Whether Ellis made his statement as a result of interrogation was a question of fact for the trial court, and we find no error in the court's conclusion that no interrogation occurred. See Edwards v. State, 220 Ga. App. 74, 77 (2) ( 467 SE2d 379) (1996); Syfrett v. State, 210 Ga. App. 185, 186-187 (3) ( 435 SE2d 470) (1993). We have held many times that the asking of general booking questions such as one's name, address, and birth date does not constitute an interrogation.
See F. A. F. Motor Cars v. Childers, 181 Ga. App. 821, 823 (4) ( 354 S.E.2d 6) (1987) (mentioning new ground in oral hearing did not amend motion for new trial). 220 Ga. App. 74, 75 (1) ( 467 S.E.2d 379) (1996). Id. at 75.
The Fifth Amendment requires the exclusion of any statement made by an accused during custodial interrogation, unless he has been advised of his rights and has voluntarily waived those rights. Miranda, supra. A well-established line of federal and state case law has created an exemption from the Miranda rule for questions attendant to arrest, because such questions are not related to the investigation of the case, and at the same time serve a legitimate administrative need. See, e.g., Muniz, supra; Edwards v. State, 220 Ga. App. 74, 76-77 (2) ( 467 S.E.2d 379) (1996); Mincey v. State, 257 Ga. 500, 506 (10) ( 360 S.E.2d 578) (1987). The Court in Muniz specifically referred to questions asked to secure "biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services."
The court implicitly allowed an amendment of the new trial motion. The claim is reviewable.”); see also Edwards v. State, 220 Ga.App. 74, 75(1), 467 S.E.2d 379 (1996). Here, the trial court's order denying the motion for new trial notes that the motion was denied after the court “read and considered” the motion, held a hearing as to same, and “considered the arguments made.”
(Footnote omitted.) Franks v. State, 268 Ga. 238, 239 ( 486 SE2d 594) (1997), citing Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U. S. 582, 600-601 (III) (C) (110 SC 2638, 110 LE2d 528) (1990); Edwards v. State, 220 Ga. App. 74, 76-77 (2) ( 467 SE2d 379) (1996); Mincey v. State, 257 Ga. 500, 506 (10) ( 360 SE2d 578) (1987).Franks, supra at 240.
Neither is this a case in which only "booking" information was sought. Compare Edwards v. State, 220 Ga. App. 74, 76-77(2) ( 467 S.E.2d 379) (1996). Indeed, before asking Johnson his name, Commander Heaton asked him several potentially incriminating questions related to the commission of the obstruction offense alleged under Count 3 of the indictment.
Edwards v. State. Asking for a person's name and birth date during the process of an arrest is not reasonably likely to elicit a response which incriminates one in the commission of a crime and, therefore, is not interrogation. Id.; Mincey v. State. The trial court properly denied the motion in limine. Edwards v. State, 220 Ga. App. 74 ( 467 S.E.2d 379) (1996).Mincey v. State, 257 Ga. 500, 507 (10) ( 360 S.E.2d 578) (1987).
We note that [a] well-established line of federal and state case law has created an exemption from the Miranda rule for questions attendant to arrest, because such questions are not related to the investigation of the case, and at the same time serve a legitimate administrative need. See, e.g., [ Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 ( 110 S.C. 2638, 110 L.Ed.2d 528) (1990)]; Edwards v. State, 220 Ga. App. 74, 76-77 (2) ( 467 S.E.2d 379) (1996); Mincey v. State, 257 Ga. 500, 506 (10) ( 360 S.E.2d 578) (1987). (Footnote omitted.)
"In the absence of testimony to the contrary, counsel's actions [including the decision not to call any witnesses] are presumed strategic[,]" Earnest v. State, 262 Ga. 494, 496-497 ( 422 S.E.2d 188) (1992), and we find no error in the trial court's ruling on this issue.Edwards v. State, 220 Ga. App. 74, 75 ( 467 S.E.2d 379) (1996) ("A trial court's finding that a defendant has been afforded effective assistance of counsel must be upheld unless clearly erroneous." (Citations and punctuation omitted.)