Opinion
CV-22-01664-PHX-MTL (ESW)
08-01-2024
Randy Eiland, Plaintiff, v. S. Rodriguez, Defendant.
ORDER
Michael T. Liburdi United States District Judge
Plaintiff Randy Eiland, who is currently confined in the Saguaro Correctional Center (“SCC”), brought this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendant moves for summary judgment. (Doc. 80.) Plaintiff was informed of his rights and obligations to respond pursuant to Randv. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (Doc. 82), and he opposes the Motion. (Doc. 92.) Also pending before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 86) and Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 84).
I. Background
In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff relevantly alleged as follows:
Plaintiff is an Idaho prisoner confined in the SCC. On September 30, 2020, Plaintiff received an Idaho Department of Correction Restrictive Housing Order and an Idaho Department of Correction Disciplinary Offense Report for an alleged disciplinary violation, Disobedience to Order 1 (Class A). On October 1, 2020, Defendant Rodriguez conducted a disciplinary hearing [and] knowingly and willingly failing to give Plaintiff 24 hours' notice before the disciplinary hearing,
[failed] to inform Plaintiff of the definition of the charge of Disobedience to Order 1 (Class A) during the disciplinary hearing, den[ied] Plaintiff the right to call witnesses or submit witness statements and present evidence, den[ied] him a copy of the Finding and Decision, and [did not provide] Plaintiff a disciplinary hearing appeal form. As his injury, Plaintiff claims he was wrongfully placed in the SCC segregation unit, and he was wrongfully charged with a felony that would extend his prison sentence.(Doc. 18 at 3.) On screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court determined that Plaintiff stated a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Defendant Rodriguez in her individual capacity. (See generally id.)
In a December 1, 2023 Order, the Court denied Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 76).
II. Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 84)
The Court has discretion to reconsider and vacate a prior order. Barber v. Hawaii, 42 F.3d 1185, 1198 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Nutri-cology, Inc., 982 F.2d 394, 396 (9th Cir. 1992). “The Court will ordinarily deny a motion for reconsideration of an Order absent a showing of manifest error or a showing of new facts or legal authority that could not have been brought to its attention earlier with reasonable diligence.” LRCiv 7.2(g)(1). Any motion for reconsideration must specifically identify the matters that were overlooked or misapprehended by the Court. Id. If any new matters are being brought to the Court's attention for the first time, the movant must identify the reasons they were not presented earlier, and any specific modifications being sought in the Court's Order. Id. No motion for reconsideration of an Order may repeat any oral or written argument made in support of or in opposition to the motion that resulted in the Order. Id.
Plaintiff argues that the Court should reconsider its December 1, 2023 Order denying his Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff primarily argues that the Court erred in finding that he must have suffered an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life to demonstrate that he had a liberty interest that warranted due process protections. Although Plaintiff continues to argue that he has a due process right created by the Idaho Department of Corrections “Disciplinary Procedures for Inmates 318.02.01.001,” Plaintiff incorrectly argues that the Court is not bound by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Sandin v. Connor. (Doc. 84 at 2 (“Plaintiff [sic] case is govern [sic] by the NINTH Circuit district [sic] and not subject to the Sandin standard.”) (emphasis in original). According to Plaintiff, the Ninth Circuit “has its own approach to the Sandin [sic] standard.” (Id.)
As an initial matter, the Ninth Circuit is bound by all Supreme Court opinions and this argument to the contrary is frivolous. Plaintiff cites to Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1097-98 (9th Cir. 1986) in support of his argument that he need not show an atypical and significant hardship to state a due process claim based on a state-created liberty interest, but Toussaint was overruled on this point by Sandin. See, e.g., Richardson v. Runnels, 594 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Toussaint v. McCarthy . . . held that California Code of Regulations Title 15 §§ 3335 and 3336 create a liberty interest in freedom from arbitrary segregation. Sandin v. Conner, . . . however, articulated a new requirement for recognizing federal due process liberty interests of inmates subject to administrative segregation. Segregation ordinarily must rise to the level of “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”).
Plaintiff further argues that he has a state-created liberty interest created by prison regulations, but also that he is otherwise entitled to the protections of Wolff v. McConnell under Burnsworth v. Gunderson, 179 F.3d 771 (9th Cir. 1999) and Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 1999).
