Opinion
No. LLI-FA-03-0091072-S
April 1, 2011
RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR MODIFICATION (#212)
Facts
The court (Ginocchio, J.) heard testimony on the plaintiff's motion for modification (#212) on November 29-30, 2010, and also on December 1, 2010. The court issued temporary orders on December 1, 2010, having found that the defendant had engaged in actions that were deleterious to the best interests of the minor child. The court found that the defendant was manipulating the minor child in order to prevail in the ongoing custody battle between the parties, that the defendant disparaged the plaintiff in her conversations with the minor child, and that the defendant had engaged in other actions that were harmful to the child. The court ordered that the plaintiff have sole legal custody of the minor child, pending a full hearing on the plaintiff's motion.
This court heard evidence and argument on the plaintiff's motion for modification over the course of three days, March 22-24, 2011. The court also considered the Defendant's Motion for Compliance (#232) and the Defendant's Motion for Modification of Child Custody Orders (#233). Both of the latter motions sought the revision of the temporary orders issued on December 1, 2010. On March 24, 2011, the court made findings that compelled the denial of both of the defendant's motions, and they were denied in open court on that date. The latter factual findings, which are hereby incorporated by reference, warrant the issuance of the orders set forth infra.
Discussion of the Law
General Statutes § 46b-56 provides in part: "(a) In any controversy before the Superior Court as to the custody or care of minor children . . . the court may make or modify any proper order regarding the custody, care, education, visitation and support of the children . . . (b) In making or modifying any order as provided in subsection (a) of this section, the rights and responsibilities of both parents shall be considered and the court shall enter orders accordingly that serve the best interests of the child and provide the child with the active and consistent involvement of both parents commensurate with their abilities and interests." "Before a court may modify a custody order, it must find that there has been a material change in circumstance since the prior order of the court, but the ultimate test is the best interests of the child." Gillespie v. Jenkins, 127 Conn.App. 228 (2011); Feinberg v. Feinberg, 114 Conn.App. 589, 594 (2009); Payton v. Payton, 103 Conn.App. 825, 833, 930 A.2d 802, cert denied, 284 Conn. 934, 935 A.2d 151 (2007). A finding of a material change in circumstances must be based on circumstances that have arisen since the previous order of custody. "If such a material change is found, the court may then consider past conduct as it bears on the present character of a parent and the suitability of that parent as custodian of the child." Simons v. Simons, 172 Conn. 341, 342-43 (1977). "The burden is on the party seeking modification to show the existence of a substantial change in circumstances." Jaser v. Jaser, 37 Conn.App. 194, 204 (1995); Emerick v. Emerick, 28 Conn.App. 794, 802, cert. denied, 224 Conn. 915 (1992); see also Walshon v. Walshon, 42 Conn.App. 651 (1996) (dismissing plaintiff's motion for modification for failure to make out a prima facie case of a material change in circumstances).
"[T]he best interests of the child include the child's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, and continuity and stability of [the child's] environment." Id.; In re Ryan R., 102 Conn.App. 608, 625-26, 926 A.2d 690, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 923, 924, 933 A.2d 724 (2007); Feinberg, supra, 114 Conn.App. 589, 593 (2009). Although our legislature has promulgated a series of criteria that a court may consider in determining a child's best interests, the best interest standard remains "inherently flexible and fact-specific to each child, giving the court broad discretion to consider all the different and individualized factors that might affect a specific child's welfare." In re Diane W., Superior Court for juvenile matters, Child Protection Session at Middletown (December 21, 2002). No single statutory provision is controlling nor is the court limited to the criteria specified by the legislature in deciding what is best for a particular child in a particular situation. As our courts have long emphasized, a "best interests" determination "involves weighing all the facts and circumstances of the family situation. Each case is unique." Gallo v. Gallo, 184 Conn. 36, 43, 440 A.2d 782 (1981).
