Egypt Farms v. Lepley

12 Citing cases

  1. Kelly v. Baltimore

    161 Md. App. 128 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005)   Cited 10 times

    Several cases have indicated that the normal rules governing summary judgment apply in "appeals" from the Workers' Compensation Commission. See, e.g., Egypt Farms, Inc. v. Lepley, 49 Md.App. 171, 176, 430 A.2d 122 (1981). See also Dawson's Charter Serv. v. Chin, 68 Md.App. 433, 440, 511 A.2d 1138 (1986) ("Summary judgment may be invoked to prevent an unnecessary trial in a worker compensation appeal, just as in any other action."); and Maloney v. Carling Nat'l Breweries, Inc., 52 Md.App. 556, 559-60, 451 A.2d 343 (1982) (summary judgment rules apply to workers' compensation appeals).

  2. Montgomery Cnty. v. Maloney

    245 Md. App. 369 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2020)   Cited 3 times

    Seeid. at 168, 867 A.2d 370 n.4 ("Since both the initial fact finder and the supervening fact finder enjoy the same prerogative independently to assess credibility and independently to weigh evidence, they may with equal validity reach different conclusions even upon the same record." (emphasis removed)); Egypt Farms, Inc. v. Lepley , 49 Md. App. 171, 176, 430 A.2d 122 (1981) ("The court (or jury) ... is not bound by the Commission's fact findings as is normally the case in administrative appeals, but is free to weigh the evidence (and the inferences from it) and reach entirely opposite conclusions."). Rather, the presumption serves primarily to shift the burden of proof in judicial-review actions in which the employer is the party aggrieved by the Commission's decision.

  3. Board of Education v. Spradlin

    161 Md. App. 155 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005)   Cited 45 times
    In Board of Edu. for Montgomery County v. Spradlin, 161 Md. App. 155 (2005), Joannie M. Spradlin ("the appellee"), filed a claim with the Workers' Compensation Commission ("the Commission"), against her employer, the Board of Education for Montgomery County ("Montgomery County") for injuries she sustained after being allegedly assaulted by her co-worker.

    Dent v. Cahill, 18 Md.App. 117, 125, 305 A.2d 233 (1973) ("Not only may trial courts, on appeal from decisions of the Commission, decide whether the Commission misconstrued the facts, but they may also decide how the facts should have been construed."); Turner v. Office of the Public Defender, 61 Md.App. 393, 405, 486 A.2d 804 (1985) ("To reverse a judgment of a court in a non-jury trial we must be convinced that the judge's factual findings were clearly erroneous."). In Egypt Farms v. Lepley, 49 Md.App. 171, 176, 430 A.2d 122 (1981), Judge Wilner, for this Court, analyzed the broad fact-finding prerogative enjoyed by a judge, as well as by a jury, on de novo review of a decision by the Commission. [T]he reviewing court has very broad authority, notwithstanding the prima facie correctness of the administrative decision.

  4. City of Baltimore v. Cassidy

    99 Md. App. 465 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994)   Cited 1 times

    "[I]n making th[e]se determinations, the reviewing court has very broad authority, notwithstanding the prima facie correctness of the administrative decision." Egypt Farms, Inc. v. Lepley, 49 Md. App. 171, 176, 430 A.2d 122, cert. denied, 291 Md. 778 (1981). This presumption of correctness applies to the factual decisions of the Commission and not to the Commission's interpretations of the pertinent statutory provisions.

  5. General Motors Corp. v. Bark

    79 Md. App. 68 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989)   Cited 38 times
    Noting that โ€œan appeal to the circuit court from a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission is totally differentโ€ from an appeal taken generally from an administrative decision under the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act

    " (Citations omitted) (Footnote omitted).And see Abell v. Goetze, Inc., 245 Md. 433, 226 A.2d 253 (1967); Egypt Farms, Inc. v. Lepley, 49 Md. App. 171, 430 A.2d 122 (1981); Turner v. State, Public Defender, 61 Md. App. 393, 486 A.2d 804 (1985). The trial de novo in this case was before Judge Hammerman, sitting without a jury.

  6. Frederick County v. Vache

    349 Md. 526 (Md. 1998)   Cited 17 times
    Noting that a reviewing court "may reverse the Commission's decision when it is based on an erroneous conception of the law"

    Notwithstanding the deferential treatment of the Commission's decision, a reviewing court has broad authority and may reverse the Commission's decision when it is based on an erroneous conception of the law. Id.; Bureau of Mines v. Powers, 258 Md. 379, 383, 265 A.2d 860, 862 (1970); Egypt Farms, Inc. v. Lepley, 49 Md. App. 171, 176, 430 A.2d 122, 125 (1981). As we shall explain, both the Commission and the circuit court erroneously construed and applied the premises and proximity exceptions to the going and coming rule in this case.

