Opinion
2:20-cv-02459-CMC-MGB
05-06-2021
Emerson Jimel Edwards, Plaintiff, v. Warden Stephon and Warden Rainmo, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Emerson Jimel Edwards (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action alleging violations of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that this action be summarily dismissed, with prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
BACKGROUND
The instant case is premised on the bare, cursory allegation that Defendants Stephon and Rainmo did not allow Plaintiff to see the chaplain or receive visitors while he was housed at Broad River Correctional Institution (“Broad River”). After reviewing Plaintiff's original Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) in this matter, the undersigned issued an order notifying Plaintiff that his case was subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted (Dkt. No. 8). In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, however, the undersigned gave him an opportunity to cure the deficiencies identified in the original pleading by filing an amended complaint with the Court.
Although Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint in compliance with the undersigned's instructions (Dkt. No. 11), the revised allegations simply restate those presented in the initial pleading, such that Plaintiff's claims are still subject to summary dismissal. Specifically, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants Stephon and Rainmo “always told him no” when he asked to see the facility's chaplain or his visitors. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff does not specify any injuries as a result of Defendants' purported conduct, but demands “$31 hundred thousand” in damages for the “violations” of his constitutional rights. (Id. at 6.) This is the extent of Plaintiff's allegations.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Amended Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). This action has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any prisoner complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). Indeed, a claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte “at any time” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute “is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits.” Id. at 326.
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). In order to satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations, ” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2). See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390- 91 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”). Such is the case here.
DISCUSSION
As noted above, Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on Defendants' apparent denial of Plaintiff's requests to see the chaplain or receive visitors at Broad River. It is well-established that § 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). In other words, a civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). Thus, “[t]he first step in any such claim is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.” Albright, 510 U.S. at 271; see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (explaining that to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law).
Of the two “violations” alleged in the Amended Complaint, only one implicates a right secured by the Constitution. As the undersigned explained in the initial proper form order (Dkt. No. 8), the existing precedent in the Fourth Circuit states that prisoners do not have a constitutional right to visitation, and that prison officials can deny the privilege for any reason or no reason at all. See Young v. Williams, No. 8:19-cv-02535-SAL-JDA, 2020 WL 847498, at *4 (D.S.C. Jan. 9, 2020), adopted, 2020 WL 833046 (D.S.C. Feb. 20, 2020) (referencing White v. Keller, 438 F.Supp. 110, 114-15 (D. Md. 1977), aff'd, 358 Fed.Appx. 431 (4th Cir. 2009)); see also Brown v. Carter, No. 4:20-cv-00924-TLW, 2020 WL 3420738, at *1 (D.S.C. June 22, 2020) (collecting cases). Thus, Plaintiff's allegations regarding his visitation rights do not state a cognizable claim under § 1983. The undersigned therefore looks to Plaintiff's allegations regarding his access to the Broad River chaplain to determine whether the Amended Complaint contains an actionable constitutional violation.
Although Plaintiff does not expressly identify which of his constitutional rights were violated when Defendants denied his alleged requests to see the facility's chaplain, the undersigned assumes Plaintiff intends to raise a claim pursuant to the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. See O'Lone v. Est. of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (noting that “[i]nmates clearly retain protections afforded by the First Amendment . . . including its directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion”) (internal citations omitted). To establish a violation under the Free Exercise Clause, the plaintiff must show both that he has a sincerely held religious belief and that the defendant's actions substantially burdened his religious freedom or expression. Carter v. Fleming, 879 F.3d 132, 139 (4th Cir. 2018). A practice or policy places a “substantial burden” on a person's religious exercise when it “put[s] substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” See Id. (referencing Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Indiana Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981)).
