Opinion
A168873
09-18-2024
E.K., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. N.C., Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. 23-FAM-00870)
BURNS, J.
E.K. filed a petition for dissolution of his purported marriage to N.C. N.C. moved to quash and dismiss the petition on the ground that E.K. lacked capacity (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.63(a), (b)(1)), because the two had never been legally married. The trial court agreed, granted the motion, dismissed E.K.'s dissolution petition, and ordered him to pay N.C. 's attorney fees as a sanction. E.K. appeals, primarily contending that he had the legal capacity to petition for dissolution because he was a putative spouse; that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing oral testimony on that issue; and that the sanctions order was not supported by the governing law. We agree on the latter point and otherwise affirm the judgment.
Background
A.
E.K. and N.C. began dating in 2016 and separated in October 2022. In early 2019, N.C. bought a house, in Redwood City, where the couple lived together until their split. Although E.K. asserts that he paid half of the down payment and closing costs pursuant to an agreement that the two would own the property 50/50, title to the house remains in N.C. 's name alone.
On November 30, 2019, E.K. and N.C. held a wedding ceremony, in Mexico, where they exchanged rings and vows, and agreed to take each other as husband and wife. They never obtained a marriage license or certificate. Nor did they attempt to comply with Mexican civil marriage requirements.
Eleven days before the ceremony, they each signed a document (before a notary) that acknowledged the ceremony was symbolic only and would not give rise to a legally binding marriage. Specifically, the written acknowledgement provides: "This statement is to confirm that our ceremony in Cabo San Lucas, Mexico on November 30th, 2019 is not legally binding and should we decide to legally get married, we will do so in California and according to the laws of our residential jurisdiction. We are not availing ourselves to California marriage laws or community property laws with our ceremony on November 30th, 2019. [¶] Furthermore, even though we are currently living together, we are not availing ourselves to any laws (common laws) that grant asset division or spousal support until eight years from the date of this statement or until we have children together, whichever comes first." (Italics added.)
B.
In December 2022, E.K. filed a civil action against N.C., which sought (amongst other causes of action) to quiet title to the Redwood City house. In the quiet title action, E.K. admitted-in both his complaint and a later-filed declaration-that he understood the parties were not legally married.
We deny E.K.'s request that we take judicial notice of more recent filings in that civil action. He fails to demonstrate relevance. (See Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 544, fn. 4.)
In April 2023, E.K. petitioned for dissolution of marriage, seeking attorney fees, spousal support, and a determination of property rights. His petition asserts he and N.C. were married on November 30, 2019. In response to the petition, N.C. declared that she and E.K. were not legally married and asked the trial court to quash and dismiss the proceeding on the ground that E.K. lacked capacity to file a dissolution action. She also requested sanctions "in the amount of $25,000 or in the amount of [her] actual attorney fees" under Family Code section 271.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
E.K. filed an opposition, which totaled over 460 pages (including his declaration and 31 third-party declarations). In his declaration, signed under penalty of perjury, E.K. acknowledged signing the notarized document, dated November 19, 2019, stating the parties' intention was that the wedding would not create a legally binding marriage. He also acknowledged that they never obtained a license. He further stated that N.C. promised and represented that they would get a marriage certificate in California upon return from Mexico and that they would then be legally married according to California law. Nonetheless, after the ceremony in Mexico, he "subjectively and in good faith believed that [he and N.C. ] . . . were lawfully married under Iranian culture and tradition."
After a hearing (where no oral testimony was taken on the merits of the motion to quash), the trial court granted the motion, awarded N.C. $18,427.38 in attorney fees, pursuant to section 271, and ordered the matter dismissed with prejudice (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.63(f)).