  7. Prince George's Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Butler

    No. 1209 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Jul. 10, 2018)

    (Some alterations in original). In Egypt Farms, Inc. v. Lepley, 49 Md. App. 171, 176 (1981), this Court further explained the broad fact-finding authority of the trial court on de novo review of a decision by the Commission: [T]he reviewing court has very broad authority, notwithstanding the prima facie correctness of the administrative decision. . . . The court (or jury), in other words, is not so bound by the Commission's fact findings as is normally the case in administrative appeals, but is free to weigh the evidence (and the inferences from it) and reach entirely opposite conclusions.

  8. Syme v. Marks Rentals, Inc.

    520 A.2d 1110 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987)   Cited 17 times
    In Syme, we observed that the Court of Appeals has applied a broad standard when determining whether there is a genuine dispute of fact, such that, even where the underlying facts are undisputed, if those facts are susceptible of more than one possible inference, the choice between those inferences should be made by the trier of fact. Syme, 70 Md. App. at 238-39, 520 A.2d 1110, citing Fenwick Motor Co. v. Fenwick, 258 Md. 134, 138, 265 A.2d 256 (1970).

    In interpreting the scope of this rule, courts in Maryland have admonished repeatedly that "the summary judgment procedure is not a substitute for a trial, but a means by which the trial court may determine, summarily, whether a trial is necessary." Washington Homes, Inc. v. Interstate Land Development Company, Inc., 281 Md. 712, 716, 382 A.2d 555 (1978); accord Coffey v. Derby Steel Company, 291 Md. 241, 247, 434 A.2d 564 (1981); Metropolitan Mortgage Fund, Inc. v. Basiliko, 288 Md. 25, 28, 415 A.2d 582 (1980); Peck v. Baltimore County, 286 Md. 368, 381, 410 A.2d 7 (1979); Maloney v. Carling Breweries, Inc., 52 Md. App. 556, 560, 451 A.2d 343 (1982); Egypt Farms v. Lepley, 49 Md. App. 171, 176, 430 A.2d 122 (1981); Vanhook v. Merchants Insurance Company, 22 Md. App. 22, 25, 321 A.2d 540 (1974). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must address two separate issues: whether the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Md. Rule 2-501(e).

  9. Esteps Electrical v. Sager

    508 A.2d 1032 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986)   Cited 11 times
    Noting that, "[b]y Motion for Reconsideration," appellant had timely moved for rehearing pursuant to Md. Code (1957, 1985 Repl. Vol.), Art. 101, ยง 56(e)

    See Cabell Concrete Block Co. v. Yarborough, 192 Md. 360, 369, 64 A.2d 292 (1949); Bethlehem Steel Company v. Mayo, 168 Md. 410, 416, 177 A. 910 (1935); McCulloh Company v. Restivo, 152 Md. 60, 67, 136 A. 54 (1927). This is particularly true since the standard of review of the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission shall be by way of trial de novo. Maryland Bureau of Mines v. Powers, 258 Md. 379, 382, 265 A.2d 860 (1970); Abell v. Goetze, Inc., 245 Md. 433, 437, 226 A.2d 253 (1967); Richardson v. Home Mutual Life Insurance Company, 235 Md. 252, 255, 201 A.2d 340 (1964); Glidden-Durkee (SCM) Corp. v. Mobay Chemical Corp., 61 Md. App. 583, 596-97, 487 A.2d 1196 (1985); Egypt Farms, Inc. v. Lepley, 49 Md. App. 171, 176, 430 A.2d 122 (1981); Montgomery Ward Company v. Bell, 46 Md. App. 37, 41, 415 A.2d 636 (1980). And because the parties are free to adduce evidence additional to that produced before the Commission, Glidden-Durkee, supra, it is necessary that the issues on which such evidence is permitted have been passed upon by the Commission. Miller v. McGraw Company, 184 Md. 529, 542-43, 42 A.2d 237 (1945); Meyler v. Mayor of Baltimore, 179 Md. 211, 219, 17 A.2d 762 (1941).

  10. Glidden-Durkee

    61 Md. App. 583 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985)   Cited 8 times

    Therefore, an appeal from the Commission is "essentially de novo". Maryland Bureau of Mines v. Powers, supra, Turner v. State of Md., Office of Public Defender, 61 Md. App. 393, 486 A.2d 804 (1985); Egypt Farms, Inc. v. Lepley, 49 Md. App. 171, 430 A.2d 122 (1981); Montgomery Ward Co. v. Bell, 46 Md. App. 37, 415 A.2d 636 (1980). As a result, the testimony on appeal is not limited to that which was presented before the Commission. Miller v. James McGraw Co., 184 Md. 529, 42 A.2d 237 (1945).