Opinion
No. 1999-KA-01121-COA.
February 20, 2001. Rehearing Denied June 19, 2001. Writ of Certiorari Denied June 19, 2001.
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: LAUDERDALE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, TRIAL JUDGE: HON. ROBERT WALTER BAILEY, DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/23/1999
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JOHN M. COLETTE
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: JEAN SMITH VAUGHAN
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: BILBO MITCHELL
BEFORE SOUTHWICK, P.J., IRVING, AND MYERS, JJ.
¶ 1. Chester Edwards was convicted of possession of methamphetamine with the intent to distribute while in possession of a firearm. He was sentenced to fifteen years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, with nine years suspended and five years of supervised probation. On appeal, he asserts that the trial court erred in admitting evidence found on his person and in his vehicle at or near the time of arrest. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶ 2. While driving a commercial vehicle, Edwards made a mandatory stop at Weigh Station N-99. His truck was found to be in compliance with the applicable weight limit. As Edwards drove the truck off of the scales, he was pulled over and asked to come into the scale operating office. The officers who pulled him over, Jones and Lott, concede that the stop was completely random. Both officers also testified that Edwards appeared to be under the influence of narcotics. They surmised this from his apparent agitation, his trembling hands and the fact that he repeatedly licked his lips, indicating a dry mouth. Officer Jones further testified that the fact that Edwards was wearing sunglasses on an overcast, possibly rainy morning added to his suspicion.
¶ 3. Before doing a "walk around" inspection of Edwards's truck, the officers asked Edwards if he had any weapons in his possession. Edwards stated that he did not. Officer Lott noticed a bulge in Edwards's right-hand pants pocket. After brushing the bulge with his hand, Lott was of the opinion that it was a weapon. Edwards admitted that it was his pocket knife and that he had forgotten about it. Lott then asked Edwards to empty all of his pockets, and Edwards refused. Officer Jones noticed another bulge in one of Edwards's other pockets, though he did not think that it was a weapon. He brushed this bulge and deduced that it was methamphetamine. Edwards continuously refused to empty his pockets. After consulting with one other officer and their chief investigator, the officers finally secured all of the contents of Edwards's pockets. Finding a container containing what they believed to be methamphetamine on Edwards's person, the officers placed him under arrest and handcuffed him.
¶ 4. After placing Edwards under arrest, the officers sought to search his truck. Edwards refused to sign a form waiving his Miranda rights and giving the officers the right to search the truck. However, the officers all testified that Edwards orally consented to the search. Edwards denies this claim. The officers searched the truck, finding more drugs and drug paraphernalia. Of note is Officer Lott's discovery of a plastic bottle wrapped in duct tape. Unable to determine the contents of the bottle, Lott opened it to find that it contained more methamphetamine. A subsequent field sobriety test indicated that Edwards was under the influence of methamphetamine. He refused to consent to a blood or urine test and was issued a citation for such.
¶ 5. After a hearing on a motion to suppress the evidence found during the search of Edwards and his truck, the trial judge concluded that the search of Edwards's person had been unreasonable and in violation of the Fourth Amendment. However, the judge refused to suppress the evidence, holding that the officers had probable cause to arrest Edwards for operating his truck while under the influence of narcotics, and thus the evidence would have been inevitably discovered in a search incident to lawful arrest.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 6. The issues presented herein concern the admissibility of evidence. "This Court's standard of review as to the relevance and admissibility of evidence during trial is well established. `The relevancy and admissibility of evidence are largely within the discretion of the trial court and reversal may be had only where that discretion has been abused.'" Washington v. State, 726 So.2d 209 (¶ 26) (Miss.Ct.App. 1998) (citing Weaver v. State, 713 So.2d 860, 865 (Miss. 1997)).
ANALYSIS
I. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE RANDOM STOP FOR INSPECTION
¶ 7. Edwards argues that his being stopped at random amounts to an unreasonable seizure in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. In doing so, he notes that the Mississippi Supreme Court has recognized the federal doctrine that random stops of motorists subject to the uncontrolled discretion of law enforcement officers are unconstitutional. Drane v. State, 493 So.2d 294, 296 (Miss. 1986) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979), U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558 (1976), U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882-83 (1975)). However, this doctrine is not applicable to the facts of the case now before us.
