as asserting that the defendants had "retaliated against her First Amendment rights"); Soranno's Gasco, Inc., 874 F.2d at 1318-19 (holding that business owner had standing to assert First Amendment retaliation claims on his own behalf because the "first amendment rights that were allegedly violated belong[ed] to Mr. Soranno, not the corporation"); Belt v. Marion Cmty. Unit Sch., Dist. No. 2, 2006 WL 839434, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2006) (suggesting that the plaintiff had standing to assert a First Amendment retaliation claim based on threats made against her spouse in retaliation for the plaintiff's exercise of her First Amendment rights); see also Caravella v. City of New York, 79 F. App'x 452, 453 (2d Cir. 2003) (unpublished summary order) (holding that a plaintiff lacked standing to bring civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on injuries indirectly caused by harm to corporation where the plaintiff had "not alleged that his constitutional rights ha[d] been violated"); Eichwald v. Griffith, 2008 WL 11451415, at *3-5, *4 n.2 (D.N.M. July 16, 2008) (holding that a father lacked standing to assert a First Amendment retaliation claim on his son's behalf, but noting that it might have been a "closer case" if the father had brought the "action on his own behalf, alleging that the adverse actions taken against his son were aimed at chilling his speech"). Other courts have reached the opposite conclusion, treating the person asserting the abstract right as the "third party" for purposes of the prudential rule against third-party standing.