Opinion
No. A-12-166
11-06-2012
PAUL EICH, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF JEANIE RAMOS, DECEASED, ET AL., APPELLEES, v. AMERICAN GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY AND THE OLD LINE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, PREDECESSOR IN INTEREST, APPELLEES, AND MELVIN A. ADAMS, INTERVENOR-APPELLANT.
Rodney A. Halstead for intervenor-appellant. Patrick Cullan and Joseph Cullan, of Cullan & Cullan, L.L.C., for appellees Paul Eich et al.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT ON APPEAL
NOTICE: THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PERMANENT PUBLICATION
AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY NEB. CT. R. APP. P. § 2-102(E).
Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: JOSEPH S. TROIA, Judge. Affirmed.
Rodney A. Halstead for intervenor-appellant.
Patrick Cullan and Joseph Cullan, of Cullan & Cullan, L.L.C., for appellees Paul Eich et al.
IRWIN, PIRTLE, and RIEDMANN, Judges.
IRWIN, Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Melvin A. Adams appeals an order of the district court for Douglas County, Nebraska, granting summary judgment to Paul Eich, the personal representative of the estate of Jeanie Ramos, deceased. In granting summary judgment, the court determined that the language of a 1994 decree dissolving the marriage of Adams and Ramos evidenced an intent for Adams to relinquish all potential property rights in a life insurance policy then owned by Ramos. We find no error in the court's determination, and we affirm.
II. BACKGROUND
In August 1993, Ramos had been issued a life insurance policy with a face amount of $100,000. In that policy, she named Adams as the primary beneficiary and her surviving children as contingent beneficiaries. Adams testified in an affidavit that he was unaware of the life insurance policy's existence or the fact that Ramos had named him as beneficiary.
On August 16, 1994, the district court entered a decree dissolving the marriage of Adams and Ramos. In the decree, the court incorporated a property settlement agreement that had been entered into by the parties.
The parties' property settlement agreement, incorporated into the dissolution decree, included a provision concerning disposition of the parties' personal property. That provision contained separate paragraphs indicating specific items of personal property awarded to each party. In addition to awarding specific items of property to each party, the paragraphs also contained identical language indicating that each party was to
have as [her/his] sole and separate property . . . all personal property presently in [her/his] possession, including all savings accounts, checking accounts, credit union accounts, stocks, bonds, jewelry, clothing, and other personal effects; and the [Respondent/ Petitioner] herein relinquishes all of [her/his] right, title and interest in the same.The property settlement agreement also included provisions wherein each party agreed to accept the benefit of the property settlement agreement
in full and complete satisfaction of all financial claims, monetary demands, support, alimony, child support or property rights of any kind, including all claims that either may have as the widow or widower of the other party or otherwise; and all claims which he or she had, now has or might hereinafter have against the other in the event of his or her death as an heir at law, surviving spouse or otherwise; and each party waives any and all claims which he or she may have in any property now owned by the other or which may hereinafter be acquired by the other, except as hereinabove provided.The property settlement agreement also included provisions wherein each party represented that it had the advice of counsel and had "received full and accurate information concerning the property of the other" and that it believed the property settlement to be fair and reasonable, and each party agreed to cooperate in effectuating the terms of the agreement.
Ramos died on July 12, 2010. In the 17 years from the time she purchased the life insurance policy until her death, including 16 years after her divorce from Adams, Ramos never changed the primary beneficiary designation on the policy, despite her remarriage. As a result, at the time of her death the policy still indicated that Adams was designated as the primary beneficiary.
On December 16, 2010, Eich, as personal representative of Ramos' estate, filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to declare that Ramos' surviving children were entitled to the life insurance benefits. On January 18, 2011, Adams intervened.
Both Adams and Eich filed motions for summary judgment. On Feburary 3, 2012, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Eich and denied Adams' motion for summary judgment. In so ruling, the court concluded that the language of the decree and Adams' actions of removing Ramos as the named beneficiary on his own life insurance policy indicated that the parties had intended to fully divest themselves of all interests in each other's property. This appeal followed.
III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Adams has assigned three errors on appeal, all of which challenge the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Eich and denial of summary judgment in favor of Adams.
IV. ANALYSIS
The issues presented in this appeal require us to determine whether the language of the property settlement agreement incorporated into the decree dissolving the marriage of Adams and Ramos evidenced an intent to relinquish all property rights in personal property, including beneficiary designation of a life insurance policy, where Ramos failed to alter the beneficiary designation after the divorce. This appeal also requires us to determine whether the fact that the agreement did not specifically mention life insurance policies or the fact that Adams was unaware of the life insurance policy mandates a finding that Adams did not relinquish his rights. We conclude that the language of the agreement does evidence a relinquishment of rights and that the agreement's failure to mention the policy and Adams' lack of knowledge about the policy do not alter the outcome.
In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment is granted and gives such party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence. Pinkard v. Confederation Life Ins. Co., 264 Neb. 312, 647 N.W.2d 85 (2002). Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, stipulations, and affidavits in the record disclose that there is no genuine issue of material fact or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Strong v. Omaha Constr. Indus. Pension Plan, 270 Neb. 1, 701 N.W.2d 320 (2005); Pinkard v. Confederation Life Ins. Co., supra; Trueblood v. Roberts, 15 Neb. App. 579, 732 N.W.2d 368 (2007).
The general rule is that divorce does not affect a beneficiary designation in a life insurance policy. Id. This rule is based on the notion that the beneficiary's claim to proceeds evolves from the terms of the policy rather than the status of the marital relationship. Pinkard v. Confederation Life Ins. Co., supra; Trueblood v. Roberts, supra. But a spouse may waive such a beneficiary interest in a divorce decree. Strong v. Omaha Constr. Indus. Pension Plan, supra; Trueblood v. Roberts, supra. For example, in Pinkard, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that when a former wife waived her beneficiary interest in an annuity by entering into a property settlement agreement, the waiver was effective even though her former husband had not changed the beneficiary designation after the divorce. See Strong v. Omaha Constr. Indus. Pension Plan, supra.
In Pinkard, the Nebraska Supreme Court directed us to focus upon the language of the dissolution decree and any agreement which sets forth the intentions of the parties concerning property rights. See, Strong v. Omaha Constr. Indus. Pension Plan, supra; Trueblood v. Roberts, supra. "If the dissolution decree and any property settlement agreement incorporated therein manifest the parties' intent to relinquish all property rights, then such agreement should be given that effect." Pinkard v. Confederation Life Ins. Co., 264 Neb. at 318, 647 N.W.2d at 89. In its analysis in Pinkard, the Nebraska Supreme Court considered comparable cases decided by the Iowa Supreme Court, including Sorensen v. Nelson, 342 N.W.2d 477, 481 (Iowa 1984), in which the Iowa Supreme Court found a waiver where the provisions of the dissolution decree evidenced the parties' intent to "'wipe the slate clean.'"
In Pinkard, the issue actually concerned a beneficiary designation on a workers' compensation settlement annuity. The parties' dissolution decree incorporated a property settlement agreement that included a mutual release provision identical to the one contained in the dissolution decree in the present case, quoted above. It also contained a provision for the mutual cooperation of the parties in effectuating the property settlement's terms identical to the one contained in the dissolution decree in the present case, quoted above.
The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment, finding that the dissolution decree provisions amounted to a waiver of the former wife's beneficiary interest in the annuity, despite the former husband's failure to alter the beneficiary designation after the divorce. Pinkard v. Confederation Life Ins. Co., supra. The Supreme Court noted that the parties' dissolution decree had provided the former husband would receive as his sole and separate property all right, title, and interest in employee benefit plans, including workers' compensation benefits; that the benefits of the property settlement agreement were in full and complete satisfaction of all claims either party might have, including claims which might later arise in the event of one party's death; and that each party waived all claims in property owned or later acquired by the other. The Supreme Court concluded as a matter of law that the former wife had relinquished her expectancy interest as the beneficiary of the workers' compensation annuity.
There are two primary distinctions between the facts of the present case and those of Pinkard v. Confederation Life Ins. Co., 264 Neb. 312, 647 N.W.2d 85 (2002). First, the provisions of the dissolution decree and the property settlement agreement in Pinkard specifically referenced workers' compensation benefits and the disputed beneficiary interest was in a workers' compensation settlement annuity; in the present case, the parties' dissolution decree and property settlement agreement make no reference to life insurance policies, and the disputed beneficiary interest is in a life insurance policy. Second, the facts in Pinkard demonstrated that the former wife had served as the former husband's guardian and conservator and had been the one to enter into the settlement with his employer that resulted in the settlement annuity, so she was clearly aware of the existence of the annuity benefit at the time of the dissolution decree and property settlement agreement; in the present case, Adams testified by affidavit that he was not aware of the existence of Ramos' life insurance policy at the time of the dissolution decree and property settlement agreement. We find that these two distinctions, however, do not change the outcome.
First, although the property settlement agreement incorporated into the decree in the present case does not specifically reference life insurance policies, it does include language that demonstrates an intent by the parties to wipe the slate clean and for each to relinquish all interest in personal property owned by the other. In the personal property provision, Adams agreed that Ramos would "have as her sole and separate property . . . all personal property presently in her possession," including financial accounts, and he agreed that he was "relinquish[ing] all of his right, title and interest in the same." (Emphasis supplied.) At the time, the life insurance policy was personal property in the possession of Ramos.
In the mutual release and cooperation provisions--the property settlement agreement incorporated into the decree in the present case--which are identical to those in Pinkard v. Confederation Life Ins. Co., supra, Adams accepted the benefit of the property settlement agreement "in full and complete satisfaction of all financial claims, monetary demands, . . . or property rights of any kind," including "all claims . . . [he] might hereinafter have against [Ramos] in the event of . . . her death as an heir at law, surviving spouse or otherwise." (Emphasis supplied.) He also waived "any and all claims" which he may have had "in any property [then] owned by [Ramos] or which may [thereinafter] be acquired by [her]." (Emphasis supplied.)
The language of the property settlement agreement, incorporated into the decree, indicates a clear intent for Adams to forgo all rights to any interest in all personal property then owned by Ramos or later acquired by Ramos. Thus, the failure of the agreement to specifically mention the life insurance policy or life insurance policies in general is not a distinction that changes the outcome. The language indicates that the parties intended to wipe the slate clean and relinquish all rights in any and all personal property, not only those items specifically mentioned. Similarly, because the language of the agreement specifically contemplates its application to items of property not even then owned, the fact that Adams may not have known about the policy is not a distinction that alters the outcome.
V. CONCLUSION
Without commenting on whether Adams' lack of knowledge about a $100,000 life insurance policy owned by his then-wife could have provided the basis for any relief or modification of the decree, we conclude that his lack of knowledge does not mandate a conclusion that he did not relinquish all rights in the beneficiary designation. The language of the settlement agreement incorporated into the decree demonstrates an intent to waive all interest in all property, whether specifically mentioned or not and whether specifically known about or not. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Eich. As such, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.