Nonnette v. Small is inapposite as it concerns the revocation of good time credits and the proposition that “revocation of good time does not comport with ‘the minimum requirements of procedural due process, unless the findings of the prison disciplinary board are supported by some evidence in the record.” Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985). Here, Plaintiff has not had good time credits revoked in connection with his conviction. To the extent Plaintiff argues that Burnsworth supports a due process claim, Plaintiff did not allege that his disciplinary conviction was not supported by “some evidence” in his operative Second Amended Complaint, instead alleging that he did not receive 24-hours-notice prior the hearing, was not allowed to call witnesses during the hearing or present witness statements, was not allowed to present evidence or have the contents of the MP3 player during the hearing, was not allowed a copy of the finding and decision, and was not allowed a disciplinary hearing appeal form, and did not know the definition of “disobedience to order 1 (class A).” (Doc. 17.) Moreover, as discussed more fully below, Plaintiff's due process claim unrelated to an atypical and significant hardship imposed by his overturned disciplinary conviction fails as a matter of law.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has not shown any basis for reconsideration of the Court's December 1, 2023 Order, and his Motion will be denied.
III. Plaintiff's Motion to Strike (Doc. 86)
Pursuant to Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff moves to strike Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant's Statement of Facts, and the attached exhibits on the ground that Defendant did not previously disclose all exhibits she used in moving for summary judgment during discovery.
In Response, Defendant argues that Rule 12(f) is the improper procedural mechanism and Plaintiff should have instead objected to the admissibility of evidence pursuant to Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.2(m)(2), the exhibits attached to the Motion for Summary Judgment address arguments not alleged in Plaintiff's operative Complaint, but that were made for the first time in Plaintiff's Reply in Support of his Motion for Summary Judgment and are therefore timely disclosed, and to the extent Plaintiff complains that Defendant did not provide a proper response to an interrogatory, Plaintiff did not properly follow the discovery procedure set forth in this Court's Scheduling Order.
Plaintiff's Motion is procedurally improper. To the extent Plaintiff objects to the admissibility of certain evidence, Plaintiff should have objected to such evidence and not moved to strike Defendant's entire Motion for Summary Judgment, Statement of Facts, and attached exhibits. Because Plaintiff has offered no basis on which to strike Defendant's entire Motion for Summary Judgment, Statement of Facts, and the attached exhibits, his
Motion to Strike will be denied.
In his Motion to Strike, Plaintiff assert that the exhibits at Docs. 81-1 and 81-2 were not disclosed during discovery. It is unnecessary for the Court to address this argument as Defendant did not lay foundation for this evidence. Accordingly, the Court will not consider this evidence in ruling on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. See, e.g., Quanta Indemnity Co. v. Amberwood Dev. Inc., No. CV 11-1807-PHX-JAT, 2014 WL 1246144, at *2 (D. Ariz. March 26, 2014) (material in a form not admissible in evidence, but which could be produced in a form admissible at trial, may be used to avoid, but not obtain summary judgment) (citing cases).
IV. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 80)
Defendant argues that she is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff's fifteen-day disciplinary detention did not constitute an atypical and significant hardship, the dismissed disciplinary finding does not affect the duration of Plaintiff's prison sentence, alleged violations of internal policies are immaterial to Plaintiff's claim, Plaintiff was provided due process as required by Wolff v. McDonnell, and Plaintiff's due process claim is moot.
A. Legal Standard
A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The movant bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record, together with affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
If the movant fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmovant need not produce anything. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Co., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). But if the movant meets its initial responsibility, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 250 (1986); see Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995). The nonmovant need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor, First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); however, it must “come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal citation omitted); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).
At summary judgment, the judge's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. In its analysis, the court must believe the nonmovant's evidence and draw all inferences in the nonmovant's favor. Id. at 255. The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider any other materials in the record. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3).
