Opinion
Civil Action No. 4:03-CV-1146-Y
January 28, 2004
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE AND NOTICE AND ORDER
This cause of action was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), as implemented by an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge are as follows:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a petition for writ of habeas corpus by a federal prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
B. PARTIES
Petitioner Audrey Edwards, Reg. No. 31384-077, is a federal prisoner who is currently incarcerated in the Federal Medical Center-Carswell in Fort Worth, Texas.
The Respondent is Lucy Mallisham, Warden of the Federal Medical Center-Carswell in Fort Worth, Texas.
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
By the instant habeas application, Edwards challenges a disciplinary proceeding conducted at the Federal Medical Center-Carswell, and the resultant loss of 27 days good conduct time, loss of telephone, commissary and visiting privileges, and 30 days disciplinary segregation. (Resp't Appendix 2.) Edwards was charged by incident report dated January 19, 2003, with the institutional offense of making sexual proposals to another and threatening another, a Code 206 violation. (Id. 1, 7.) In the report, the reporting officer, Senior Officer J. Reamy, gave the following written account of the alleged violation:
Edwards entered the Officer's station and began to ask me personal questions about my age, the month and year I was born and what sign I was born under to see if we were a match. She went on to say that if I was the President, she would be my Monica Lewinsky. She made the stated [sic] she would make me scared to work this Unit. She went on to state she is getting out soon and would stalk me and fight my wife for me if she didn't want to share. She stated she was made to have babies and that I looked like her baby's father. She stated I was a freak and took panties during shakedowns and I must go to Deep Ellam in Dallas, as she claims she often had. While speaking to me, she left the Office and returned [sic] few minutes later with pictures of herself and children and made comments about the mirrors around the bed in the picture. I took her statements as a form of sexual proposals [sic] and a threat to myself and family. (Id. 2 at 6.)
Edwards received a copy of the incident report on the January 20, 2003. (Id. 2 at 4.) Thereafter, she was advised of her rights in connection with the disciplinary proceeding on January 24, 2003, and she appeared for a disciplinary hearing before a disciplinary hearing officer on January 30, 2003. (Id. at 2, 6.) At the hearing, Edwards waived her right to a staff representative, denied the charges, and gave a statement regarding her version of the events. (Id. 2 at 4.) After reviewing the evidence, including the incident report and Edwards's statement, the hearing officer found Edwards guilty of the offense. (Id. 2 at 5-7.) Edwards received a copy of the "Discipline Hearing Officer Report" on March 3, 2003. (Id. 2 at 7.)
Edwards then pursued her administrative remedies, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the hearing officer's finding, among other things. (Id. 4, 5.) She first appealed the decision to the Regional Director, who denied the appeal on April 14, 2003. (Id. 3, 4 at 10.) Edwards then appealed that denial to the Board of National Inmate Appeals. (Id. 5.) On July 28, 2003, the Administrator of the National Inmate Appeals denied the appeal. (Id. 5 at 13.) Thereafter, Edwards filed the instant habeas corpus petition in this court. The respondent has filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, motion for summary judgment, with supporting documentary exhibits, to which Edwards has replied.
D. ISSUES
Edwards challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the disciplinary hearing officer's finding on the following grounds and seeks restoration of her lost good conduct time:
1. There was no evidence to support the disciplinary hearing officer's finding, only "an officer's word against [hers]";
2. Other than the reporting officer's allegations, the disciplinary hearing officer "could not find any confidential information or history of [Edwards] indulging in any indecent conversations or behavior";
3. There was a two-hour time lapse before the reporting officer decided to write the incident report; and
4. No threat or sexual proposal took place. (Petition at 4-5; Pet'r Reply at 6.)
E. DISCUSSION
The government moves for dismissal of the action on the grounds that Edwards has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or, alternatively, for summary judgment on the grounds that, as to the claims presented, there are no true contested material facts at issue. (Resp't Mot. to Dismiss at 4-5.) The government concedes, however, that "Edwards may assert the following as contested facts: (1) whether Edwards was denied the right to call witnesses; and (2) whether there existed "some evidence" in support of the finding of guilt against Edwards." (Id.) Although Edwards raised the first issue in her administrative appeals, she does not raise the issue in the instant federal petition. Thus, the following discussion is limited to whether there was some evidence to support the disciplinary hearing officer's finding of guilt.
In the context of prison disciplinary proceedings resulting in the loss of good time credits, an inmate is entitled to minimum due process requirements, which include the requirement that there exist "some evidence" in support of the hearing officer's decision. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1986); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-66 (1974). Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. The relevant inquiry is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary officer. Id. at 455-56.
Essentially, Edwards's argument is that the reporting officer "took the entire conversation out of its original context" and wrote a "fictitious incident report." (Petition at 4, 7.) She urges that the alleged violation never took place and complains about the fact that the hearing officer found the reporting officer's version of the events credible and disbelieved her version of the events. According to Edwards, the reporting officer's written account of the alleged violation "is an accusation only," and not evidence. (Pet'r Reply at 3.) In support of her argument, Edwards relies upon the Eighth Circuit case of Moore v. Plaster, 266 F.3d 928, 932 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1037 (2002).
As to matters of credibility and reliability of the evidence, the hearing officer is entitled to make such determinations, and the court will not consider such claims. Smith v. Rabalais, 659 F.2d 539, 545-46 (5th Cir. 1981); Najjar v. Yusuff, 81 Fed. Appx. 815, 816, 2003 WL 22427949, at *1 (5th Cir. 2003). As to the sufficiency of the evidence, Moore is distinguishable. In that case, the investigator's report, which was not based on personal knowledge, was the only evidence considered by the hearing officer in support of the alleged disciplinary violation. Moore, 266 F.3d at 931-32. The court determined that the conclusory statements of the investigator, without more, did not constitute "some evidence" of the alleged violation. Id. Here, the incident report included the reporting officer's detailed statement regarding what the officer personally heard and observed. In this circuit, such a report clearly constitutes "some evidence" to support the hearing officer's guilty finding. See Hudson v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 534, 536-37 (5th Cir. 2001).
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing discussion, it is recommended that respondent's motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, motion for summary judgment be granted to the extent that this petition for writ of habeas corpus be denied.
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT TO PROPOSED FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION AND CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO OBJECT
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), each party to this action has the right to serve and file specific written objections in the United States District Court to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation within ten (10) days after the party has been served with a copy of this document. The court is extending the deadline within which to file specific written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation until February 18, 2004. The United States District Judge need only make a de novo determination of those portions of the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation to which specific objection is timely made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(B)(1). Failure to file by the date stated above a specific written objection to a proposed factual finding or legal conclusion will bar a party, except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice, from attacking on appeal any such proposed factual finding or legal conclusion accepted by the United States District Judge. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en bane op. on reh'g); Carter v. Collins, 918 F.2d 1198, 1203 (5th Cir. 1990).
IV. ORDER
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636, it is ORDERED that each party is granted until February 18, 2004, to serve and file written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation. It is further ORDERED that if objections are filed and the opposing party chooses to file a response, a response shall be filed within seven (7) days of the filing date of the objections.
It is further ORDERED that the above-styled and numbered action, previously referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for findings, conclusions, and recommendation, be and hereby is returned to the docket of the United States District Judge.