Section 46b-56(c) of the General Statutes, provides, in relevant part:
"(c) In making or modifying any order as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, the court shall consider the best interests of the child, and in doing so may consider, but shall not be limited to, one or more of the following factors: (1) The temperament and developmental needs of the child; (2) the capacity and the disposition of the parents to understand and meet the needs of the child; (3) any relevant and material information obtained from the child, including the informed preferences of the child; (4) the wishes of the child's parents as to custody; (5) the past and current interaction and relationship of the child with each parent, the child's siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the best interests of the child; (6) the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage such continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent as is appropriate, including compliance with any court orders; (7) any manipulation by or coercive behavior of the parents in an effort to involve the child in the parents' dispute; (8) the ability of each parent to be actively involved in the life of the child; (9) the child's adjustment to his or her home, school and community environments; (10) the length of time that the child has lived in a stable and satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity in such environment, provided the court may consider favorably a parent who voluntarily leaves the child's family home pendente lite in order to alleviate stress in the household; (11) the stability of the child's existing or proposed residences, or both; (12) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved, except that a disability of a proposed custodial parent or other party, in and of itself, shall not be determinative of custody unless the proposed custodial arrangement is not in the best interests of the child; (13) the child's cultural background; (14) the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser, if any domestic violence has occurred between the parents or between a parent and another individual or the child; (15) whether the child or a sibling of the child has been abused or neglected, as defined respectively in section 46b-120; and (16) whether the party satisfactorily completed participation in a parenting education program established pursuant to section 46b-69b. The court is not required to assign any weight to any of the factors that it considers."
In the present case, the court finds that the plaintiff has met his burden of proving a substantial change in circumstance that warrants the change in the primary residence of the minor child. The court also finds that it is in the minor child's best interests that the plaintiff have sole legal and physical custody of the minor child. The court is fully mindful of the statutory goal that there be "active and consistent involvement of both parents," General Statutes § 46b-56(b), but that same statute also contemplates an order that provides for "(3) the award of sole custody to one parent with appropriate parenting time for the noncustodial parent where sole custody is in the best interests of the child; . . ."
When the court temporarily gave sole custody to the plaintiff on December 1, 2010, the court found that the defendant had made baseless complaints to the Department of Children and Families, that the defendant was making efforts to cause the minor child to hate her father, that the defendant was manipulating the minor for the express purpose of creating evidence that would result in limiting the plaintiff's access to his daughter, and that the defendant was causing emotional harm to her daughter. The court allowed the defendant to have limited, supervised visitation with the minor child, and also allowed regular parenting telephone calls between the minor child and the defendant.
As set forth in detail in the court's findings of March 25, 2011, the defendant's misconduct continued after the orders were issued on December 1, 2010. In summary, the court found that the defendant took advantage of a brief lapse in supervision to attempt to recruit the minor child to join in the defendant's effort to regain custody of her. The defendant then made false statements to the guardian ad litem regarding the nature of the defendant's remarks to the minor child. Further, the defendant offered as an exhibit a recording of a parenting telephone conversation with the minor child. Remarkably, even though the defendant considered it to be an exhibit in support of her position, the recording included an example of the defendant making a derogatory statement about the plaintiff to the minor child. The defendant fails to recognize that she is manipulating and damaging her minor child, despite the findings of numerous unbiased parties, all of which findings have been well supported and clearly communicated to her.
The Plaintiff's Motion for Sole Custody, having been heard by the Court, it is hereby ORDERED:
1. Neither party shall disparage, denigrate, slander, or make false statements regarding the other to the minor child, Sydney Eisenlohr (hereinafter referred to as "the minor child") or within her reasonable hearing range. Neither party shall discuss adult topics in front of or with the minor child. The phrase "adult topics" includes issues relating to parenting time, custody, the court, court proceedings, or the positions of the parties in the litigation. Each party shall use his or her best efforts to shield the minor child from disputes arising out of the dissolution, the present orders, any prior court orders, or any post-judgment proceedings. The parties shall not argue either in front of the minor child or within her reasonable hearing range. The defendant shall permanently cease the practice of making writings or drawings with the minor child relating to adult topics. The defendant shall provide the plaintiff's counsel with the original and all copies of all such drawings and writings made to date.
2. Each party has an affirmative obligation to foster feelings of love and affection in the minor child toward the other parent and family members. Neither party shall cause or permit any third party to discuss adult topics, as defined in the preceding paragraph, with the minor child.