B. Facts
Plaintiff is an Idaho prisoner incarcerated at SCC. (Doc. 81 ¶ 1; Doc. 93 ¶ 1.) Defendant is an employee of SCC and served as the Disciplinary Hearing Officer over the disciplinary hearing on October 1, 2020, alleged in the SAC. (Doc. 81 ¶ 2; Doc. 93 ¶ 2.) On September 28, 2020, Plaintiff's property was searched because Plaintiff was a new intake to SCC, and the search uncovered an MP3 player, which contained 1,000 images of child pornography. (Doc. 81 ¶¶ 3-4; Doc. 93 ¶ 4.) On September 29, 2020, Plaintiff “was given a Disciplinary Report . . . for a MP3 player found in his . . . property.” (Doc. 93 ¶ 5.) On October 1, 2020, Defendant conducted the disciplinary hearing. (Doc. 81 ¶ 9; Doc. 93 ¶ 9.) Defendant found Plaintiff guilty, and Plaintiff was given 15 days in detention as a sanction. (Doc. 81 ¶ 10.) Defendant did not rely on a review of the images on the MP3 player in finding Plaintiff guilty, but rather, found that the Disciplinary Offense Report and findings of the facility investigator were sufficient and formed the basis of her guilty finding pursuant to policy. (Id. ¶ 40.)
Plaintiff has not been criminally charged, and according to the Eloy Police Department's records of the incident, charges were declined due to insufficient evidence. (Doc. 81 ¶¶ 19-20.) Plaintiff subsequently appealed the disciplinary conviction and it was dismissed on appeal. (Doc. 81 ¶ 16; Doc. 93 ¶ 16; Doc. 53-1 at 103: 24-25 (Plaintiff's deposition: “Q: But the underlying DOR that you received for this incident was dismissed. Correct? A. Correct. Q: Do you know why it was dismissed? A. No, I don't. Q: Was it pursuant to your appeal? A. Yeah, it was on appeal.”).
C. Discussion
Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot show an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life entitling him to due process protections in relation to the 15-day detention sanction. In Response, Plaintiff specially disavows any claims pursuant to Sandin. (Doc. 92 at 5 (“As an initial matter, Plaintiff failed to plead any conditions of confinement that presented an atypical and significant hardship. . . . Defendant Rodriguez herein is trying to introduce unpled [sic] claim that cannot form the basis to establish or defeat summary judgment.”) Plaintiff asserts that under Wolff v. McDonell, he does not have to show an atypical and significant hardship to be entitled to due process protections. Plaintiff asserts that he was not provided proper “process” under Wolff because he was allegedly not provided notice of the charges 24 hours prior to the disciplinary hearing, was not provided a written statement of the evidence relied on or a written statement for the disciplinary action, was not allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence during the disciplinary hearing, and was not afforded an impartial hearing by Defendant Rodriguez. (Doc. 92.)
Although Plaintiff repeatedly argues that his claim is about the Wolff protections, he also argues that he has a “liberty interest in remaining free from disciplinary segregation.” (Id.) Plaintiff is incorrect: a liberty interest in remaining free from disciplinary segregation only exists if the disciplinary segregation constituted an atypical and significant hardship, which Plaintiff specifically denies.
The Court has already found that Plaintiff's due process claim relating to the 15-day confinement fails as a matter of law because Plaintiff does not show that his 15-day confinement constituted an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. (Doc. 76.)
To the extent Plaintiff asserts that his due process claim is based solely on the alleged Wolffviolations, Plaintiff admitted in his deposition that the disciplinary conviction was overturned on appeal. Accordingly, the evidence shows that Plaintiff was afforded due process by the prison, and his due process claim fails as a matter of law. See Frank v. Schultz, 808 F.3d 762, 763-764 (9th Circ. 2015) (where Plaintiff filed action alleging that he had been deprived of due process because, among other things, he had not received advance written notice that the charge against him was modified, the due process claim failed as a matter of law because the due process error complained of was corrected during the administrative appeal process, which is part of the due process afforded to prisoners.); Torricellas v. Poole, 954 F.Supp. 1405, 1414 (C.D. Cal.1997) (“Where a procedural error has been corrected in the administrative process, as it was here, there has been no compensable due process violation. The administrative appeal is considered part of the process afforded, and any error in the process can be corrected during that appeals process without necessarily subjecting prison officials to liability for procedural violations at lower levels.”) (quoted with approval by Frank), affd, 141 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir.1998).
Because Defendant is entitled to summary judgment, the Court does not address her alternate argument that she complied with Wolff during the disciplinary process.
Accordingly, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted.
IT IS ORDERED:
(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 80), Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 86) and Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 84).
(2) Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 86) and Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 84) are denied.
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(3) Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 80) is granted, and the action is terminated with prejudice. The Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly.