Ehrenberg v. City of Concord

3 Citing cases

  1. Neville v. Highfields Farm

    744 A.2d 89 (N.H. 1999)   Cited 3 times

    In addition, once a planning board is created and a statute grants exclusive jurisdiction to the board over a particular subject matter, the range of issues the town may consider relative to that subject matter becomes severely narrowed. See Ehrenberg v. City of Concord, 120 N.H. 656, 661, 421 A.2d 128, 131 (1980) (decided under prior law); see also Mudge v. Precinct of Haverhill Corner, 133 N.H. 881, 885, 587 A.2d 603, 605 (1991); Levasseur v. Board of Selectmen, 116 N.H. 340, 342, 358 A.2d 665, 666 (1976). Where a town duly appoints an entity to handle specified matters and later attempts to overturn a decision of that entity by town vote, we have found a circumvention, rendering the town's decision invalid.

  2. Williams v. City of Dover

    543 A.2d 919 (N.H. 1988)   Cited 4 times
    In Williams v. Dover, 543 A.2d 919 (N.H. 1988), for example, a member of the planning board, on behalf of his employer, installed a driveway and performed other construction on his employer's property without obtaining permits.

    Williams filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the superior court, challenging his removal. See Ehrenberg v. City of Concord, 120 N.H. 656, 659, 421 A.2d 128, 130 (1980). A hearing was held, and the trial court found that Williams had contacted the appropriate city officials regarding the construction of the driveway and that Williams had been informed that a number of permits would be required.

  3. Winslow v. Holderness Planning Board

    125 N.H. 262 (N.H. 1984)   Cited 19 times
    Holding action of planning board in reviewing application for rezoning "quasi-judicial"

    The statute reflected the fact that the board's decision would have a disproportionately great impact on Raymond and on owners of land abutting his, but comparatively little impact on other town residents. We conclude that action of this type must be characterized as judicial or quasi-judicial, see Ehrenberg v. City of Concord, 120 N.H. 656, 659, 421 A.2d 128, 130 (1980), at least for the purpose of deciding whether the rights of the parties were adequately protected; i.e., whether due process requirements were met. Other jurisdictions have adopted a similar view. See, e.g., Kaelin v. City of Louisville, 643 S.W.2d 590, 591 (Ky. 1982); Kletschka v. LeSueur County Bd. of Com'rs, 277 N.W.2d 404, 405 (Minn.