3. The plaintiff shall have sole physical custody and legal custody of the minor child. See paragraph 5, infra. The plaintiff remains obligated to provide information to the defendant with regard to all significant matters affecting the health, education, daycare arrangements, and welfare of the minor child. Such information shall be provided within a reasonable time period or as soon as practical in the event of an emergency situation. The defendant may obtain copies of the minor child's health and educational records directly from the providers pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 46b-56(g). The plaintiff shall not have an affirmative obligation to provide documents to the defendant unless she is unable to obtain such records directly from the provider. The minor child's mental health treatment records shall not be disclosed to the plaintiff or the defendant unless deemed appropriate by the minor child's therapist. A copy of these orders shall be provided to all persons or entities charged with the health, education, care, and welfare of the minor child, including teachers, doctors, school administrators, and daycare providers.
4. Because of past, inappropriate communication issues attributable to the defendant, the plaintiff's obligation to communicate with defendant shall be limited to providing information by email once per week on issues such as medical treatment or educational issues in the event that there are developments of significance during that time period. Thus, for example, if the minor child does not have a doctor's appointment during a given week, or has not missed school during a given week, the plaintiff shall not be obligated to communicate the fact that there were no such medical appointments or the fact that the minor child did not miss school. The weekly emails, if such emails are necessary, shall include a list of reasonably anticipated extracurricular activities and/or out-of-state travel, including the minor child's itinerary and any relevant contact information. The itinerary shall be limited to dates of travel, destination, place of stay, e.g., name and address of hotel and telephone contact number. The parties will communicate through their existing email accounts. Communications through email shall take place in a non-argumentative, business-like, and non-disparaging manner. The plaintiff's obligation to communicate is limited to providing the information described above. He shall not be obligated to respond to overly detailed, multi-page inquiries from the defendant that do not serve legitimate information exchange purposes. Because of past communication issues, phone communication is encouraged but not required. The defendant shall be notified immediately by telephone in the event of any serious or emergency situation involving the health, safety, or well-being of the minor child. The defendant shall make arrangements such that her home telephone and cellular telephone numbers do not appear as "private number" or as a "blocked" call on the plaintiff's caller identification service.
5. Because of the defendant's pattern and practice of interfering with the plaintiff's relationship with the minor child, the defendant's refusal to communicate appropriately with the minor child or the plaintiff, and inter alia, her refusal to foster or support a relationship between the minor child and the plaintiff, sole physical and legal custody of the minor child is hereby vested in the plaintiff, post-judgment. The defendant may only move for modification of the physical and legal custody arrangements once she has completed all additional co-parenting classes and/or training recommended by the defendant's therapist. As a further condition precedent to the defendant being able to move for modification, she shall successfully complete an intensive therapy program, as described herein, with Connecticut Resource Group, LLC in Waterbury, Connecticut (hereinafter "CRG"). The defendant's therapist at CRG shall be either Michaela Kauffmann, Ph.D., or Sidney S. Horowitz, Ph.D., or another qualified Ph.D. level therapist from CRG, licensed for at least five years in the State of Connecticut, with experience working with families in high-conflict custody or high-conflict divorce cases, who shall serve as the defendant's therapist, at the defendant's sole expense. The defendant, the plaintiff, and CRG will work together to ensure that defendant's appointments and presence at CRG are never on the same day that the minor child meets with her therapist, who is also a member of CRG. No other provider shall be selected without the express written agreement of the plaintiff. The focus of the therapy shall be upon the acceptance of responsibility for parental alienation committed by the defendant, how to support a positive, nurturing relationship between the plaintiff and the minor child, and any treatment necessary to address the defendant's mental health issues, as identified by the therapist. The therapist shall have full access to the entire post-judgment custody file, all communications between the parties, the court's findings of December 1, 2010 and March 25, 2011, the present orders, and any other information deemed appropriate by the therapist. The therapist shall also accept the plaintiff's input and shall be permitted to communicate with the plaintiff for the purpose of obtaining information relevant to the defendant's therapy. The plaintiff shall ensure that he makes best and reasonable efforts to communicate with the defendant's therapist at CRG. Therapy shall continue for such duration as is deemed clinically appropriate by the therapist. In the event that the defendant seeks modification of the parenting orders herein, the defendant shall be deemed to have waived any applicable privilege regarding her therapy records and same shall be fully disclosed to the plaintiff. Further, as respecting possible modification, because of past issues of the defendant failing to comply with orders of the court; providing token compliance with orders of the court while ignoring the spirit and intent of the orders (including the orders dated December 1, 2010); the defendant's lengthy pattern of contemptuous conduct; the expenses and financial waste caused by the defendant; the substantial financial drain on the resources of the plaintiff and the guardian ad litem caused by the defendant; the pattern of parental alienation; prior false reports of abuse and/or neglect to governmental entities; and the need for repose on the part of