¶ 8. In the present case, we are dealing with the closely regulated trucking industry. The United States Supreme Court has held that its prohibition of random stops of motorists does not "cast doubt on the permissibility of roadside truck weigh-stations and inspection checkpoints, at which some vehicles may be subject to further detention for safety and regulatory inspection than are others." Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 454 (1990) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979)). This issue is without merit.
II. ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE OF DRUGS FOUND ON THE APPELLANT'S PERSON
¶ 9. Edwards also challenges the admission into evidence of the drugs found on his person. He contends that the search of his person was unconstitutional. We disagree. The State presented testimony which indicated that, for safety reasons, Department of Transportation policy is to do a check for weapons before officers accompany a driver away from the inspection station and out to his parked truck. As stated above, the officers asked Edwards if he had any weapons in his possession, and Edwards told them that he did not. One of the officers noticed a bulge in one of Edwards's pockets. When the officer brushed his hand against the bulge, he surmised that it was a weapon. Edwards then presented a large folded hunting knife, saying that he had forgotten about it. Edwards was requested to empty all of the contents from his pockets, and he refused. At this point, the officers conducted a full pat down of Edwards's person.
¶ 10. The officers testified that Edwards appeared to be impaired by some form of narcotic. This, coupled with the fact that Edwards denied having the knife on his person, created a reasonable fear by the officers for their safety. Thus, the frisk of his person was appropriate. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). The pat down brought another suspicious bulge to Officer Jones's attention. He believed the bulge to be contraband, and the contents were ultimately removed from Edwards's pocket. If, during a valid frisk, an officer touches an object that he has probable cause to believe is either a weapon or contraband, he is allowed to seize and examine that object. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375-76 (1993). The contraband was found on Edwards's person pursuant to a valid search and was therefore admissible at trial.
III. ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE OF DRUGS FOUND IN APPELLANT'S VEHICLE
¶ 11. In his third assignment of error, Edwards asserts that the discovery of contraband in his vehicle was made pursuant to a warrantless, and therefore invalid search of his vehicle. As Edwards points out, "where the state relies on consent to a warrantless search of a vehicle of an accused person, the state must prove such consent beyond a reasonable doubt." Luton v. State, 287 So.2d 269, 272 (Miss. 1974). The testimony of the officers at trial indicated that while no written consent was obtained, Edwards's gave oral consent to the search of his truck. Edwards testified to the contrary, claiming that he gave no such consent. The Mississippi Supreme Court has directly addressed the argument presented before us:
In the case at bar each officer who was present at all critical stages of the arrest and search under discussion testified. Testimony of the state and the appellant in the record before us is conflicting as to consent, voluntariness of consent, and waiver of rights pertaining to the search. In this posture of testimony there was presented clearly to the trial court the issue of voluntariness of the consent to the search of the appellant's automobile. It was a classic question of fact to be decided by the judge himself who had the opportunity of seeing and observing each of the witnesses who testified. The trial judge gave to each bit of the testimony such weight and worth as he deemed proper under existing circumstances. No one questions that the appellant had a constitutional right guaranteed unto him that his automobile would not be searched without authority of law but this constitutional right can be and was by him waived.
Luton, 287 So.2d at 272 (citations omitted). The trial judge found that Edwards consented to the search of his vehicle, and we are not inclined to disturb this finding. We find this issue to be without merit.
¶ 12. In a fourth issue, Edwards presents a sort of "catch all" assignment of error. This issue, taken verbatim from his brief, reads:
IV. THE LAUDERDALE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN NOT SUPPRESSING ALL OF THE METHAMPHETAMINE THAT HAD BEEN DISCOVERED, BY THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICERS, AND IN PARTICULAR THE METHAMPHETAMINE DISCOVERED IN THE SEALED CONTAINER, AS IT WAS ALL THE PRODUCT OF SEVERAL UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES AND AS SUCH MUST BE CONSIDERED FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE AND EXCLUDED FROM EVIDENCE.
