¶ 21. There is a presumption that a trial attorney's performance is competent. Edwards v. State, 615 So.2d 590, 596 (Miss. 1993). To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, therefore, an appellant must prove that counsel's overall performance was deficient and that his defense was prejudiced by his attorney's inadequate performance.
¶ 24. In support of his contention that the judge improperly refused to poll the jurors individually and therefore denied him a fair trial, Robert cites Edwards v. State, 615 So.2d 590 (Miss. 1993), arguing that it is implicit that each member should be polled individually when requested. However, in Edwards, the issue was directed at the timing of the polling.
Hart's sentence was less than the maximum thirty (30) years and a one million dollar fine authorized by Miss. Code Ann. § 41-29-139(b)(1) (Supp. 1991). In Edwards v. State, 615 So.2d 590 (Miss. 1993), the contention was made that a twenty-five-year sentence for the crime of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute was disproportionate and a denial of Edwards' rights under the United States and Mississippi Constitutions. In determining that Edwards' contention was without merit, we stated:
Id. There is, however, a presumption that a trial attorney's performance is competent. Edwards v. State, 615 So.2d 590, 596 (Miss. 1993). ¶ 6. Conner's only contention that his trial counsel was ineffective is that she introduced the photographic lineup into evidence.
¶ 18. In the case Edwards v. State 615 So.2d 590, 597 (Miss. 1993), our supreme court held that a trial judge is not in error nor has he abused his discretion for sentencing a defendant within the limits set out in the statute. Conversely, if a sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime committed, it can then be attacked on Eighth Amendment grounds. Wallace v. State, 607 So.2d 1184, 1188 (Miss.
When the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised on appeal, a presumption arises that defense counsel was competent. Edwards v. State, 615 So.2d 590, 596 (Miss. 1993). In order for an appellant to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he must prove that his counsel's overall performance was (1) deficient and that (2) his defense was prejudiced by his attorney's inadequate performance.
The burden of proving that both prongs of Strickland have been met is on the defendant who faces a rebuttable presumption that "trial counsel's conduct is within the wide range of reasonable conduct and that decisions made by counsel are strategic." Edwards v. State, 615 So.2d 590, 596 (Miss. 1993). Further, Bell's declaration during the plea colloquy that he was satisfied with the services of his lawyer is presumptively true. "Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity."
As to the first prong, it is presumed "that trial counsel's conduct is within the wide range of reasonable conduct and that decisions made by counsel are strategic." Edwards v. State, 615 So.2d 590, 596 (Miss. 1993). Understandably, the Strickland standard "is difficult to establish, and appropriately so."
So Howard fails to show plain error occurred or that failure to object to these comments, which was presumably trial strategy, prejudiced his defense. Cox v. State, 793 So.2d 591, 600 (Miss. 2001) (holding a defendant "must meet both prongs of the Strickland test to prove ineffectiveness of counsel: that the legal representation was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense" (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Edwards v. State, 615 So.2d 590, 596 (Miss. 1993))).
To overcome this presumption, the defendant must “identify the acts or omissions of counsel” and show “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Lindsay v. State, 720 So.2d 182, 184 (Miss.1998) (citing Edwards v. State, 615 So.2d 590, 596 (Miss.1993)); see also Jackson, 815 So.2d at 1200.Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052.