the minor child, it is anticipated that in addition to satisfaction of the foregoing conditions, no modification motion is permitted to be filed by defendant regarding the sole physical and/or sole legal custody arrangements, except in the case of the plaintiff's total and permanent disability as determined by the Social Security Administration, unless the following conditions are satisfied: prior to filing or serving such a modification motion, the defendant shall (a) provide a copy of the proposed motion to the court in Litchfield by lodging the proposed motion with the clerk of the court as well as copies of all supporting evidence to be offered in support of the proposed motion; (b) the court shall determine whether the proposed motion is in good faith and is not vexatious, in bad faith, and/or is not otherwise in the best interests of the minor child; and (c) the proposed motion shall not be served, scheduled, heard, or placed on the calendar if the court determines that the motion does not comport with the foregoing criteria. See Practice Book § 25-26. In the event that such proposed motion is lodged with the court, the plaintiff shall be provided notice of the proposed motion and the court's determination as to the appropriate handling of the motion. In the event that the defendant makes any materially false representation in the proposed motion or supporting documentation, she shall be subject to sanctions, attorneys fees, and all other remedies available to the court. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the defendant may move for expansion of the length and duration of her supervised access as specified in paragraphs 7-8 infra.
6. While the plaintiff has sole physical and legal custody of the minor child, he shall be responsible for all day-to-day decisions for the minor child's care, guidance, well-being, health, education, and welfare. The plaintiff may attend the minor child's regularly scheduled activities, including school events, sports, music, dance, and any other extracurricular activities during school hours, sponsored by the school after school hours, and on weekends. To the extent that the defendant attends or participates in the minor child's school or extracurricular activities, she shall not use such participation as an opportunity to discuss adult topics with minor child, interfere with the activity, "lobby" the minor child to make disparaging statements about the plaintiff, excessively inquire of the minor child about her living arrangements or well-being, or "lobby" third parties such as teachers, coaches, or other third parties regarding the minor child's living arrangements or the minor child's relationship with her father. The defendant shall likewise not use her opportunity to participate in such activities as a means of obtaining unsupervised access to the minor child, either personally or through an agent. The defendant's inquiries to third parties such as teachers or coaches shall be similarly limited to legitimate questions regarding the minor child's academic progress or participation in the event at issue. The defendant shall not cause any third party or agent to violate any of the foregoing orders.
7. Pending further order of this court, the defendant's parenting access shall continue to be professionally supervised. Thomaston Counseling shall serve as the professional supervisor. The defendant shall pay all costs associated with the supervised parenting access. The defendant's parenting access shall be twice per week, for a total of two and one-half hours per week, as arranged between the parties and the supervision agency. Parenting access shall be scheduled to accommodate the plaintiff's work schedule as well as the minor child's activities, therapy sessions, and school obligations. Each party participating in the exchange for supervised parenting access shall make his or her best efforts to ensure a smooth, timely, and conflict-free transition. Neither party may discourage the minor child from expressing any display of affection toward the other. In the event that an emergency necessitates cancellation of the defendant's parenting access, the plaintiff shall make every practical attempt to advise the defendant of the situation as promptly as possible. If it is possible to schedule the defendant's supervised parenting time on a weekend, taking into account the minor child's sports and extracurricular activities, the defendant shall have supervised visitation every other Saturday for one and one-half hour and during the week for one hour. On the weeks when the defendant does not have supervised visitation on Saturday, she shall have supervised access for two one and one-half hour sessions during the week. The defendant's supervised parenting access shall not take precedence over special events, the minor child's extra-curricular activities, vacations, family trips or other pre-planned special activities. The plaintiff shall make reasonable efforts not to schedule activities so as to interfere with the defendant's supervised parenting time. The parties will attempt to arrive at a mutually convenient and consistent schedule, taking into account all of the foregoing. The plaintiff shall explain the schedule to the minor child and, if practical, shall provide her with a calendar reflecting the supervised visitation schedule. Any changes to the supervised access schedule for the upcoming week shall be communicated by the weekly information exchange email. Changes and revisions, especially on short notice, are to be avoided whenever possible. The plaintiff shall have two weeks per year for exclusive vacation with the minor child during which the defendant's supervised parenting access shall not take place. The two vacation weeks may coincide with the minor child's school and summer vacation schedule. The plaintiff shall provide at least thirty (30) days advance notice of the vacation weeks. The plaintiff may provide said notice by email. The defendant may request additional supervised parenting time for the following holidays/special occasions only: Easter, Thanksgiving, Christmas, Mother's Day, the minor child's birthday, and the defendant's birthday. The defendant's request shall be effected by email at least thirty (30) days prior to any of the special occasions described in this order. The plaintiff shall make reasonable efforts to accommodate the request. The defendant shall bear all costs associated with additional supervised parenting time during the aforesaid holidays/special occasions.