The court explained: "[E.K.] has failed to raise any legally sufficient basis for filing a dissolution petition. The Court finds that [E.K.] has not made any attempt to demonstrate a legally valid license under either Mexican or California law. He does not describe compliance with legal formalities. [¶] Regarding putative spouse status, the Court does not find that [E.K.] can claim relief under . . . section 2251[, subdivision] (a). That statue only allows a party to claim putative spouse status when the party actually believes at the time of the wedding that they had entered into a legally binding marriage. The papers here indicate no such belief at the time of the Mexican wedding, the filings instead indicate that [E.K.] has only recently come to believe that the marriage may have been legally binding based on the advice of his attorney. And even in argument today that counsel . . . said that basically . . . [E.K.] expected when the parties return[ed] to California that it would be binding. It was not binding at the time of the ceremony. It was not a legal ceremony."
Discussion
A.
E.K. first maintains that the trial court erred in concluding that he lacked capacity to petition for dissolution. We assume that E.K. is correct that we review the order de novo. (Cf. McCall v. PacifiCare of Cal., Inc. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 412, 415 [demurrer standard of review]; but see Miller v. Miller (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 111, 116 (Miller) [abuse of discretion standard of review applied to dismissal after order granting motion to quash].) Nonetheless, we find no error.
1.
"In California, there are several requirements for a valid marriage. The parties must consent to the marriage; consent must be followed by the issuance of a license; and the marriage must be solemnized by an authorized person. (§§ 300, [306], 400.) In addition, the parties must declare, in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife. (§ 420.)" (In re Marriage of Left (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1145.) A marriage may be legally dissolved- and the spouses thereby restored to the status of "unmarried persons" (§ 2300)-only by (a) death of one of the parties, (b) a judgment of dissolution of marriage, or (c) a judgment of nullity of marriage. (§ 310.)
Dissolution is an in rem proceeding. Marriage is the res that is adjudicated. (In re Marriage of Zierenberg (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1436, 1444.) Thus, the existence of the marriage is a jurisdictional prerequisite, which can be challenged as invalid via motion to quash. (See Zaragoza v. Superior Court (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 720, 724-727 [challenge to the existence of marriage may be waived if not raised via motion to quash]; Carbone v. Superior Court (1941) 18 Cal.2d 768, 771.)
" 'Parties to an "invalid" marriage generally do not have the rights and obligations granted to and imposed upon spouses under the Family Code. But there is an important exception: A party to an invalid marriage who has "putative" spouse status may be entitled to property, support and attorney fees/costs rights similar to those attaching upon the dissolution of a valid marriage.'" (In re Marriage of Aviles &Vulovic (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 694, 699 (Aviles &Vulovic); accord Fam. Code, § 2251, subd. (a).) A putative spouse is one who "believed in good faith that the marriage was valid" (Fam. Code, § 2251, subd. (a), italics added) "in the past, at the time of the marriage." (Aviles &Vulovic, at p. 701; accord, Estate of DePasse (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 92, 108, disapproved on another ground by Ceja v. Rudolph &Sletten, Inc. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1113, 1126 (Ceja).) "The good faith inquiry is a subjective one that focuses on the actual state of mind of the alleged putative spouse. While there is no requirement that the claimed belief be objectively reasonable, good faith is a relative quality and depends on all the relevant circumstances, including objective circumstances." (Ceja, at p. 1128 [considering analogous Code Civ. Proc., § 377.60, subd. (b)].)
Although we review a finding that a party is a putative spouse under the substantial evidence standard of review (In re Marriage of Guo &Sun (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1491, 1497, disapproved on another ground by Ceja, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1126), here the court determined E.K. could not claim putative spouse status, quashed his petition, and dismissed it with prejudice (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.63(f)). The trial court's order was akin to a judgment of dismissal.
Although the parties erroneously agree that the order granting the motion to quash is appealable as an order granting a motion to quash service of summons (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(3)), the order is appealable because it is a final order of dismissal. (See id., § 904.1, subd. (a); Miller, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p. 116.)
2.
The trial court did not err in concluding E.K. had no capacity to petition for dissolution because it was undisputed that E.K. and N.C. were never lawfully married and that E.K. did not have a good faith belief that they were.
