See Page v. Clark, 197 Colo. 306, 592 P.2d 792 (1979). Whether a claimant has sustained his burden of proof is a question of fact for the ALJ. Eisnach v. Industrial Commission, 633 P.2d 502 (Colo.App. 1981). The ALJ is the sole arbiter of conflicting medical evidence, Rockwell International v. Turnbull, 802 P.2d 1182 (Colo.App. 1990), and his or her findings are binding on review if supported by substantial evidence and plausible inferences drawn from the record.
The determination of whether an employer has sustained this burden of proof was a question of fact for resolution by the ALJ. See Eisnach v. Industrial Commission, 633 P.2d 502 (Colo.App. 1981); General Cable Co. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 878 P.2d 118 (Colo.App. 1994). Consequently, we are bound by the ALJ's determination if supported by substantial evidence and plausible inferences drawn from the record.
The question of whether the claimant met her burden of proof to establish a causal connection between the employment and the need for low back treatment is one of fact for determination by the ALJ. Faulkner v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, supra; Eisnach v. Industrial Commission, 633 P.2d 502 (Colo.App. 1981). Because the issue is factual in nature, we must uphold the ALJ's pertinent findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence and plausible inferences drawn from the record.
The question of whether the claimant satisfied her burden of proof to establish causation is one of fact for determination by the ALJ. Eisnach v. Industrial Commission, 633 P.2d 502 (Colo.App. 1981). Because the issue is factual in nature we must uphold the ALJ's order if supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Section 8-41-301(1)(c), C.R.S. 1998. The question of whether the claimant proved a causal relationship between the incident on March 28, 1998, and his subsequent disability and need for treatment was one of fact for determination by the ALJ. City of Durango v. Dunagan, 939 P.2d 496 (Colo.App. 1997); Eisnach v. Industrial Commission, 633 P.2d 502 (Colo.App. 1981). Because proof of causation is factual in nature, we must uphold the ALJ's order if supported by substantial evidence in the record.