¶ 13. We have addressed all matters presented in this assertion in our analysis above. This final issue is also meritless.
¶ 14. THE JUDGMENT OF THE LAUDERDALE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT OF CONVICTION OF POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE WITH THE INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM AND SENTENCE OF FIFTEEN YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS WITH NINE YEARS SUSPENDED AND FIVE YEARS OF SUPERVISED PROBATION AND FINE OF $5,000 IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT. McMILLIN, C.J., KING AND SOUTHWICK, P. JJ., PAYNE, BRIDGES, THOMAS, LEE, IRVING AND CHANDLER, JJ., CONCUR. SOUTHWICK, P.J., CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY MCMILLIN, C.J., BRIDGES, IRVING, MYERS AND CHANDLER, JJ.
¶ 15. The majority affirms, but I find that in some respects the statement of legal principles might lead to an overly broad interpretation of our holding. Thus with respect for the validity and succinctness of the majority's analysis, I write separately.
¶ 16. I find the following facts to be critical to the outcome:
1) The defendant's truck stopped at a stationary weigh station established at one of the interstate highway entrances to Mississippi.
2) A weigh station officer randomly ordered a walk-around inspection of the truck. The specific acts that are involved with this kind of inspection were to open the cab door in order to see the vehicle identification number and compare it to the "cab card," to check the safety of the tires, and to make certain of the condition of mud flaps and of load-restraining straps on flatbed trailers.
3) Before going to the vehicle with Edwards, one of the officers after seeing a knife in Edwards' pocket and asking him to remove it, did a pat-down. Drugs were found.
¶ 17. In my view, the state has the authority to make stops of commercial vehicles at fixed locations, randomly to make a slightly more intrusive examination that still falls short of a search of some of them, and to perform a pat-down of the driver if a reasonable apprehension of weapons exists. I will review the three events that I just enumerated to explain my analysis
1. Right to stop at weigh station
¶ 18. Requiring vehicles to stop at this weigh station is a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Nonetheless, probable cause or even reasonable suspicion is not required in this situation. There are only "limited circumstances" in which suspicion is unnecessary. A fairly comprehensive list of those situations appears in a recent opinion of the United States Supreme Court. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 121 S.Ct. 447, 451-53 (2000).
¶ 19. Relevant here is that mandatory stops at highway roadblocks have been approved for certain purposes. Id. at 453. In an earlier opinion, the United States Supreme Court referred to weigh station stops of truckers as being distinguishable from the random stopping of all motorists in order to check their driver's licenses and automobile registrations. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979). The Court's prohibiting of random stops of motorists did not "cast doubt on the permissibility of roadside truck weigh-stations and inspection checkpoints, at which some vehicles may be subject to further detention for safety and regulatory inspection than are others." Id. at 663 n. 26. Accord, Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 454 (1990).
¶ 20. Three years before Prouse, the Supreme Court had found highway law enforcement officer's rights to stop, question and inspect to be more extensive at fixed checkpoints than for roving patrol stops as were in involved in Prouse:
[The] objective intrusion — the stop itself, the questioning, and the visual inspection — also existed in roving-patrol stops. But we view checkpoint stops in a different light because the subjective intrusion — the generating of concern or even fright on the part of lawful travelers — is appreciably less in the case of a checkpoint stop.
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
¶ 21. In Prouse, the Court analyzed the issue of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness of stops to check for a license or registration "by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654. This balancing requirement originated in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967); 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 10.8(a) (3d ed. 1996).
¶ 22. There are three requirements under Camara to validate a particular law enforcement practice involving a stop and limited detention: (1) existence of a strong public interest in maximizing success in combating the problem at hand; (2) an inability to achieve adequate result by relying on probable cause determinations; and (3) the "relatively limited invasion of the * * * citizen's privacy" involved in the procedure in question. Camara, 387 U.S. at 537. "Applying the previously discussed Camara standards, it would seem clear that the required stops at these stations for the purpose of weighing are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." 4 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 10.8(c).