In family law proceedings, "the respondent may move to quash the proceeding" for "[l]ack of legal capacity to sue." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.63(b)(1); accord, Miller, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p. 116.) Here, the trial court determined that the record demonstrates that E.K. cannot prevail as a matter of law. (See Miller, at pp. 117, 121 [although alleged father did not lack standing, dismissal after motion to quash affirmed because alleged father "cannot prevail on the merits as a matter of law"].)
E.K. makes no attempt to show the marriage was legally binding or valid under either California or Mexican law. (See §§ 300, 306, 308 ["[a] marriage contracted outside this state that would be valid by laws of the jurisdiction in which the marriage was contracted is valid in California"]; Estate of DePasse, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 103 ["a license is a mandatory requirement for a valid marriage in California"].) In the earlier civil litigation, E.K. admitted knowing (at the time of the ceremony) that it was not. In his opening brief on appeal and declarations in opposition to the motion to quash, E.K. again concedes that he and N.C. never obtained a license and that he acknowledged the marriage would not be valid shortly before the ceremony.
Instead, E.K. maintains, in his opening brief, that he is a putative spouse because "nuptials were performed in accordance with Persian tradition with all the [other] formalities of a wedding." He also suggests that he is a putative spouse because he only signed the November 19 acknowledgement under duress or the influence of fraud.
Both arguments miss the mark. It is well settled that a putative spouse must have a subjective good faith belief in the existence of a valid or lawful marriage. (§ 2251, subd. (a); Ceja, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1128; Vallera v. Vallera (1943) 21 Cal.2d 681, 684.) E.K.'s belief that the two participated in a cultural or religious marriage ceremony is irrelevant. (See In re Marriage of Vryonis (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 712, 719-720 ["[i]f the trial court based its putative marriage finding on [the petitioning party's] belief she had celebrated a valid Muta marriage, the ruling was error because the required good faith belief is in the existence of a lawful California marriage"], disapproved on another ground by Ceja, at pp. 1126, 1128.) As for duress or fraud, the reasons why E.K. signed the acknowledgement (or the document's enforceability as a contract) are similarly immaterial: all that matters is that he subjectively understood, at the time of the ceremony, that it was not creating a lawful marriage. (Ceja, at p. 1128; Aviles &Vulovic, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 701.)
Here, it cannot be disputed that, at the time of their November 2019 wedding ceremony, neither party believed in good faith that they were legally married. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting N.C. 's motion to quash or in dismissing the petition. (See Miller, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p. 117; In re Marriage of Zierenberg, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th at p. 1445 [vacating judgment of dissolution because parties had previously divorced elsewhere and "at the time of the California decree, the res of marriage no longer existed; there was nothing to dissolve"].)
B.
E.K. also argues that the trial court violated section 217 and California Rules of Court, rule 5.113(b) by refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing and by failing to make findings justifying the refusal. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. (In re Marriage of Hearn (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 380, 390 (Hearn) [standard of review].)
1.
In general civil practice," '[m]otions are normally heard on affidavits alone.'" (Velez v. Smith (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1160.) Trial courts have discretion to refuse oral testimony. (Ibid.)
In family law matters, a" 'request for order'" is the same as a" 'motion.'" (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.63(a).) Section 217 varies from the general civil rules in some respects but nonetheless grants the court discretion to refuse oral testimony. Section 217, subdivision (a), provides that as a general matter "the court shall receive any live, competent testimony that is relevant and within the scope of the hearing." However, the court "may make a finding of good cause to refuse to receive live testimony and shall state its reasons for the finding on the record or in writing." (§ 217, subd. (b), italics added; accord, Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.113(c).)
California Rules of Court, rule 5.113(b) sets out factors the court must consider in making a finding of good cause to refuse live testimony, including "[w]hether material facts are in controversy," "[w]hether live testimony is necessary for the court to assess the credibility of the parties or other witnesses;" "[t]he right of the parties to question anyone submitting reports or other information to the court;" and "[a]ny other factor that is just and equitable."