8. Upon a majority recommendation of the supervised parenting access provider, the defendant's therapist, and the minor child's therapist, the defendant may move that her parenting access be modified to supervised parenting access by a responsible third party. Such a motion shall not be filed for at least six months from the date of this order. In such event, the parenting supervisor shall be a responsible third party acceptable to the court or recommended by the Court Support Services Division, Family Services Unit ("Family Services"). Significant consideration shall be given to the plaintiff's preference, such as a person related to the plaintiff by blood or marriage. The supervisor shall not be a person who has previously engaged in acts of parental alienation. The supervisor shall not be the maternal grandmother, the minor child's godmother, or the godmother's husband unless the plaintiff, in his sole discretion, agrees otherwise in writing. If the plaintiff permits any of the latter individuals to serve as supervisor, he may thereafter choose to withdraw such permission at his discretion. The duration and schedule of such supervised parenting time shall be established at the time that any motion pursuant to this paragraph is filed, taking into account the schedule and convenience of the third-party supervisor. The provisions of paragraph 18 infra shall also apply to any motion for modification pursuant to this paragraph.
9. Neither party shall communicate with the other through the minor child, including, without limitation, visitation schedules, parenting issues, or support payments.
10. The defendant shall have reasonable communication access to the minor child when she is with the plaintiff other than when the defendant has supervised parenting time, including access by mail, e-mail, or telephone. Such reasonable access shall not disrupt the minor child's schedule or routines. Telephone access shall be limited to one telephone call every other day, of no more than thirty minutes of duration. The minor child shall not be forced, intimidated, interrogated, or unduly pressured to remain on the phone with the defendant. If the minor child wishes to terminate the call in less than thirty minutes, she shall be permitted to do so. The defendant shall not use the foregoing communications to lobby or interrogate the minor child or to discuss any adult topics as described in these orders. If the plaintiff believes that impermissible discussions are taking place, he may use any reasonable means to document the violation, including recording of telephone conversations. In the event such documentation is necessary, it shall be performed in a way that is not intrusive to the minor child.
11. The defendant is ordered to seek employment, submitting at least six applications per week with potential employers. The defendant may submit employment applications online, but she is also expected to go into the community to seek employment. The defendant must maintain a record of all employment applications that she submits and she will produce that record when ordered to do so by the court. Until the defendant obtains employment, she is relieved of the obligation to pay child support in the amount of $57 per week in accordance with the State of Connecticut Support and Arrearage Guidelines. The defendant is similarly relieved of the obligation to pay unreimbursed medical, dental, daycare, and mental health expenses per the Guideline Worksheet. Finally, the defendant is relieved of her obligation to pay 17% of all unreimbursed medical expenses and 20% of unreimbursed daycare expenses. The defendant shall devote her funds to the costs of her therapy, the expense of supervised visitation, and to her outstanding debt to the guardian ad litem. Until the defendant makes significant therapeutic progress, the court has no confidence that she will be able to interact freely with the minor child in a manner consistent with the minor child's best interests, thus warranting a departure from the applicable guidelines. Once the defendant obtains employment, the plaintiff is invited to move for an order that the defendant make the presumptive child support payments, unreimbursed medical expense payments, and child care expense payments. Once such an order of payment is entered, the plaintiff shall submit invoices, checks, or other reasonable proof of the expenses, as applicable, within two weeks of the expense being incurred. The defendant shall, upon receiving such proof of expenses, promptly reimburse her portion of the expense within two weeks of receipt of the documentation. With regard to significant, pre-planned expenses, such as orthodontia, the plaintiff shall include the treatment proposal in the weekly informational email. The plaintiff shall be entitled to claim the minor child as a tax exemption for state and federal tax purposes for 2010 and forward. If the defendant has already claimed the minor child as a tax exemption for 2010, she shall file an amended return that makes no such claim.