While the federal pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, ” it “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. Here, the undersigned explicitly warned Plaintiff that his case would be summarily dismissed if he did not provide some minimal level of factual support regarding Defendants' alleged interference with his religious expression. (See Dkt. No. 8 at 2.) In particular, the undersigned emphasized that Plaintiff must explain how each individual Defendant was personally involved in the alleged harm. (Id. at 2-3.) See Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017); see also Hill v. Bodiford, No. 4:20-cv-2254-BHH-TER, 2020 WL 5079073, at *3 (D.S.C. Aug. 7, 2020), adopted, 2020 WL 5077656 (D.S.C. Aug. 27, 2020) (explaining that a § 1983 plaintiff must show that he suffered an injury resulting from a defendant's specific conduct and “an affirmative link” between the injury and that conduct). Despite having availed himself of the opportunity to amend his original pleading, however, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint does not provide sufficient factual allegations to demonstrate these requisite factors.
As a threshold matter, Plaintiff does not even identify his religion or the religion to which the chaplain at Broad River belonged. Beyond that, the Amended Complaint is totally devoid of any contextual or factual allegations regarding the circumstances of Plaintiff's requests to see the chaplain and Defendants' subsequent denials thereof-most notably, how Defendants' actions significantly burdened Plaintiff's ability to practice his religion. And finally, Plaintiff does not allege any injuries resulting from Defendants' actions. Such bare allegations are insufficient, even for a pro se party like Plaintiff, to state a claim for relief. See e.g., Vance v. Wright, No. 1:16-cv-3431-BHH-SVH, 2016 WL 7637669, at *2 (D.S.C. Nov. 29, 2016), adopted, 2017 WL 26075 (D.S.C. Jan. 3, 2017) (summarily dismissing pro se detainee's First Amendment claim where plaintiff alleged that he was denied access to religious material, but did not provide any information about his religion, the materials he was denied, or how the denial interfered with his religion); Carter v. South Carolina, No. 5:14-cv-1842-RMG-KDW, 2014 WL 5325234, at *9 (D.S.C. Oct. 17, 2014) (summarily dismissing pro se claim where plaintiff failed to provide “minimal factual allegations, ” including the religion to which he and/or the facility's chaplain belonged, and any concrete injury suffered because of the chaplain's failure to serve plaintiff's faith); see also Garner v. Cohen, No. 2:16-cv-561-TLW-MGB, 2016 WL 9175627, at *4 (D.S.C. Sept. 1, 2016), adopted, 2017 WL 2645754 (D.S.C. June 20, 2017) (finding complaint's “vague references to [pro se] Plaintiff's rights being violated, absent any specific facts or allegations against the Defendants, [were] wholly insufficient to state any sort of plausible claim”). Because Plaintiff has had an opportunity to amend his Complaint and still failed to state a claim to relief under § 1983, the Amended Complaint must be summarily dismissed.
Although not alleged in the Amended Complaint, the undersigned notes that Plaintiff also could have raised his claim pursuant to the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), which prohibits government officials from imposing a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person confined to an institution. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(4)(A). However, even if the Court construed Plaintiff's Amended Complaint under RLUIPA, his allegations would still be subject to summary dismissal. First, “the inmate bears the initial burden of establishing that a prison policy substantially burdens his or her ability to practice in accordance with a sincerely held religious belief.” See Gentry v. Robinson, 837 Fed.Appx. 952, 956-57 (4th Cir. 2020) (referencing Greenhill v. Clarke, 944 F.3d 243, 250 (4th Cir. 2019)). Thus, for the same reasons stated above, Plaintiff's naked assertions in the Amended Complaint are insufficient to demonstrate any such burden on his religious expression under RLUIPA. Second, a prisoner bringing a cause of action under RLUIPA is not entitled to money damages against state defendants in either their individual or official capacities. See Wall v. Wade, 741 F.3d 492, 496 n.5 (4th Cir. 2014) (explaining that Congress did not authorize damages claims against state officials under RLUIPA). Here, Plaintiff seeks only monetary damages against Defendants Stephon and Rainmo. (Dkt. No. 11 at 6.) Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims are likewise subject to dismissal under RLUIPA.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court dismiss this action with prejudice. See Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724 F. App'x. 280, 281 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018) (noting that where the district court has already afforded an opportunity to amend, the district court has the discretion to afford another opportunity to amend or can “dismiss the complaint with prejudice, thereby rendering the dismissal order a final, appealable order”).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.