o The Hearing Examiner properly concluded that respondent has the financial ability to pay one half of the college expenses of his children ( see generally, Eiseman v. Eiseman, 237 A.D.2d 484, 485). Further, the Hearing Examiner did not err in awarding judgment to petitioner without holding a hearing to determine the amount of those expenses.

Therefore, the amount the defendant is obligated to pay is $58,095, the stipulated amount the parties attributed to college expenses paid by the plaintiff. Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff's counsel fees in the sum of $15,000 ( see, DeCabrera v. Cabrera-Rosete, 70 N.Y.2d 879, 881; Eiseman v. Eiseman, 237 A.D.2d 484, 485-486). Bracken, J. P., Copertino, Thompson and Friedmann, JJ., concur.

The greatest deference should be given to the factual findings of a support magistrate who is in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses and the evidence proffered (see Matter of Niagara County DSS v. Randy M., 206 AD2d 878 (4th Dept. 1994); Matter of McCarthy v. Braiman, 125 AD2d 572 (2nd Dept. 1986)). In the first Objection, counsel cites Eiseman v. Eiseman, 237 AD2d 484 (2nd Dept. 1997), in support of the argument that the college contributions, as ordered by Mr. Gorman, are beyond Petitioner's means and ability to afford. In the latter case, the father's actual income represented 74% of the combined income, but the lower court directed the father to pay only 60% of the college costs, and the mother 40%, based upon the record which supported an adjustment to the parties' proportionate shares because the mother actually enjoyed a stronger financial position than her earnings seemed to indicate.