Summary
In E.J. Platte Fisheries v. Wadford, 170 Miss. 617, 155 So. 161, it was held that the buyer of fishing equipment, a resident of this state, who leased such equipment to Louisiana fishermen, could not enjoin the unpaid seller in this state from prosecuting an attachment suit in Louisiana.
Summary of this case from Blount v. Hair Flying ServiceOpinion
No. 31281.
May 28, 1934. Suggestion of Error Overruled September 11, 1934.
1. EQUITY. Injunction.
Chancery court may enjoin persons within its jurisdiction from prosecuting suits in another state, but must observe maxims that equity follows the law and that he who seeks equity must do equity.
2. INJUNCTION.
Where buyer of fishing equipment, resident of Mississippi, leased equipment to Louisiana fishermen, buyer could not enjoin unpaid seller in Mississippi from prosecuting attachment suit in Louisiana, notwithstanding Louisiana procedure might deprive buyer of exemption, since buyer, by consummating removal of equipment to Louisiana, deprived seller of right to seize equipment in Mississippi under purchase money statute or on ground of imminent removal from state (Code 1930, sections 123, 2239).
3. INJUNCTION.
Court cannot inquire into motives of party ordering attachment in Louisiana when that party has done no more than what he has a right under laws of Mississippi to do.
APPEAL from Chancery Court of Warren County.
Brunini Hirsch, of Vicksburg, for appellant.
The burden of proof in this case was upon Wadford. He did not introduce the record in the Madison parish court to show what property was attached, what was its value, or anything else.
Via the bridge over the Mississippi river, Tallulah, the parish seat, is only twenty-two miles from Vicksburg; and, under the facts and circumstances in this case, the mere inconvenience to Wadford and his witnesses in attending the trial cannot sustain the injunction sued out. Wadford, who, himself, removed his property out of the state of Mississippi — part of it permanently, in the lands of the lessees thereof in Louisiana — had no right to sue out said injunction, on the ground that he had an exemption therein.
The Platte Fisheries submits that the facts in this case, as made out by this record, without even opening up a law book, conclusively show that the suing out of the writ of injunction, restraining the Louisiana proceedings, was without a semblance of right under the facts and circumstances of this case. Voller Teller, of Vicksburg, for appellee.
The rule is well established that a citizen of one state may be enjoined from prosecuting an action against another citizen of the same state in a foreign jurisdiction for the purpose of evading the law of his own state.
Fisher v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 112 Miss. 30, 72 So. 846; 22 Cyc. 814; 1 Joyce on Injunctions, sec. 106; 7 R.C.L. 1035, sec. 65; 3 L.R.A. Digest, page 2807, sec. 316; John D. O'Haire v. James F. Burns, 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 267, 45 Colo. 432, 101 P. 755; 25 L.R.A. (N.S.), page 267, note "Injunction Against Actions or Proceedings in Foreign Jurisdiction;" Hall v. Milligan, 69 A.L.R. 618; Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Elias Smith, 70 Miss. 344.
Appellee was indebted to appellant in the sum of about one thousand dollars, and does not dispute the debt or the amount thereof. Appellee is a commercial fisherman, and said debt was for the purchase money of fishing equipment, or for equipments, supplies, and advances furnished and used in connection with appellee's fishing business. On or about November 8, 1933, appellant filed suit to enforce its purchase-money lien; this action being in the circuit court of Warren county, in which county both the parties were and are domiciled. The sheriff was unable to find any of the property, and it was discovered that all of it, being substantially all the unincumbered property owned by appellee, had been leased to two fishermen to be used across the river in Madison parish, Louisiana, and had been removed to that parish and state. Appellant thereupon sued out an attachment in Louisiana and levied upon the property there. Appellee then filed a bill in the chancery court of Warren county to enjoin appellant from prosecuting the attachment suit in Louisiana on the ground that the latter proceeding was oppressive and inequitable and would put appellee to unnecessary expense and hardship and would deprive appellee of his exemptions allowed by the laws of this state. The chancery court sustained the bill and made the injunction perpetual.
The rule is well recognized in this state that the chancery court in proper cases may control persons in our jurisdiction in the matter of prosecuting suits in another state. Fisher v. Ins. Co., 112 Miss. 30, 72 So. 846. At the same time, we must recognize the limitations upon that rule as set forth, for instance, in such cases as Jones v. Hughes, 156 Iowa, 684, 137 N.W. 1023, 42 L.R.A. (N.S.) 502. And see Sturges v. Jackson, 88 Miss. 508, 40 So. 547, 6 L.R.A. (N.S.) 491, 117 Am. St. Rep. 754. In the examination of the question whether the facts are sufficient to sustain a bill of this kind, we must keep in mind the maxims which limit the field of chancery interference; and two of these maxims are that equity follows the law, and he who seeks equity must do equity. And, as a derivative of these two maxims, it follows that he who resorts to equity must not thereby propose to do inequity in depriving another of substantial legal rights, which, except for the actions of the complainant in the premises, the opposite party would have, or would have had, under our laws.
Had the property remained in this state, appellant could have seized it, as appellant attempted to do, under our purchase-money statute, section 2239, Code 1930; or, if there were no purchase-money lien, appellant could have attached it under section 123, Code 1930, on the ground that it was about to be removed out of the state. Appellee, by consummating the removal of the property to Louisiana, deprived appellant of the right to seize it in this state, and, when appellant thereupon attached it in Louisiana, appellant did there no more, in effect, than it would have had the right to do here, under our laws, had the property been found here before removal.
Much is said in the argument about the oppressive motives of appellant, but courts are not authorized to inquire into motives when the party has done what, and substantially no more than what, he has a right under our laws to do. And, as to the argument that the procedure in Louisiana might prevent appellee from obtaining his exemption of two hundred fifty dollars allowed by our statutes, there are two answers: First, there are no exemptions under our law as against purchase money; second, the property is admitted to be worth in excess of one thousand dollars, and a debtor could not claim the entire property as beyond reach of seizure because a small part of it, if here, might be exempt. If so, a local debtor could send ten thousand dollars worth of property, all he owned, into another state, and enjoin an attachment of it because, if he had left it here, he would have had an exemption on it of two hundred fifty dollars.
Reversed and remanded.