¶ 23. In Edmond, the Supreme Court referred to Camara as a case supporting administrative inspections. Edmond, 121 S.Ct. at 452. Similar factors, though, have been employed in the situation of temporary law enforcement stops of individuals. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979) (seizures involve "a weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty").
¶ 24. Requiring truckers to stop at this weigh station was valid.
2. Random inspection
¶ 25. Once the seizure occurred, the evidence supported that the officer randomly selected Edwards's truck for an additional, "walk-around" inspection.
¶ 26. First, there was at least a suggestion in Prouse that weigh station stops followed by additional inspections were justified in certain circumstances. As mentioned above, the Court did not intend to "cast doubt on the permissibility of roadside truck weigh-stations and inspection checkpoints, at which some vehicles may be subject to further detention for safety and regulatory inspection than are others." Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 n. 26. The majority accepts that as conclusive. In my view, we must go further to ascertain whether what Prouse itself did not address is sufficiently supported by other authority.
¶ 27. Next, I repeat the relevant facts in our case. The officers randomly chose Edwards for an additional obligation. It was to pull his truck to the side for a walk-around inspection. After Edwards did so, he walked into the inspection station. There he was questioned by two officers, Matthew Lott and Tex Jones. Lott told Edwards that he wanted to see his bill of lading, truck registration and his driver's license. Edwards returned to the truck to get it, acting angry and agitated according to Lott. After Lott reviewed the paperwork, he found it to be in order. Edwards was then informed that the officers would be doing a walk-around inspection of the vehicle. That is when the vehicle identification number would be compared to the "cab card," the safety of the tires checked, and the existence and condition of mud flaps and load-restraining straps on flatbed trailers would be determined.
¶ 28. For the substantive answer to whether random selection for these inspections is proper, I return to the Camara factors that are referenced in Prouse. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654.
¶ 29. First, there is a strong public interest in assuring that the large commercial vehicles are meeting minimal safety standards such as the condition of their tires, mud flaps, straps holding down loads, and other matters being inspected as described by the testimony at trial. Examining the driver's license and registration is something that Prouse itself authorizes when it occurs at a fixed site and to all vehicles of a specific category, as opposed to random stops by roving patrols of vehicles chosen at the officers' discretion. The Supreme Court did not question that at roadside truck weigh-stations and inspection checkpoints, "some vehicles may be subject to further detention for safety and regulatory inspection than are others." Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 n. 26.
¶ 30. Secondly, I find that if weigh station officials through their quick glance as a truck was being weighed must acquire probable cause to believe that there are defects in basic safety items such as tires, mud flaps, and other features, this would prevent acceptable results from being obtained. Delaying the vehicle and allowing a closer look is necessary. Moreover, if randomness is prohibited the manpower needs would be greatly increased, which might well lead to no inspections occurring except for probable cause arising from the quick glance.
¶ 31. Thirdly, we must decide whether requiring the driver to delay for the additional time necessary for a walk-around inspection is a "relatively limited invasion" of privacy. This is not a full vehicle search, with cargo being shifted or even removed, with the contents of the cab being examined, or any meaningful intrusion other than the inconvenience of the driver's having to wait somewhat longer at the weigh station. With one exception, what the officer saw were the same things any bystander would have seen whenever the vehicle was in a stationary position being refueled at a truck stop or paused at a rest stop. The exception was the officer's opening of the door to see the vehicle inspection number. Considering the safety concerns that apply if a commercial truck is not what its driver purports it to be, suggesting theft or some other illegal conduct, I find this a relatively limited and necessary invasion.
¶ 32. It is true that Prouse itself found that random stopping of passenger vehicles on the open road is unconstitutional. Thus I consider more closely as a separate issue the very randomness of the additional intrusion, though under the Camara factors I have already found that randomness is necessary for acceptable results to be obtained. As the testimony at Edwards trial indicated, there were 5000 trucks a day through the weigh station. Inspecting all of them was beyond the capacity of the officers.
¶ 33. One matter to remember is that it is not the initial stopping and detaining that has been random. All trucks were stopped. Only the additional delay for an inspection was random.