2.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying E.K.'s request for an evidentiary hearing. The court explained on the record, "The court is declining to hear further evidence in this matter based on good cause under California Rule of Court[,] Rule 5.11 [sic], subsection (b). The Court does not find that credibility is relevant in assessing [E.K.'s] claims because they all fail as a matter of law."
Here, both parties' declarations acknowledged the existence of a document (signed by both parties before a notary public) that expressed the parties' mutual understanding-at the time of the wedding-that they would not be legally married. N.C. also presented evidence of E.K.'s admissions (in other litigation) wherein he acknowledged his understanding that he was not legally married to N.C. For the reasons stated above, this record was conclusive. There was no valid marriage and E.K. was not a putative spouse.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding good cause to refuse an evidentiary hearing. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.113(b)(2), (3); Velez v. Smith, supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1161-1162.) Furthermore, E.K. makes no effort to show any prejudice. (See Hearn, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 392; In re Marriage of George &Deamon (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 476, 484 [failure to make good cause finding is harmless where appellant does not show how live testimony would affect trial court's order].)
C.
E.K. contends that his conduct-filing the dissolution petition and opposition to N.C. 's motion to quash-provided no basis for the court's award of sanctions under section 271. We agree the trial court abused its discretion. (Sagonowsky v. Kekoa (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1152 (Sagonowsky) [standard of review].) To the extent that we review the trial court's interpretation of section 271, our review is de novo. (Ibid.)
1.
Section 271, subdivision (a), provides: "Notwithstanding any other provision of this code, the court may base an award of attorney's fees and costs on the extent to which any conduct of each party or attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys. An award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to this section is in the nature of a sanction. In making an award pursuant to this section, the court shall take into consideration all evidence concerning the parties' incomes, assets, and liabilities. The court shall not impose a sanction pursuant to this section that imposes an unreasonable financial burden on the party against whom the sanction is imposed. In order to obtain an award under this section, the party requesting an award of attorney's fees and costs is not required to demonstrate any financial need for the award." (Italics added.)
The purpose of section 271 is to promote settlement and to encourage cooperation that reduces the cost of litigation. (Sagonowsky, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 1152; Parker v. Harbert (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1172, 1176.) Litigants who flout that policy by needlessly increasing litigation costs are subject to imposition of attorney fees and costs as sanctions. (Sagonowsky, at p. 1152; Parker, at p. 1176.)
2.
The trial court applied the wrong legal standard. It awarded sanctions because it found E.K. filed a frivolous petition in retribution for N.C. 's successful pursuit of a domestic violence restraining order. The court also reasoned that sanctions would deter E.K. from taking similar action in the future. Because its award bore no connection to section 271's purpose of promoting settlement (see Webb v. Webb (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 876, 885; In re Marriage of Tharp (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1317-1318), the court abused its discretion.
Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5-which authorizes sanctions to compensate a party for attorney fees incurred "as a result of actions or tactics, made in bad faith, that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay"- may have authorized sanctions here. However, we need not consider that statute further because N.C. did not ask for fees on that basis and the trial court did not address it. (Sagonowsky, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 1156.)
We need not reach E.K.'s additional arguments. Nonetheless, N.C. concedes (by failing to respond to E.K.'s argument in N.C. 's respondent's brief) that the trial court further abused its discretion by failing to consider E.K.'s financial condition and whether the award "impose[d] an unreasonable financial burden." (See § 271, subd. (a); In re Marriage of Corona (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1226.)
Disposition
The portion of the trial court's judgment that awards sanctions, pursuant to section 271, is reversed and remanded to the trial court for further consideration. In all other respects, the trial court's judgment is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (3).)
WE CONCUR: SIMONS, ACTING P. J., CHOU, J.