12. The defendant shall notify the plaintiff's counsel in writing once she obtains employment. She shall then provide the plaintiff with a current, sworn financial affidavit in conformity with the provisions of the Connecticut Practice Book. The defendant shall provide the plaintiff's counsel with any and all documents evidencing the defendant's financial condition, as reasonably requested by the plaintiff's counsel and at reasonable intervals as requested by the plaintiff's counsel. The plaintiff is further empowered — in his sole discretion and as he deems appropriate — to file a motion with the court to seek disclosure of the defendant's assets and to examine the defendant under oath for disclosure of assets, analogous to the procedures for examination of judgment debtors, in order to determine the defendant's financial condition.
13. The minor child shall continue in therapy with her current therapist pursuant to prior orders of this court. The plaintiff shall continue to transport the minor child to all therapy sessions. The defendant may attend therapy sessions and participate in the minor child's therapy if requested to do so by the minor child's therapist, including joint sessions with the plaintiff if so directed by the minor child's therapist. Notice of the defendant's participation in such therapy sessions shall be provided to the plaintiff reasonably in advance of the sessions. The defendant is prohibited from using such participation in therapy sessions to engage in inappropriate adult conversations with the minor child, nor may she interrogate, or lobby the minor child. Participation in therapy shall take priority over regular parenting time.
14. In the event of any emergency situation involving illness, injury, or medical condition affecting the minor child, the party noticing the situation shall immediately notify the other party by the most expeditious means possible. The defendant shall not cause, directly or indirectly, any false report of injury, abuse, or neglect to be made to any person or entity, including, without limitation, the Department of Children and Families ("DCF"). Violation of the latter requirement may expose the defendant to various penalties associated with contempt of a court order, including a monetary fine, sanctions, attorneys fees, or any other appropriate remedy. In the event that either party becomes aware of an injury or condition involving the minor child that he or she reasonably believes may warrant the involvement of the DCF, prior to initiating any such report the guardian ad litem shall be notified, shall be provided with a summary of the facts and circumstances, shall have an opportunity to meet with her ward without the involvement of the reporting party, may document the condition of the minor child, including by interview, the taking of notes, and/or photographs/video, may prepare documents or summaries for the benefit of DCF, may contact or speak with DCF workers as necessary, and shall discuss the situation with the party prior to the involvement of the DCF. Any report that the defendant makes to DCF shall be accompanied by a copy of the court's findings of March 25, 2011. Any report to the DCF that is determined to be misleading, false, fraudulent, manipulated, or in any way in bad faith, whether made directly by a party or initiated through a third party by action or inaction of a party, the offending party shall pay to the non-offending party the sum of $2,000. Said sum is narrowly tailored to address the contemptuous conduct at issue and shall not be deemed a fine or excessive penalty. The court shall further award reasonable attorneys fees and any other consequential damages to the non-offending party flowing from any false report, as well as any other relief in law or in equity deemed appropriate by the court.
15. The plaintiff may undertake such action to document his parenting access with the minor child by video or audio means when the minor child is with him in order to protect against false reports to persons or governmental entities by the defendant. Such documentation — if done at all — shall be performed in a manner that is not intrusive or upsetting to the minor child.
16. In the event that there are future parenting access, visitation, or other issues affecting the minor child that necessitate the continued involvement of the guardian ad litem, the existing orders requiring the guardian ad litem's fees to be evenly between the parties are hereby modified. The guardian ad litem shall, taking into account all equitable factors, including prior patterns of conduct, and whether fault or violation of the present orders are at issue, assess the cost of her services to the party deemed to have necessitated the involvement or on such percentage, as she deems appropriate in her discretion. The guardian ad litem is empowered to file motions to modify the current payment arrangements, to seek additional fees from the parties, or to require the parties to escrow funds with the guardian ad litem to deal with possible costs associated with her further involvement. The guardian ad litem's decision regarding the proportional assessment of her fees shall be binding and enforceable on the parties as an arbitration award and confirmable by the court as any such award.
