Opinion
A-13754 0378
06-19-2024
PETER CHARLES EDWIN, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Megan R. Webb, Assistant Public Defender, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Kenneth M. Rosenstein, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Appeal from the Superior Court, Fourth Judicial District, Fairbanks, Michael A. MacDonald, Judge Trial Court No. 4FA-17-01619 CR
Megan R. Webb, Assistant Public Defender, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Kenneth M. Rosenstein, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Wollenberg, Harbison, and Terrell, Judges.
Peter Charles Edwin was convicted of one count of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor related to E.Z. and acquitted of two other charges (one involving E.Z. and another involving N.Z.). Prior to trial, Edwin moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that two pieces of inadmissible evidence were presented to the grand jury in violation of his constitutional rights. The superior court denied this motion, and Edwin now appeals.
AS 11.41.436(a)(2).
Edwin's primary argument on appeal is that the superior court applied the wrong test in determining whether he was prejudiced by the introduction of the inadmissible evidence. The superior court denied Edwin's motion because the court concluded that, under Stern v. State, substantial evidence supported the indictment and that any inadmissible evidence did not unfairly prejudice the grand jury's consideration of the case.
See Stern v. State, 827 P.2d 442 (Alaska App. 1992).
Edwin argues, however, that because the inadmissible evidence implicated his constitutional rights, the court should have determined whether the errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. But we have previously held that the Stern test is the appropriate test for evaluating the impact of the erroneous admission of evidence at a grand jury proceeding, even when the error is of constitutional dimension, and Edwin has provided no argument for why we should reconsider our prior decision in this case.
See State v. Case, 928 P.2d 1239, 1241 (Alaska App. 1996).
Edwin also argues that the superior court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment even under the Stern test. Under this test, the court subtracts the improper evidence and determines whether the remaining evidence is legally sufficient to support the indictment; "[i]f the remaining evidence is legally sufficient, the court then assesses the degree to which the improper evidence might have unfairly prejudiced the grand jury's consideration of the case."
Stern, 827 P.2d at 445-46.
We reject Edwin's claim. The two pieces of evidence in question were: (1) evidence that Edwin had not spoken to the police after he was arrested; and (2) N.Z.'s statement that Edwin had previously abused other girls. Both pieces of evidence, however, were followed by curative instructions from the prosecutor, which we assume the grand jury followed.
See Lawson v. State, 264 P.3d 590, 597 (Alaska App. 2011) (stating that "we presume that jurors follow the court's instructions" (citing Whiteaker v. State, 808 P.2d 270, 277 (Alaska App. 1991))).
And as to the second piece of evidence specifically, we note that at the time N.Z. made the challenged statement, the grand jury had already heard E.Z.'s testimony regarding the two incidents she reported. And N.Z. subsequently testified that she only disclosed Edwin's alleged abuse of her after learning what E.Z. had experienced. Additionally, "evidence which would be legally admissible at trial [is] admissible before the grand jury." At trial, the State was permitted to introduce evidence of a prior incident of sexual abuse involving Edwin's eleven-year-old niece. Therefore, had N.Z. been referring to the prior conduct involving Edwin's niece - which was admissible at trial - this evidence would be admissible at the grand jury proceeding.
Former Alaska R. Crim. P. 6(r)(1) (2017) (now numbered as subsection (s)(1)).
Furthermore, there was other strong evidence of Edwin's guilt presented to the grand jury, including: E.Z.'s detailed testimony about the incident, testimony that items corroborating E.Z.'s account were discovered during a search of Edwin's residence, evidence that E.Z. immediately reported the incident to her parents, and evidence that E.Z. gave the same account when interviewed at a child advocacy center right after the incident. Given this evidence, we agree with the superior court that the introduction of the challenged evidence was "likely not a decisive factor" in the grand jury's decision to indict.
For these reasons, we uphold the superior court's denial of Edwin's motion to dismiss the indictment.
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.