See Page v. Clark, 197 Colo. 306, 592 P.2d 792 (1979). Whether a claimant has sustained his burden of proof is a question of fact for the ALJ. Eisnach v. Industrial Commission, 633 P.2d 502 (Colo.App. 1981). The ALJ is the sole arbiter of conflicting medical evidence, Rockwell International v. Turnbull, 802 P.2d 1182 (Colo.App. 1990), and his or her findings are binding on review if supported by substantial evidence and plausible inferences drawn from the record.
However, irrespective of whether the standard of proof at the administrative adjudicatory level of proceedings is clear and convincing, beyond a reasonable doubt, or merely a preponderance of the evidence, it is solely for the trier of fact to determine the persuasive effect of the evidence and whether the burden of proof has been satisfied. See Mehlbrandt v. Hall, 121 Colo. 165, 169, 213 P.2d 605 (1950); see also Eisnach v. Industrial Commission, 633 P.2d 502 (Colo.App. 1981). Therefore, we agree with the Panel that the question whether a party has overcome the IME impairment rating by clear and convincing evidence is a question of fact for the ALJ's determination.
Eisnach v. Industrial Commission, 633 P.2d 502 (Colo.App. 1981).
Where, as here, there is ample competent evidence supporting its findings they are binding on review. See Eisnach v. Industrial Commission, 633 P.2d 502 (Colo.App. 1981). IV.
The hearing officer's resolution of conflicting evidence is binding on review. See Eisnach v. Industrial Commission, 633 P.2d 502 (Colo.App. 1981). Here, while the evidence was in conflict as to the origin of claimant's mental disability, there was ample competent evidence to support the finding that the disability was proximately caused by the unique psychological stresses of undercover narcotics work.
Based on that finding, the denial of benefits was proper. As stated in Eisnach v. Industrial Commission, 633 P.2d 502 (Colo.App. 1981): "The burden was on the claimant to establish his right to compensation benefits, and whether he sustained his burden was a factual question for the [trier of the facts] to determine.
Temporary aggravations of preexisting conditions are compensable. See H H Warehouse v. Vicory, 805 P.2d 1167 (Colo. App. 1990); Eisnach v. Industrial Commission, 633 P.2d 502 (Colo. App. 1981); see also Diaz v. Intertape Polymer Group. April 24, 2008, W.C. No. 4-704-673. It does not appear that the respondents even contest that the initial medical treatment the claimant received was reasonable and necessary and thus some benefits under the act were due as a consequence of the March 4, 2005 incident. In our opinion, this alone would support a determination of compensability.
The ALJ has broad discretion in assessing the weight and sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether this burden has been satisfied. See Sena v. World of Sleep, 173 Colo. 348, 478 P.2d 671 (1970); Eisnach v. Industrial Commission, 633 P.2d 502 (Colo. App. 1981); Castro v. U.S. Transfer Storage, W.C. 3-849-678 (March 8, 1989). Here, the ALJ made the following findings of fact.
We do not dispute the claimant's legal argument that temporary aggravations of preexisting conditions are compensable. See H H Warehouse v. Vicory, 805 P.2d 1167 (Colo.App. 1990); Eisnach v. Industrial Commission, 633 P.2d 502 (Colo.App. 1981). Moreover, the "substantial permanent aggravation" language of ยง 8-41-304(1), C.R.S. 2007, applies only when there is a dispute concerning which of multiple employers or insurers is liable for an occupational disease.
The claimant's contention regarding the absence of a formal FCE concerns the weight to be afforded the expert's opinion, a matter within the ALJ's discretion. See Rockwell International v. Turnbull, supra; Eisnach v. Industrial Commission, 633 P.2d 502 (Colo.App. 1981). Contrary to the claimant's argument, the ALJ was not compelled to find this expert's opinion unpersuasive.