Opinion
No. 0554629S
November 25, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON VARIOUS MOTIONS
I. Plaintiff's Motions, dated August 4, 2003, to Modify Support, Alimony and Visitation
a. By agreement dated September 2, 2003, the parties agreed to the current visitation schedule. The plaintiff now seeks to modify said visitation to include Saturday nights.
The court finds no change in circumstances justifying any modification. Therefore, plaintiff's motion for modification of visitation is denied.
b. Plaintiff's current support obligation is $250.00 per week. Said order was entered when plaintiff was employed as a vice president at PMSI earning about $1,740.00 per week. Since then, plaintiff's employment was terminated without any fault on his part.
Since said termination, the plaintiff sought comparable employment to no avail. Presently, he is employed as a purchasing agent by Tech-Air earning a gross weekly wage of $520.00.
The defendant, who opposes any reduction, was earning about $18,963.00 at the time of the dissolution of their marriage when the plaintiff was ordered to pay $250.00 per week support. Since then her income has increased in 2002 to $23,000.00± and, according to her financial affidavit, it will be $22,930.00± in 2003.
Based on the above and the Connecticut Child Guidelines, the plaintiff's support obligation is modified to $103.00 per week retroactive to August 4, 2003.
c. Also, based on the above, defendant's motion to increase her alimony is denied.
II. Defendant's Motion for Contempt Against the Plaintiff for Failure to Pay Obligation Support and Provide Medical Insurance
a. By agreement of the parties in September 2002, the plaintiff paid $225.00 per week support instead of $250.00 per week as ordered by the court. He continued to do so until May 2003. Therefore, the plaintiff is in arrears for 86 weeks or $2,150.00. Said arrearage is to be paid at the rate of $25.00 per week. In addition, the plaintiff shall pay to the defendant $336.00 within 60 days, which represents his share of unpaid extracurricular activities he is obligated for.
b. The separation agreement of the parties provides, inter alia, that the plaintiff is to provide medical insurance coverage for the minor child as is available through his employment. When the plaintiff's employment was terminated with PMSI, he no longer had any such medical insurance available through his employment. Because of this, the parties agreed that the defendant would provide said medical coverage for her minor child.
c. The plaintiff now has medical insurance available through his present employment at a cost to him. The defendant has such coverage free. However, it is the plaintiff's obligation per the separation agreement to provide said coverage for his minor child. Therefore, if defendant gives written notice to the plaintiff that she wishes him to provide said coverage, he shall make application for same at his employer within 30 days and provide the defendant with copies and/or notice of said application.
d. For reasons set forth above and because most of the claimed grounds for contempt arose from agreements between the parties, the court finds no willful intent to ignore the court orders entered in the parties' dissolution of their marriage. Accordingly, defendant's motion for contempt is denied.
III. Defendant's Motion to Reopen Judgment on Grounds of Fraud
The defendant claims that the plaintiff lied to her about the value of the family trusts from which the plaintiff receives dividends and that she would not have entered into the separation agreement if she knew what the value of the corpus was.
The plaintiff testified that he did not know the value of the corpus of said trust; at the time of the separation agreement and does not know the value to this date; that he is only an income beneficiary of the trust for his lifetime and upon his death of the defendant his minor child will become one of the beneficiaries of the family trusts. He denies that he will ever receive a share of the corpus of the trusts involved.
Proof of fraud requires clear and convincing evidence of the intentional misstatement or failure to disclose a material fact which is relied upon by another to that person's injury. See Billington v. Billington, 220 Conn. 212, 217 (1991). The burden of proving same is upon the party alleging the fraud. See Miller v. Appleby, 183 Conn. 51, 55.
The trier is the judge of the credibility of the testimony and the weight to be accorded to it. Id.
The court finds that the defendant has failed to prove fraud by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, defendant's motion to reopen the judgment of dissolution of the parties' marriage on the ground of fraud is denied.
VASINGTON, JUDGE.