufficient to support the court's finding and conclusion that H.L. Robertson was acting for Arabelle Siemsen as her agent and managing superintendent, and that he was not an independent contractor. As to agency, see 1 Cal. Jur., sec. 131, p. 854; Schader v. White, 173 Cal. 441 [ 160 P. 557]; Eldridge v. Mowry, 24 Cal.App. 183 [ 140 P. 978]; Puget Sound Lumber Co. v. Krug, 89 Cal. 237, 243 [26 P. 902]. We do not feel warranted in disturbing the judgment of the trial court.

  9. Simpson v. Bergmann

    125 Cal.App. 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1932)   Cited 30 times

    ting the joint property without the authority or consent of his cotenant cannot bind or prejudicially affect the latter (33 Cor. Jur., Joint Tenancy, sec. 22, p. 913), where the act of one joint tenant is beneficial to his cotenant such act will be regarded as the act of all in so far as sharing in the benefits thereof is concerned ( Crary v. Campbell, 24 Cal. 634). [4] Mrs. Bergmann testified that she and her husband were building the house, and this was alleged in substance in her pleading. While she was not named in the bond this evidence is sufficient to show that her husband was also acting for her in the transaction, and notwithstanding the agency was undisclosed she could maintain an action for damages on the contract (1 Cor. Jur., Agency, sec. 131, p. 854; Schader v. White, 173 Cal. 441 [ 160 P. 557]; McKee v. Cunningham, 2 Cal.App. 684 [ 84 P. 260]; Eddy v. American Amusement Co., 9 Cal.App. 624 [ 99 P. 1115]; Wilcox-Rose Construction Co. v. Evans, 9 Cal.App. 118 [ 98 P. 83]; Eldridge v. Mowry, 24 Cal.App. 183 [ 140 P. 978]; Cowan v. Tremble, 111 Cal.App. 458 [ 296 P. 91]). [5] The bond was signed by the contractor as principal and by W.F. Button as surety.

  10. Tynan Lbr. Co. v. W.A. Hammond Co.

    124 Cal.App. 159 (Cal. Ct. App. 1932)   Cited 4 times

    It was an essential part of the contract and respondent must be presumed to have assented to all the terms specified. ( Eldridge v. Mowry, 24 Cal.App. 183 [ 140 P. 978].) The judgment is reversed.