"The sole means of recovery of damages for injuries caused by a dog bite or attack is upon a theory of strict liability" ( King v. Hoffman, 178 A.D.3d 906, 908, 114 N.Y.S.3d 467 ). To recover in strict liability in tort for damages caused by a dog bite or attack against a property owner, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the owner: "(1) had notice that a dog was being harbored on the premises, (2) knew or should have known that the dog had vicious propensities, and (3) had sufficient control of the premises to allow the [property owner] to remove or confine the dog" ( Sarno v. Kelly, 78 A.D.3d 1157, 1157, 912 N.Y.S.2d 130 ; seeElardi v. Morales, 192 A.D.3d 1074, 1074–1075, 141 N.Y.S.3d 716 ; J.R. v. Poonam Apts., LLC, 186 A.D.3d 1421, 1422, 128 N.Y.S.3d 863 ).

The landlord defendants appeal. "To recover against a landlord for injuries caused by a tenant's dog on a theory of strict liability, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the landlord: (1) had notice that a dog was being harbored on the premises; (2) knew or should have known that the dog had vicious propensities, and (3) had sufficient control of the premises to allow the landlord to remove or confine the dog" ( Elardi v. Morales, 192 A.D.3d 1074, 1074, 141 N.Y.S.3d 716 ; seeBukhtiyarova v. Cohen, 172 A.D.3d 1153, 1154, 102 N.Y.S.3d 57 ). "Vicious propensities include the propensity to do any act that might endanger the safety of the persons and property of others in a given situation" ( Bard v. Jahnke, 6 N.Y.3d 592, 596–597, 815 N.Y.S.2d 16, 848 N.E.2d 463 [internal quotation marks omitted]; seeOrsini v. Cromarty, 191 A.D.3d 1011, 1011, 142 N.Y.S.3d 591 ).

Here, the defendant established, prima facie, that it had neither notice that the subject dog was being harbored on the premises nor knowledge of the dog's alleged violent propensities (see King v Hoffman, 178 A.D.3d at 909; Bukhtiyarova v Cohen, 172 A.D.3d 1153, 1155; see also Kennedy v Brooklyn Hospitality, LLC, 217 A.D.3d at 931; Elardi v Morales, 192 A.D.3d 1074, 1074-1075). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Agro v Olivieri, 226 A.D.3d 734, 735; Kennedy v Brooklyn Hospitality, LLC, 217 A.D.3d at 931).

In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Brooks v Adell, 211 A.D.3d at 793-794; Elardi v Morales, 192 A.D.3d 1074, 1075). Contrary to the plaintiff's assertion, the decedent's son's deposition testimony that the dog "d[id] his job" to "protect[ ]" the home by "bark[ing] when someone knocked on the door" was insufficient to establish that the dog served as a guard dog.

Knowledge of "normal canine behavior," such as running around, pulling on a leash and barking at another dog or passersby, barking at strangers, or chasing animals, will not support a finding of knowledge of vicious propensities ( Collier v. Zambito, 1 N.Y.3d at 447, 775 N.Y.S.2d 205, 807 N.E.2d 254 ; Bukhtiyarova v. Cohen, 172 A.D.3d 1153, 1155, 102 N.Y.S.3d 57 [internal quotation marks omitted]; seeGill v. Welch, 136 A.D.2d 940, 940, 524 N.Y.S.2d 692 ; Campo v. Holland, 32 A.D.3d 630, 631, 820 N.Y.S.2d 352 ). Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that they were not aware, nor should they have been aware, that Adell's dog had any vicious propensities (seeElardi v. Morales, 192 A.D.3d 1074, 141 N.Y.S.3d 716 ; Kraycer v. Fowler St., LLC, 147 A.D.3d 1038, 1039, 48 N.Y.S.3d 206 ; see alsoOrozco v. 725 S. Blvd., LLC, 82 A.D.3d 480, 480, 918 N.Y.S.2d 90 ; Le Pore v. Di Carlo, 272 A.D.2d 878, 879, 707 N.Y.S.2d 736 ). Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the evidence submitted by the defendants did not present a triable issue of fact (seePalumbo v. Nikirk, 59 A.D.3d 691, 692, 874 N.Y.S.2d 222 ).

"To recover against a landlord for injuries caused by a tenant's dog on a theory of strict liability, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the landlord: (1) had notice that a dog was being harbored on the premises; (2) knew or should have known that the dog had vicious propensities, and (3) had sufficient control of the premises to allow the landlord to remove or confine the dog" (see Quintanilla v Schutt, 212 A.D.3d 850 [2d Dept 2023] quoting Elardi v Morales, 192 A.D.3d 1074 [2d Dept 2021]; citing Bukhtiyarova v Cohen, 172 A.D.3d 1153 [2d Dept 2019]). Here the Plaintiff does not allege strict liability, but rather proceeds on a theory of negligence.

.. Here, the moving defendants have established, prima facie, that they did not own a dog at the subject premises; that they were not aware that a dog was being harbored on their properties nor should they have been; and that they did not know of a dog being kept at their properties which had any vicious propensities (Elardi v Morales, 192 A.D.3d 1074 [2d Dept 2021], quoting Sarno v Kelly, 78 A.D.3d at 1157; citing J.R. v Poonam Apts., LLC, 186 A.D.3d at 1422; Kraycer v Fowler St., LLC, 147 A.D.3d at 1039).