¶ 34. Prouse found that the "States have a vital interest in ensuring that only those qualified to do so are permitted to operate motor vehicles, that these vehicles are fit for safe operation, and hence that licensing, registration, and vehicle inspection requirements are being observed." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 658. Delaware's specific measure of stopping al kinds of motorists randomly was found not sufficiently to further those aims:
The marginal contribution to roadway safety possibly resulting from a system of spot checks cannot justify subjecting every occupant of every vehicle on the roads to a seizure — limited in magnitude compared to other intrusions but nonetheless constitutionally cognizable — at the unbridled discretion of law enforcement officials. To insist neither upon an appropriate factual basis for suspicion directed at a particular automobile nor upon some other substantial and objective standard or rule to govern the exercise of discretion "would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches . . . ." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S., at 22. . . . . This kind of standardless and unconstrained discretion is the evil the Court has discerned when in previous cases it has insisted that the discretion of the official in the field be circumscribed, at least to some extent. . . . . Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S., at 532-533.
Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661. Prouse then distinguished weigh station stops of commercial trucks and found that its holding was irrelevant to that analysis. Id. at 663 n. 26.
¶ 35. For the very reasons that random stops were not justified in Prouse, I find them to be fully justified here once all commercial trucks have been required to undertake the initial stop to be weighed. I find that the health and safety concerns regarding large commercial vehicles are immense, individualized suspicions would not be effective, and the additional intrusion of the walk-around inspection is limited. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 537.
¶ 36. This was the analysis that upheld Kansas's random stopping of commercial trucks on the highway for safety inspections. United States v. Burch, 153 F.3d 1140, 1141 (10th Cir. 1998) (state trooper randomly stopping commercial trucks for inspection). Random safety inspections of commercial motor vehicles have long been a recognized tool for highway safety:
We begin by accepting as substantial the Government's interests in promoting highway safety and protecting employees from retaliatory discharge. Roadway does not question the legislative determination that noncompliance with applicable state and federal safety regulations in the transportation industry is sufficiently widespread to warrant enactment of specific protective legislation encouraging employees to report violations. "Random inspections by Federal and State law enforcement officials in various parts of the country [had] uniformly found widespread violation of safety regulations," and [the relevant federal statute] was designed to assist in combating the "increasing number of deaths, injuries, and property damage due to commercial motor vehicle accidents." 128 Cong. Rec. 32509, 32510 (1982) (remarks of Sen. Danforth and summary of proposed statute).
Brock v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 262 (1987) (bracketed inserts in original).
¶ 37. Even beyond commercial truck inspections, there have been situations in which random searches have been authorized when the reasons are not simply law enforcement. Of course, we are concerned with a seizure and not a full search, a distinction which under the balancing tests being applied in Camara and other case law is significant. As a useful analogy are the precedents that address "special need" searches. As the Supreme Court majority in Edmond stated, some "suspicionless searches" are permitted when the reasons serve "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement." Edmond, 121 S.Ct. at 451, quoting Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (random drug testing of student-athletes permissible) .
¶ 38. Among those special needs are several situations for random drug and alcohol testing for employees in safety-sensitive positions. Edmond, 121 S.Ct. at 451-52, citing Treasury Employees v. Van Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 627 (1989) ("the expectations of privacy of covered employees are diminished by reason of their participation in an industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure safety. . . . [The importance of safety] was recognized by Congress when it enacted the Hours of Service Act in 1907, and also when it authorized the Secretary to "test . . . railroad facilities, equipment, rolling stock, operations, or persons, as he deems necessary" under a 1970 railroad statute).
¶ 39. The critical considerations are under Camara or the similar factors in Brown v. Texas. Under those factors, I find that increased inspections of randomly selected truckers are permissible.
¶ 40. Relevant by analogy is case law for random administrative inspections of closely regulated businesses. See., e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702-704 (1987). Its primary application is to stationary business premises. Burger provides for notice to business premises owners "that inspections will be made on a regular basis and by limiting the inspection to regular business hours and to vehicles and parts subject to record-keeping requirements." Charles H. Whitebread Christopher Slobogin, Criminal Procedure, § 13.03 (a) (1993) at 276. I find that the Burger test is satisfied here. Instead of the inspectors' choosing when to inspect, the trucker chooses by the schedule that he keeps. The inspection occurs at a stationary weigh site, can only occur when the trucker decides to use the adjacent highway, and is limited in scope to what can be seen from outside the vehicle. That a trucker is not always inspected is equivalent to the business that is not going to be inspected every day that it is open for business.
