The fact that appellant may have only a seventh grade education does not mean that he was unable to understand the proceedings. People v. Mims, 42 Ill.2d 441, 248 N.E.2d 92 (1969); Edwards v. State, 7 Md. App. 327, 254 A.2d 719 (1969); State v. Place, 25 Ohio App.2d 158, 267 N.E.2d 832 (1971). A test for competency to plead guilty is no more stringent than the test for competency to stand trial.
Denied February 2, 1970Petition denied February 2, 1970. Opinion of Court of Special Appeals reported: 7 Md. App. 327.
We hold that the court did not commit constitutional error in accepting it. See Edwards v. State, 7 Md. App. 327. It seems that appellant relies on this point in claiming that his plea was involuntary.
While we have held that a guilty plea, knowingly and intelligently made, stands for a conviction of the highest order, Kitonis v. Warden, 6 Md. App. 110, 113, the sina qua non to such conviction is a convincing demonstration that the guilty plea was knowingly and intelligently entered. As we stated in Silverberg v. Warden, 7 Md. App. 657, 662: "Maryland has long followed the rule that there is reversible error where the record does not disclose that the defendant voluntarily and knowingly entered his guilty plea. Edwards v. State, 7 Md. App. 327." Since it would appear that the record before the hearing judge was not adequate to permit him to make a determination whether the applicant's pleas were knowingly and intelligently entered at the time of his trial, we shall grant the application for leave to appeal and remand the case in order that such a determination may be made upon a proper record.
We hold that Boykin, insofar as it may require personal inquiry by the trial judge, should not be applied to guilty pleas accepted prior to the date of that decision, 2 June 1969. Maryland has long followed the rule that there is reversible error where the record does not disclose that the defendant voluntarily and knowingly entered his guilty plea. Edwards v. State, 7 Md. App. 327. The question is whether the record here discloses that the guilty pleas were intelligent and voluntary at the time they were accepted.
The court made the factual finding that the prosecutor had no knowledge of any investigation concerning those other charges at the time of the negotiation. Under such circumstances, the court said, a prosecutor conducting a plea negotiation does not make an implied guarantee that the accused will not be prosecuted on other charges of which he had no knowledge (Edwards v State, 7 Md. App. 327). The plea minutes reveal no promises were made to the defendant at any time.