Opinion
No. COA15-778
04-19-2016
CHRISTOPHER ELDER, Plaintiff, v. DESIREE H. ELDER, Defendant.
Plumides, Romano, Johnson & Cacheris, by Richard B. Johnson, for plaintiff. Brione B. Pattison for defendant.
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. Mecklenburg County, No. 13 CVD 3235 Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 27 January 2015 by Judge Gary L. Henderson in Mecklenburg County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27 January 2016. Plumides, Romano, Johnson & Cacheris, by Richard B. Johnson, for plaintiff. Brione B. Pattison for defendant. ELMORE, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals from an order for permanent child support, arguing that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay $16,541.61 in child support arrearage and $2,521.69 in attorney's fees. We affirm.
I. Background
Christopher Elder (plaintiff) and Desiree H. Elder (defendant) were married on 20 March 1993, separated on 14 February 2013, and are now divorced. The parties had two minor children during their marriage. On 21 February 2013, plaintiff filed a complaint for child custody, child support, and equitable distribution. On 18 March 2013, defendant filed her answer and counterclaims for child custody, temporary and permanent child support, post-separation support and alimony, and equitable distribution.
A hearing on permanent child support was held on 12 December 2014 in Mecklenburg County District Court. Based on plaintiff's testimony and financial affidavit, the trial court found that plaintiff had a gross monthly income of $8,454.00. Using Worksheet B of the North Carolina Child Support Guidelines, the court ordered plaintiff to pay $1,415.37 per month as permanent child support, retroactive to 1 April 2013. After crediting certain payments that plaintiff had previously made from April 2013 through December 2014, the trial court ordered him to pay $16,541.61 to defendant in child support arrearage. Plaintiff was also ordered to pay half of defendant's attorney's fees in the amount of $2,521.69.
Plaintiff timely appeals.
II. Discussion
A. Child Support Arrearage
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay $16,541.61 in child support arrearage. In its order, the trial court found that "neither party presented any evidence about their actual income in 2013. [Plaintiff] changed employment during 2013, but only received a slight increase in income as a result. According to plaintiff, the trial court miscalculated the amount owed because it did not consider his income between April 2013 and June 2014.
"Child support orders entered by a trial court are accorded substantial deference by appellate courts and our review is limited to a determination of whether there was a clear abuse of discretion." Leary v. Leary, 152 N.C. App. 438, 441, 567 S.E.2d 834, 837 (2002) (citing White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985)). "Abuse of discretion results where the court's ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision." State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988); see also White, 312 N.C. at 777, 324 S.E.2d at 833 ("A trial court may be reversed for abuse of discretion only upon a showing that its actions are manifestly unsupported by reason . . . [or] upon a showing that [the trial court's decision] was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.").
An award of child support must "be in such amount as to meet the reasonable needs of the child . . . ." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.4(c) (2015). Where child support is awarded prospectively, meaning "from the time a party files a complaint for child support to the date of trial," Taylor v. Taylor, 118 N.C. App. 356, 361, 455 S.E.2d 442, 446 (1995) (citations omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 343 N.C. 50, 468 S.E.2d 33 (1996), payments are generally calculated "based on the parents' current incomes at the time the order is entered," N.C. Child Support Guidelines, 2016 Ann. R. N.C. 52 (emphasis added). See Sharpe v. Nobles, 127 N.C. App. 705, 708, 493 S.E.2d 288, 290 (1997) ("Child support obligations are ordinarily determined by a party's actual income at the time the order is made or modified." (citation omitted)); cf. N.C. Child Support Guidelines, 2016 Ann. R. N.C. 50 (defining cases of retroactive child support as those "involving a parent's obligation to support his or her child for a period before a child support action was filed").
Here, the trial court awarded child support prospectively for a period beginning 1 April 2013, after defendant filed her counterclaim. Because prospective child support calculations are typically based on the parties' incomes at the time the order is entered, the trial court was not required to consider plaintiff's income between April 2013 and June 2014. Moreover, because the trial court correctly applied the statutory guidelines in determining the amount of child support arrearage, we affirm the court's $16,541.61 award. See Robinson v. Robinson, 210 N.C. App. 319, 333, 707 S.E.2d 785, 795 (2011) ("[A]n amount of child support which falls within the 'guidelines is presumptively correct.' " (citing Beamer v. Beamer, 169 N.C. App. 594, 599, 610 S.E.2d 220, 224 (2005))).
B. Attorney's Fees
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay half of defendant's attorney's fees, in the amount of $2,521.69, because it failed to make sufficient findings of fact regarding defendant's ability to defray the expense of the suit and plaintiff's refusal to provide adequate support.
In a child support action, the trial court may award "reasonable attorney's fees to an interested party acting in good faith who has insufficient means to defray the expense of the suit" if the court finds "that the party ordered to furnish support has refused to provide support which is adequate under the circumstances existing at the time of the institution of the action or proceeding . . . ." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.6 (2015); Brower v. Brower, 75 N.C. App. 425, 429, 331 S.E.2d 170, 173-74 (1985), superseded on other grounds by statute, 1987 Sess. Laws ch. 739, § 4, as recognized in Craig v. Craig, 103 N.C. App. 615, 619, 406 S.E.2d 656, 658 (1991). "An award of attorneys' fees is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. When that discretion has been properly exercised in accordance with the statutory requirements, the order must be affirmed on appeal." Spicer v. Spicer, 168 N.C. App. 283, 296, 607 S.E.2d 678, 687 (2005) (citing Stanback v. Stanback, 287 N.C. 448, 462, 215 S.E.2d 30, 40 (1975)). "Whether the[ ] statutory requirements have been met is a question of law, reviewable on appeal." Hudson v. Hudson, 299 N.C. 465, 472, 263 S.E.2d 719, 724 (1980) (citing Rickert v. Rickert, 282 N.C. 373, 193 S.E.2d 79 (1972)).
We reject plaintiff's argument that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact regarding defendant's ability to defray the cost of litigation. The court found that defendant had a gross monthly income of $5,384.00, and that her attorney's fees arising from her claim for child support totaled $5,043.38. The court also found that defendant paid $291.11 per month for the children's medical insurance, $523.33 per month in work-related childcare expenses, and the cost of the children's private school tuition was $1,068.00 per month. Although plaintiff paid $6,125.35 toward the children's tuition from August 2013 through November 2013, the record shows that defendant pays the monthly cost of tuition. Based on these findings and the evidence in the record, the court specifically found that defendant had "insufficient means to defray the costs of this action."
We also reject plaintiff's contention that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact regarding his refusal to provide adequate support at the time of the institution of the action. Although the order contains no finding which explicitly states that plaintiff "has refused to provide adequate support under the circumstances existing at the time of the institution of the action," the court's $16,541.61 award in child support arrearage assessed against plaintiff shows that he refused to provide such adequate support. See Leary, 152 N.C. App. at 444, 567 S.E.2d at 838 (holding that "the trial court sufficiently found that plaintiff had refused to provide adequate child support" where it ordered the plaintiff to pay $706.00 per month in child support to the defendant). Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court's award of attorney's fees.
III. Conclusion
We conclude that the trial court did not err in ordering plaintiff to pay $16,541.61 in child support arrearage and $2,521.69 in attorney's fees to defendant.
AFFIRMED.
Judges STROUD and DIETZ concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).