Opinion
No. 78-837
Decided December 28, 1978. Rehearing denied January 18, 1979. Certiorari denied April 9, 1979.
Arguing that petty theft statute had preempted municipal shoplifting ordinance, plaintiff sought writ of prohibition against his being further prosecuted under the municipal ordinance. The district court dismissed the complaint, and plaintiff appealed.
Affirmed
1. THEFT — Shoplifting — Municipal Ordinance — Fifty Dollar Limitation — Not in Conflict — Not Preempted — Petty Theft Statute — Not Invalid. Where municipal shoplifting ordinance was limited to incidents involving merchandise valued at fifty dollars or less, that ordinance was neither in conflict with nor preempted by the petty theft statute, § 18-4-401, C.R.S. 1973, and thus, the ordinance was not invalid.
Appeal from the District Court of the County of Boulder, Honorable William D. Neighbors, Judge.
G. Philip Bryson, for plaintiff-appellant.
Jeffrey D. Larson, for defendant-appellee.
Plaintiff, Firooz Eftekhar-Zadeh, was charged in Longmont Municipal Court with the offense of shoplifting in violation of a Longmont city ordinance. He brought an action in the district court under C.R.C.P. 106, seeking a writ of prohibition against any further municipal court proceedings, arguing that the Colorado petty theft statute preempted the Longmont shoplifting ordinance, and that the municipal court therefore lacked jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that the ordinance in question was not preempted by state law. We affirm.
The plaintiff was prosecuted under Longmont City Code § 5-4-4, which provides:
"Shoplifting: A person commits shoplifting when he knowingly and without authorization obtains or exercises control over merchandise being a thing of value of less than Fifty Dollars . . . ."
In this court also, the plaintiff claims the ordinance is invalid because it conflicts with, and is therefore preempted by, the Colorado petty theft statute, § 18-4-401, C.R.S. 1973.
[1] We regard Quintana v. Edgewater Municipal Court, 179 Colo. 90, 498 P.2d 931 (1972), as controlling. In Quintana, the Supreme Court struck down the Edgewater ordinance as unconstitutional because it dealt with offenses in the felony category which are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the district court. The Quintana court said, however, that:
"Municipal courts are particularly adaptable to the handling of the crime of shoplifting of articles of relatively small value. This type of theft constitutes a great problem and should be combated not only by our state authorities in state courts, but by our police department in municipal courts."
Here, the Longmont ordinance is not subject to the same constitutional infirmities that applied to the Edgewater ordinance in Quintana. The Longmont ordinance therefore falls within the quoted language from Quintana, and is neither in conflict with nor preempted by § 18-4-401, C.R.S. 1973.
The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE COYTE and JUDGE PIERCE concur.