17. The court recognizes, and values, the efforts by the guardian ad litem. The guardian ad litem has performed an invaluable service for the court, the parties, and most of all for the minor child. In return for devoting substantial professional time to this case, the guardian ad litem has received little compensation. Ironically the defendant, who has most burdened the guardian ad litem and who has made only the most minimal payments against her debt to the guardian ad litem, criticized the guardian ad litem in open court for not making a sufficient number of personal visits to the defendant's home. The court wishes to avoid further increases to the debt already owed to the guardian ad litem. These orders have been fashioned in a manner that is intended to greatly reduce, if not completely eliminate, the need for the guardian ad litem to perform further services in this case. The primary remaining responsibility for the guardian ad litem is set forth in paragraph fourteen, supra. The court further orders as follows:
(a) The guardian ad litem's fees, as presented by invoice, Court Exhibit 2, are found to be reasonable, necessary, and in the best interests of the minor child.
(b) One year from the date of these orders, the guardian ad litem is authorized to seek a money judgment relative to the plaintiff's then-outstanding debt to the guardian ad litem, Dina M. Menchetti.
(c) One year from the date of these orders, the guardian ad litem is authorized to seek a money judgment relative to the defendant's then-outstanding debt to the guardian ad litem, Dina M. Menchetti.
(d) The plaintiff shall pay the guardian ad litem $300.00 per month, as may be modified from time-to-time by the mutual agreement of the guardian ad litem and the plaintiff in a writing signed by both the guardian ad litem and the plaintiff.
(e) The defendant shall pay the guardian ad litem $150.00 per month, as may be modified from time-to-time by mutual agreement of the guardian ad litem and the defendant in a writing signed by both the guardian ad litem and the defendant.
(f) As respecting tax refunds, monetary gifts, lottery and prize winnings and inheritances that the parties may receive, the parties shall provide prompt notice of receipt to the guardian ad litem and as respecting the defendant, one hundred percent of such amounts shall be paid to the guardian ad litem toward the outstanding balance until paid in full, and as respecting the plaintiff, due to other outstanding obligations, such as his own legal fees, fifty percent of such amounts shall be paid to the guardian ad litem toward the outstanding balance until paid in full.
(g) The guardian ad litem has the right to request current sworn financial affidavits at reasonable intervals, and shall have the right to a hearing if the parties refuse to submit such affidavits. If one or more of the parties' financial circumstances warrant an amendment, in the sound discretion of the court, the guardian ad litem may seek modification of the payment arrangements, including accelerated payments of the guardian ad litem's fees or increases in the monthly payment sum.
(h) Should the parties sell or refinance for cash any real property titled in their respective names, whether jointly or individually, (not including the residence of non-party Sandra Eisenlohr or any of her property or assets), or any personal or other property for which the parties have an ownership interest, such as motor vehicles, jewelry, furnishings or tools, for which the transaction yields positive equity or cash in excess of $200.00 (two hundred dollars), the parties shall notify the guardian ad litem of the same and those funds shall be applied to pay their respective balances owned to the guardian ad litem for her fees until said balances are satisfied.
18. To protect the minor child from further litigation, to protect the integrity of the court's judgment, and as part of the court's inherent authority to manage its docket, it is ordered that prior to filing any motion in this case, and in addition to the provisions of paragraph five, supra, the defendant shall, prior to filing or serving any motion in this case: (a) provide a copy of the proposed motion to the court in Litchfield by lodging the proposed motion with the clerk of the court, as well as copies of all supporting evidence to be offered in support of the proposed motion; (b) the court shall determine whether the proposed motion is in good faith and is not vexatious, in bad faith, and/or is not otherwise in the best interests of the minor child; and (c) the proposed motion shall not be served, scheduled, heard, or placed on the calendar if the court determines that the motion does not comport with the foregoing criteria. In the event that the defendant makes any false representation in the proposed motion or supporting documentation, she shall be subject to sanctions, attorneys fees, and all other remedies available to the court. Counsel of record shall receive notice that any motion has been lodged with the court by the defendant.
19. All prior inconsistent orders are vacated.