’ " ’ " Pilley v. State, 930 So. 2d 550, 564-65 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) (quoting Farrior v. State, 728 So. 2d 691, 695 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998), quoting in turn Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 569, 574 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991), quoting in turn Johnson v. State, 390 So. 2d 1160, 1167 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980) ). See also Edwards v. State, 139 So. 3d 827, 837 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013) ("In a prosecution for murder, the intent of the defendant ‘must be inferred by the jury from a due consideration of all of the material evidence.’ " (quoting Rivers v. State, 624 So. 2d 211, 213 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) )).

Although the trial court's order notes that "[Wiggins] must produce substantial evidence from which an inference can be made that McMillian appeared to be intoxicated at the dog track, either through circumstantial or direct evidence, or a combination of both[,]" the order also appears to emphasize the trial court's conclusion that "[i]nherent in [Wiggins]'s argument is that [Wiggins] lack[s] any direct evidence that McMillian appeared intoxicated." In Edwards v. State, 139 So.3d 827 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013), the Court of Criminal Appeals noted, in relevant part: " ‘ " ‘Circumstantial evidence is in nowise considered inferior evidence and is entitled to the same weight as direct evidence provided it points to the guilt of the accused.’

, that she helped to facilitate the killing, and that her husband was killed "for a pecuniary or other valuable consideration or pursuant to a contract or for hire". The fact that the jury could have drawn contrary inferences favoring Gill based on the same evidence is of no moment because habeas relief is only proper 'where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with [the Supreme] Court's precedents.' See Morton v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 684 F.3d 1157, 1166 (11th Cir. 2012) ("[W]e may issue a writ of habeas corpus only 'where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with [the Supreme] Court's precedents.'") (citations omitted.). While Gill argues there is no direct proof of her intent to kill her husband, the appellate court correctly found that circumstantial evidence is sufficient as long as the jury believes beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant is guilty. See Edwards v. State, 139 So. 3d 827, 836 (Ala. Crim. App. March 29, 2013) (quoting White v. State, 314 So. 2d 857 (Ala. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 951 (1975) ("'Circumstantial evidence alone is enough to support a guilty verdict of the most heinous crime, provided the jury believes beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty.'")). Sheriff's Deputy Bill Wright testified that in retrospect, he would have expected Gill to be more "upset" (id. at 290, 295); Likewise, Investigator Mike Grantham testified that he "had never been to a crime scene that is this horrendous where they were calm. . ."(id. at 392), and Odell Jones, the victim's cousin, stated that she expected Gill to be more upset, but instead, Gill just told the story of her husband's death "so eas[ily]."

As this Court has repeatedly emphasized: " ‘ " ‘Circumstantial evidence is in nowise considered inferior evidence and is entitled to the same weight as direct evidence provided it points to the guilt of the accused.’ " ’ " Wiggins v. Mobile Greyhound Park, LLP, 294 So.3d 709, 723 (Ala. 2019) (quoting Edwards v. State, 139 So. 3d 827, 836-37 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013), quoting in turn Hollaway v. State, 979 So. 2d 839, 843 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007), quoting in turn White v. State, 546 So. 2d 1014, 1017 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) ). As long as the circumstantial evidence presented by the plaintiffs was sufficient to allow the jury to reasonably infer that wrongful acts by the defendants led to the plaintiffs' loss of the 47 school accounts, direct evidence was not required to submit the issue of causation to the jury.

" ‘A trial court has broad discretion in formulating its jury instructions, providing they are an accurate reflection of the law and facts of the case.’ " Edwards v. State, 139 So.3d 827, 832 (Ala.Crim.App.2013) (quoting Coon v. State, 494 So.2d 184 (Ala.Crim.App.1986) ).At the conclusion of all the evidence, the circuit court gave the following instruction to the jury:

” Edwards v. State, 139 So.3d 827, 832 (Ala.Crim.App.2013). Furthermore, the Alabama Supreme Court has explained that “ ‘Generally speaking, the standard of review for jury instructions is abuse of discretion.’ ”