¶ 41. For the variety of reasons, starting with the Camara factors, then looking explicitly at the direction from the footnote in Prouse, and finally considering as analogies the special needs and the warrantless administrative inspection case law, I find no defect in the random selection of certain vehicles for a walk-around inspection once they have already been stopped for weighing.
3. Pat-down for weapons
¶ 42. The remaining issue is the officer's pat-down of Edwards before the two officers went with him out to his tractor-trailer rig. It was during that pat-down that Edwards' significant problems began as it was then that the contraband was discovered.
¶ 43. There was testimony that for safety reasons, Department policy is to do a check for weapons before officers go with a driver away from the inspection station and out to his parked truck. Officer Lott asked Edwards if he had any guns or knives on him. Edwards said he did not, but Lott pointed out a bulge in Edward's pocket that appeared to be a knife. Edwards said he had forgotten that, and pulled out a fairly large folded hunting knife and placed it on the counter. Edwards then placed some other pocket items on the counter, but refused to remove everything from his pockets. Officer Jones testified that since Edwards had not acknowledged having the knife, Jones did a pat-down. He felt another lump in Edwards' pocket, and told Lott "he's got methamphetamine in his pocket." The officers then called for an investigator to assist. The investigator arrived, the Bureau of Narcotics was contacted, and the drugs were removed from Edwards' pocket. The substance appeared to be methamphetamine and Edwards was arrested.
¶ 44. Only after these events was any search of the truck undertaken. At that time, the search was incident to arrest. The majority also describes the finding of consent. Therefore only the initial pat-down presents a meaningful Fourth Amendment issue.
¶ 45. Since the walk-around inspection of the vehicle was permissible, may the officers do a pat-down of the driver prior to that valid inspection since they will be with him at the vehicle during the inspection? The United States Supreme Court has addressed the minimal additional intrusion that arises once a valid stop has occurred in performing a pat-down when the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that he is in danger. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1(1968). If a valid frisk is conducted, the officer's discovery by touch of an object that he has a reasonable basis to believe is either a weapon or contraband, allows him to seize and examine that object. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375-76 (1993).
¶ 46. The Mississippi Supreme Court has indicated that if a "`reasonable investigatory stop' is conducted, an officer is authorized to `conduct a weapons search limited in scope' to the discovery of concealed weapons." Shannon v. State, 739 So.2d 468, 471 (Miss. 1999). Facially that language conflates into one issue what may be two — the validity of the stop and the validity of the frisk. Even if all investigatory stops do not give a right to frisk, here there was more. In other words, we need not decide if the Department of Transportation policy meets Fourth Amendment requirements by always conducting a pat-down whenever officers will be accompanying a driver to his vehicle for a walk-around inspection. It is enough to point out that additional circumstances justified this pat-down under traditional analysis.
¶ 47. The majority discusses the other circumstances. In summary, prior to the frisk, Edwards was asked if he had any weapons on him. He said that he did not and thereby failed to acknowledge the large folding knife that was in his pocket and visible by its bulge to the officer. One officer testified that Edwards was visibly impaired, which from that officer's experience with truck drivers was probably from the use of methamphetamines. I find that Edward's refusal to acknowledge carrying a knife after being specifically asked if he had weapons and his appearing to be under the influence of illegal drugs, created a reasonable fear by the officers for their safety.
¶ 48. It does not matter that the officers also were following a more general frisk policy. The fact that they were aware of the unacknowledged knife prior to the frisk was sufficient to create an independent basis for their actions.
¶ 49. I do not mean to suggest that there is constitutional difficulty in the officers' for their own safety always doing a pat-down of the driver whenever a walk-around inspection is to be conducted. Addressing that issue, however, is for another day.
¶ 50. I agree that we should affirm Edwards's conviction.