Opinion
CIVIL 3:20-CV-439
05-17-2023
EMMA EIFERT, Plaintiff, v. MERIDIAN SECURITY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants.
Mariani Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Martin C. Carlson United States Magistrate Judge
I. Introduction
This case comes before the court on a partial motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant, Meridian Security Insurance Company (“Meridian”). (Doc. 25). The plaintiff, Emma Eifert, filed a complaint in state court against Meridian in 2019, alleging that Meridian failed to pay benefits to her under her insurance policy when she was struck by the door of an unidentified driver in a parking lot. Meridian then removed the case against it to federal court. (Doc. 1). The plaintiff's complaint alleges claims for breach of contract and bad faith.
The district court bifurcated the breach of contract and bad faith claims and stayed discovery regarding the bad faith claim pending the resolution of the breach of contract claim. (Doc. 18).
Meridian has now moved for partial summary judgment on the breach of contract claim, arguing that there are no genuine disputes of material fact with respect to the plaintiff's claim that Meridian denied her claim for uninsured motorist (“UM”) benefits. Specifically, the defendant contends that the plaintiff's failure to report the accident to the police bars her claim for UM benefits, both under the Meridian policy and under Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle and Financial Responsibility Law (“MVFRL”), 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1701, et seq.
For the purposes of this partial motion for summary judgment, the defendant is not contesting the plaintiff's claim for first party benefits; rather, this motion focuses solely on the plaintiff's claim for UM benefits.
After consideration, we agree that the plaintiff is barred from recovering UM benefits due to her undisputed failure to report the accident to the police, which is a prerequisite to coverage under both the policy and the MVFRL. Accordingly, we will recommend that the Court grant the defendant's partial motion for summary judgment.
The factual background of this Report and Recommendation is taken from the parties' submissions to the extent they are consistent with the record. (Docs. 45, 46, 49-52).
Eifert's complaint stems from an incident in 2017 where she was struck by the door of a vehicle while walking through a parking lot. Eifert alleges that she was walking through the Arena Hub Plaza parking lot in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, on November 24, 2017, when the door of an SUV opened and struck her person. The complaint asserts that the tortfeasor failed to stop and assist Eifert and instead drove away. Eifert contends that she suffered serious physical injuries as a result of the accident.
We note that in the plaintiff's deposition, she testified that the driver of the vehicle that struck her got out of his car and asked her if she was okay. (Doc. 25-1, at 11).
At the time of the accident, Eifert had an insurance policy with Meridian that included coverage for uninsured motorist benefits. This coverage included accidents in which the plaintiff was involved in a hit-and-run accident. Part C of the policy pertains to UM benefits and states in relevant part:
A. We will pay compensatory damages which an “insured” is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an “uninsured motor vehicle” because of “bodily injury”:
1. Sustained by an “insured”; and
2. Caused by an accident.
C. “Uninsured motor vehicle” means a land motor vehicle or trailer of any type:
3. Which is a hit-and-run vehicle whose operator or owner cannot be identified and which hits:
a. You or any “family member” . . .(Doc. 25-1, at 58). Part E of the policy pertains to the insured's duties and responsibilities and states that “[a] person seeking Uninsured Motorist Coverage must also: (1) Promptly notify the police if a hit-and-run driver is involved . . .” (Id., at 63).
It is undisputed that Eifert did not notify the police on the day of the accident or thereafter, and nobody notified the police on her behalf. (Doc. 25-1, at 12-13). Rather, Eifert reported the accident to her local insurance agent and then to an agent of the defendant a few days after the accident. (Id., at 13-14). Eifert submitted a claim for first party benefits as well as UM benefits, alleging that her loss was caused by a phantom, unidentified driver. Meridian subsequently denied her claim for UM benefits.
This lawsuit followed. Eifert file a complaint against the defendant in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County, and the defendant removed the case to federal court. (Doc. 1). As we have noted, Eifert's complaint asserts a breach of contract claim based on the denial of her UM claim and the refusal of Meridian to pay first party benefits, as well as a claim of bad faith. The defendant subsequently moved to bifurcate and stay the bad faith claim pending the resolution of the breach of contract claim, which was granted by the district court. (Doc. 18).
