Opinion
CV-23-00279-TUC-JCH (MSA)
01-24-2024
Jimmy Lee Eisenhour, Petitioner, v. M. Gutierrez, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARIA AGUILERA, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Petitioner Jimmy Eisenhour, a federal inmate, petitions for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The Court will recommend that the petition be denied as without merit.
Discussion
Petitioner claims that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has manipulated his custody classification so as to prevent him from earning good conduct time and an earlier release date. In response, Respondent contends that dismissal is proper because the Court lacks jurisdiction over the petition, the petition is moot, and Petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Respondent also contends that Petitioner's claim lacks merit. These contentions are taken in turn.
First, jurisdiction. A § 2241 petition is a proper vehicle for a prisoner's challenge to the execution of his sentence. Pinson v. Carvajal, 69 F.4th 1059, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2023). As the loss of good conduct time can affect the length of confinement, § 2241 jurisdiction is available “for a prisoner's claims that he has been denied good time credits without due process of law.” Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted), overruled on other grounds by Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). Here, Petitioner alleges that the BOP intentionally misclassified him so that he cannot earn good conduct time. This is a cognizable challenge to the execution of Petitioner's sentence.
Respondent argues that jurisdiction is lacking because, contrary to Petitioner's allegations, custody classification does not affect good conduct time. Respondent also points out that custody classification is a discretionary decision that generally is not subject to judicial review. However, in determining whether jurisdiction exists, the Court must accept the petitioner's factual allegations as true. Pinson, 69 F.4th at 1073; see Reeb v. Thomas, 636 F.3d 1224, 1228 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that habeas jurisdiction is “available for allegations that BOP action is contrary to established federal law, violates the United States Constitution, or exceeds its statutory authority” (footnote omitted)). The Court has jurisdiction over Petitioner's claim as pleaded. If he turns out to be wrong on the facts (he is), that will mean that his claim lacks merit, not that the Court lacks jurisdiction to address the merits.
Second, mootness. “Generally, an action is mooted when the issues presented are no longer live and therefore the parties lack a legally cognizable interest for which the courts can grant a remedy.” Dep't of Fish & Game v. Fed. Subsistence Bd., 62 F.4th 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Alaska Ctr. For Env't v. U.S. Forest Serv., 189 F.3d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1999)). “Mootness is a jurisdictional issue,” Maldonado v. Lynch, 786 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (quoting Blandino-Medina v. Holder, 712 F.3d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir. 2013)), so Petitioner's allegations are material to whether his claim is moot. This case involves a live dispute because, as just noted, the parties disagree about the facts. That Respondent might be correct about the facts (he is) goes towards who wins that dispute, not whether there is a dispute at all.
Third, exhaustion. “As a prudential matter, courts require that habeas petitioners exhaust all available judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Ward v. Chavez, 678 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001)). Petitioner asserts, in his verified petition, that a BOP staff member refused to accept his administrative filing and refused to give him the forms necessary to exhaust at the appeals level. (Doc. 1 at 3-4.) In a sworn statement, Petitioner's cellmate says that he witnessed that event. (Doc. 1-1 at 3.) If these statements are true, then the exhaustion requirement should be waived. See Fraley v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 1 F.3d 924, 925 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (waiving the exhaustion requirement because “further application for an administrative remedy would [have] be[en] futile”). However, the staff member in question asserts, in his own sworn statement, that Petitioner's accusations are false and that he has never refused to give a prisoner an exhaustion form. (Doc. 7-2 at 8-9.) Because the exhaustion requirement is prudential, and because this factual dispute cannot be resolved on the papers, the Court will leave the issue unresolved and turn to the substance of Petitioner's claim.
Finally, the merits. Petitioner alleges that he cannot earn good conduct time because of his custody classification. However, Respondent has submitted evidence showing that a prisoner's ability to earn good conduct time does not depend on his custody classification. (Doc. 7-1 at 4-5.) Respondent has also submitted evidence showing that Petitioner has earned 146 days of good conduct time, that he can earn an additional 344 days of good conduct time in the future, and that both the earned and unearned future time (490 days) is being factored into his projected release date. (Id. at 20.) Petitioner's allegations are belied by the evidence. His claim is meritless.
Conclusion
The Court recommends that Petitioner Jimmy Eisenhour's petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1) be denied.
This recommendation is not immediately appealable to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The parties have 14 days to file specific written objections with the district court. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). The parties have 14 days to file responses to objections. Id. The parties may not file replies to objections absent the district court's permission. The failure to file timely objections may result in the waiver of de novo review. United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the referral of this matter. Filed objections should bear the following case number: CV-23-00279-TUC-JCH.