Eichman v. J J Building Co.

117 Citing cases

  1. Alaska Southern Partners v. Zappulla

    1994 Ct. Sup. 2841 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1994)

    The plaintiff therefore failed to satisfy its burden of proof by providing credible evidence of the fair market value of the property on the date title vested. Connecticut's deficiency judgment statute, General Statutes 49-14, is the requirement than the party seeking a deficiency judgment satisfy her burden of proof regarding the fair market value of the property as of the date title vests in her. Eichman v. J J Building Company, 216 Conn. 443, 445 (1990). In Eichman, the trial court heard expert testimony from two appraisers, one for the plaintiff and one for the defendant.

  2. Suffield Bank v. Berman

    1993 Ct. Sup. 625 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1993)   Cited 1 times

    The procedure set forth in Connecticut General Statutes 49-14 is the only method of satisfying a mortgage note when the security is inadequate to make a foreclosing plaintiff whole. Eichmann v. J J Building Co., 216 Conn. 443, 582 A.2d 182, 185 (1990). The statute provides for a hearing at which the court shall consider evidence of the valuation of the mortgaged property.

  3. CTB Ventures 55, Inc. v. Rubenstein

    667 A.2d 1272 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995)   Cited 5 times
    In CTB Ventures the trial court explicitly stated that it did not accept as the fair market value the figure testified to by the appraiser presented by the creditor but found a deficiency on the basis of other evidence of value specifically, the valuation of the debtor's appraiser.

    We disagree with the defendant's characterization of the evidence and find the defendant's claim lacking in merit. While there is no formally established procedure to move for the dismissal of a motion for a deficiency judgment, our Supreme Court recognized in Eichman v. J J Building Co., 216 Conn. 443, 582 A.2d 182 (1990), that the trial court may dismiss such a motion if the plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case. Although a deficiency proceeding is not a trial, the motion to dismiss a deficiency judgment for a failure to state a prima facie case is akin to, and has the same effect as, a Practice Book § 302 motion for a directed verdict.

  4. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Delco Dev.

    1997 Ct. Sup. 3397 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997)

    The date of valuation is the date that title in the property vested in the party claiming the deficiency, in this case, July 11, 1996. See Eichman v. J J Building Co., 216 Conn. 443, 451 (1990). The party seeking a deficiency judgment has the burden of proving that the property was worth less than the amount of the debt on the date of the vesting of title and has the burden of presenting sufficient evidence for the trial court to determine the value of the property on that date.

  5. The Connecticut Nat. Bank v. West Road Assoc.

    1994 Ct. Sup. 4550 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1994)

    " General Statutes § 49-14(a); see also Practice Book § 528. "`The value of the premises on the date that title becomes vested in the mortgagee determines whether the mortgagee is entitled to a deficiency judgment.'" [Eichman v. J J Building Co.], 216 Conn. 443, 449, 582 A.2d 182 (1990), quoting [Di Diego v. Zarro], 19 Conn. App. 291, 294, 562 A.2d 555 (1989). "Implicit in General Statutes § 49-14 is the requirement that the party seeking a deficiency judgment satisfy [its] burden of proof regarding the fair market value of the property as of the date title vests.

  6. Federal Deposit Insurance v. Suna Associates, Inc.

    80 F.3d 681 (2d Cir. 1996)   Cited 33 times
    Finding no abuse of discretion in the admission of expert testimony based on a hybrid of two widely used methods

    Pursuant to the Judgment for Strict Foreclosure, title to the thirty-five condominium units passed to the FDIC on May 7, 1992, thereby fixing that date as the date for the appraisals that would be used in the subsequent deficiency determination. See Eichman v. J J Bldg. Co., 216 Conn. 443, 449, 582 A.2d 182, 185 (1990). The parties consented to a full trial before a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §(s) 636(c).

  7. Edwards v. CBD & Sons

    No. 3:17-cv-00466 (SRU) (D. Conn. May. 21, 2018)   Cited 4 times

    In a foreclosure proceeding, the value of the properties is measured as their "fair market value . . . as of the date title vests in the foreclosing plaintiff." United of Omaha Life Ins. Co. v. Conn. Student Loan Found., 718 F. Supp. 2d 277, 289 (D. Conn. 2010) (citing Eichman v. J&J Bldg. Co., 216 Conn. 443, 445 (1990)). This case is not exactly a foreclosure proceeding, but the same method of valuation appears appropriate.

  8. J.E. Robert Co. v. Signature Props., LLC

    320 Conn. 91 (Conn. 2016)   Cited 2 times
    In J.E. Robert Co., this court examined whether the trial court in a mortgage foreclosure action properly relied on an appraisal that valued the leased fee interest in a property, instead of the fee simple interest.

    We begin our analysis by setting forth the proper standard of review. It is in the trial court's province to determine the valuation of mortgaged property, usually guided by expert witnesses, relevant circumstances bearing on value, and its own knowledge. See, e.g., Eichman v. J & J Building Co., 216 Conn. 443, 451, 582 A.2d 182 (1990). The trial court also determines the credibility and weight accorded to the witnesses, their testimony, and the evidence admitted.

  9. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winthrop Props., LLC

    312 Conn. 662 (Conn. 2014)   Cited 58 times
    In JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Winthrop Props., 312 Conn. 662, 94 A.3d 622 (2014), the Supreme Court of Connecticut noted that the procedural matter before it was "not intended to alter established definitions and the scope of such terms within the substantive doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and relation back, which implicate different concerns.

    Thus, any deficiency judgment sought in connection with the foreclosure arises from the contractual relationship between the parties to the promissory note. See Eichman v. J & J Building Co., 216 Conn. 443, 453, 582 A.2d 182 (1990) (“deficiency judgment hearings more closely resemble suits for collection”); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Voll, 38 Conn.App. 198, 207, 660 A.2d 358 (noting while deficiency judgments are part of foreclosure, “the deficiency judgment is the functional equivalent of a suit upon the note” [internal quotation marks omitted] ), cert. denied, 235 Conn. 903, 665 A.2d 901 (1995). When payment of a promissory note secured by a mortgage is further protected by a separate guarantee, in addition to the aforementioned potential remedies against the mortgagor, the mortgagee may pursue a claim against the guarantors to recover any of the unpaid debt of the mortgagor.

  10. Sears, Roebuck and Company v. Board of Tax Review

    241 Conn. 749 (Conn. 1997)   Cited 121 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that 10 percent interest rate set forth in § 37–3a is not required rate of interest but, rather, represents maximum rate that trial court, in its discretion, may apply

    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Newbury Commons Ltd. Partnership v. Stamford, supra, 226 Conn. 99; cf. Eichman v. J J Building Co., 216 Conn. 443, 452, 582 A.2d 182 (1990) (in deficiency judgment hearing, trier of fact "is privileged to adopt whatever testimony he reasonably believes to be credible" [internal quotation marks omitted]). This principle applies not only to the trial court's determination of the true and actual value of taxable property, but also to its determination of whether the plaintiff has satisfied the burden of establishing overvaluation.