Meridian has now filed a partial motion for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff's breach of contract claim based on the denial of UM benefits fails as a matter of law because Eifert failed to notify the police of the accident as required under the policy and under the MVFRL. (Doc. 25). This motion is fully briefed and is ripe for resolution. (Docs. 26, 27, 29). For the reasons that follow, we recommend that the defendant's motion be granted.
III. Discussion
A. Motion for Summary Judgment - Standard of Review
The defendant has moved for partial summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that the court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Through summary adjudication, a court is empowered to dispose of those claims that do not present a “genuine dispute as to any material fact,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), and for which a trial would be “an empty and unnecessary formality.” Univac Dental Co. v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 702 F.Supp.2d 465, 468 (M.D. Pa. 2010). The substantive law identifies which facts are material, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis that would allow a reasonable fact finder to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id., at 248-49.
The moving party has the initial burden of identifying evidence that it believes shows an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 145-46 (3d Cir. 2004). Once the moving party has shown that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's claims, “the non-moving party must rebut the motion with facts in the record and cannot rest solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal memoranda, or oral argument.” Berckeley Inv. Group. Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006), accord Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). If the non-moving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial,” summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Summary judgment is also appropriate if the non-moving party provides merely colorable, conclusory, or speculative evidence. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. There must be more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the non-moving party and more than some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Id., at 252; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In making this determination, the Court must “consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 794 (3d Cir. 2007).
Moreover, a party who seeks to resist a summary judgment motion by citing to disputed material issues of fact must show by competent evidence that such factual disputes exist. Further, “only evidence which is admissible at trial may be considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Countryside Oil Co., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 928 F.Supp. 474, 482 (D.N.J. 1995). Similarly, it is well-settled that: “[o]ne cannot create an issue of fact merely by . . . denying averments . . . without producing any supporting evidence of the denials.” Thimons v. PNC Bank, NA, 254 Fed.Appx. 896, 899 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Thus, “[w]hen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported . . ., an adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations or denial.” Fireman's Ins. Co. of Newark New Jersey v. DuFresne, 676 F.2d 965, 968 (3d Cir. 1982); see Sunshine Books, Ltd. v. Temple University, 697 F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir. 1982). “[A] mere denial is insufficient to raise a disputed issue of fact, and an unsubstantiated doubt as to the veracity of the opposing affidavit is also not sufficient.” Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455, 458 (3d Cir. 1969). Furthermore, “a party resisting a [Rule 56] motion cannot expect to rely merely upon bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions.” Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 341 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing Ness v. Marshall, 660 F.2d 517, 519 (3d Cir. 1981)).
Finally, it is emphatically not the province of the court to weigh evidence or assess credibility when passing upon a motion for summary judgment. Rather, in adjudicating the motion, the court must view the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the opposing party, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992). Where the non-moving party's evidence contradicts the movant's, then the non-movant's must be taken as true. Id. Additionally, the court is not to decide whether the evidence unquestionably favors one side or the other, or to make credibility determinations, but instead must decide whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; see also Big Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1363. In reaching this determination, the Third Circuit has instructed that:
To raise a genuine issue of material fact . . . the opponent need not match, item for item, each piece of evidence proffered by the movant. In practical terms, if the opponent has exceeded the “mere scintilla” threshold and has offered a genuine issue of material fact, then the court cannot credit the movant's version of events against the opponent, even if the quantity of the movant's evidence far outweighs that of its opponent. It thus remains the province of the fact finder to ascertain the believability and weight of the evidence.Id. In contrast, “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted); NAACP v. North Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 476 (3d Cir. 2011).
B. The Partial Motion for Summary Judgement Should Be Granted.
Meridian seeks the dismissal of the plaintiff's breach of contract claim based on the denial of her UM coverage. The defendant contends that it properly denied Eifert's claim for UM benefits because she did not report the accident to the police, which is a prerequisite under both the policy itself and the MVFRL. After consideration, we agree.
In order to state a claim for breach of contract in Pennsylvania, Eifert must prove three elements: “(1) the existence of a contract, including its essential terms, (2) a breach of the contract, and (3) resultant damages.” Meyer, Darragh, Buckler, Bebenek & Eck, P.L.L.C. v, Law Firm of Malone Middleman, P.C., 137 A.3d 1257 (Pa. 2016). Here, the parties do not dispute the existence of a contract. Rather, Meridian asserts that the denial of the plaintiff's UM claim did not breach the contract because the plaintiff failed to perform her duties and responsibilities under the contract-that is, the requirement that she report the accident to the police.
As we have noted, Eifert's policy with Meridian provided for UM coverage in the event that the insured was struck by a hit-and-run vehicle, provided that the insured reported the accident to the police. (See Doc. 25-1, at 58, 63). Similarly, the MVFRL requires that an accident involving an unidentified, uninsured motor vehicle, be reported to the police. 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1702 (defining “uninsured motor vehicle”). Thus, the clear language of the statute indicates that in order for a claimant to have a legal action arising out of an accident involving an uninsured motor vehicle, the accident involving the unidentified vehicle must have been “reported to the police or proper governmental authority.” Id. The purpose of this requirement in the MVFRL is to enable law enforcement and the insurance company “to promptly investigate the accident, thus making it less likely a claimant might fabricate a phantom vehicle's involvement to excuse his own neglect.” Vanderhoff v. Harleysville Ins. Co., 78 A.3d 1060, 1066-67 (Pa. 2013).
Here, it is entirely undisputed that Eifert did not report the accident to the police, nor did anyone report the accident on her behalf. Instead, Eifert contends that no one at Meridian made her aware of the requirement that she report the accident to the police. The difficulty with this contention is that the requirement of a police report is plainly set forth in the policy and, as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated, “in the absence of proof of fraud, ‘failure to read is an unavailing excuse or defense and cannot justify avoidance, modification, or nullification of the contract or any provision thereof.'” Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire Ins. Co., 469 A.2d 563, 566 (Pa. 1983) (quoting In re Olson's Estate, 291 A.2d 95, 98 (Pa. 1972) (collecting cases) (internal quotations and citations omitted)); see also Tran v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 408 F.3d 130, 136-37 (3d Cir. 2005). Thus, we find this argument unavailing.
Eifert further argues that Meridian has not shown that the failure to report the accident to the police resulted in prejudice to the defendant. Yet the law imposes no such requirement to show prejudice upon Meridian. Quite the contrary, regarding the prejudice to Meridian, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that “[§ 1702's] provision is controlling, and neither its plain language, the case law interpreting it, nor its underlying policy require that prejudice must be established before uninsured coverage can be denied based on lack of police notification.” State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Foster, 889 A.2d 78, 82 (Pa. 2005). Further, courts in this circuit have similarly found that the failure to report an accident involving an unidentified, uninsured motorist, even where the insurer has not shown prejudice, precludes a plaintiff from receiving UM benefits. See e.g., Simms v. New Jersey Manufacturers Ins. Co., 2023 WL 2538999, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2023) (finding UM coverage precluded where the plaintiff did not report to the police that he was in an accident involving a phantom vehicle); Smart v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2023 WL 187567, at *2 n.3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2023) (noting that given the MVFRL's police notification requirement, the issue of whether the insurer had notice is irrelevant); Pildis v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2014 WL 12617597, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2014) (dismissing the plaintiff's breach of contract claim where the plaintiff did not mention a phantom vehicle in her report to the police); Ins. Corp. of Hannover v. Heavens, 2008 WL 11512220, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2008) (finding that the plaintiff did not satisfy § 1702's reporting requirement when he reported his accident to his employer and his insurance but not the police).
While the plaintiff contends that Foster is inapposite here, given that Foster involved a declaratory judgment act filed by the insurer, she points us to no authority for the proposition that Foster's holding-that there is no prejudice requirement under § 1702 of the MVFRL-applies only to declaratory judgment actions filed by an insurer. Rather, the caselaw we have relied on in this Report and Recommendation indicates that Foster's holding is not so narrowly confined.
In the instant case, given that it is undisputed that Eifert did not report her accident to the police, Meridian was well within its rights under both the insurance policy and the MVFRL to deny Eifert's claim for UM benefits. Accordingly, we recommend that Meridian's partial motion for summary judgment be granted, and the plaintiff's breach of contract claim based on the denial of UM benefits be dismissed.
IV. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT Meridian's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 25) be GRANTED, and the plaintiff's breach of contract claim based on the denial of her uninsured motorist benefits should be dismissed.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is 13 made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.