Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Superior Court County No. 56-2007-00285373- CU-CO-SIM of Ventura Barbara A. Lane, Judge.
John Fu for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, David Chaney, Chief Assistant Attorney General, James M. Schiavenza, Pamela J. Holmes, Supervising Deputy Attorneys General, Gary Ostrick, Deputy Attorney General, for Defendant and Respondent.
GILBERT, P.J.
Plaintiff Todd Edwards appeals a summary judgment granted in favor of defendant State of California Employment Development Department (EDD). Edwards alleged that he suffered damages by relying on EDD misinformation about his eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits. We conclude, among other things, that the dismissal of his action was proper because Edwards did not exhaust his judicial remedies under the Unemployment Insurance Code and because he did not timely file a government liability claim for damages against the EDD. We affirm.
FACTS
The EDD is the California state agency responsible for deciding claims for unemployment insurance benefits.
Edwards applied for, and began receiving, unemployment insurance benefits after he lost his job in August of 2004. In September, Edwards received an EDD "fact sheet" about California Training Benefits (CTB), which are continuing unemployment benefits for applicants who attend a qualified educational training program. Several months later, Edwards decided to attend an ITT four-year training program to obtain a B.A. degree in digital animation and game design.
On June 9, 2005, Robert Johnson, an EDD employee, orally advised Edwards that he would receive CTB funds when he started attending ITT. Edwards promptly enrolled at ITT, obtained a student loan for tuition, and started attending ITT classes on June 13th.
On June 14, 2005, Johnson called Edwards and told him that his CTB unemployment benefit application could not be approved.
On June 16, 2005, the EDD issued its written decision on Edwards's application. It denied his claim for CTB benefits and informed him of his right to appeal.
Edwards filed an appeal and had an evidentiary hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ) of the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (CUIAB). The ALJ upheld the EDD's decision to deny benefits.
Edwards appealed to the CUIAB. On January 9, 2006, the CUIAB ruled that Edwards was not eligible for the CTB benefits and it denied his claim. The CUIAB advised Edwards that he had six months from the date of its decision to file a superior court petition for writ of mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) if he disagreed with its decision. Edwards never filed that petition.
On June 13, 2007, Edwards filed a complaint for "promissory estoppel, " fraud, and negligent misrepresentation against the EDD. In his prayer for relief, he sought damages for the EDD's misrepresentation about his eligibility for CTB benefits, and "[f]or all CTB benefits that he was promised" by the EDD.
The EDD filed a demurrer. It claimed that Edwards had failed to file a government liability claim before filing this action and that Edwards had not exhausted the judicial remedy of filing a Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 (hereafter "section 1094.5") petition for writ of mandate.
On June 15, 2007, Edwards filed a government claim alleging that he suffered damages starting from June 14, 2005, the date the EDD notified him that his application for CTB unemployment benefits was denied.
The trial court sustained the EDD's demurrer. Edwards filed a first amended complaint for promissory estoppel, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. After the trial court sustained a second EDD demurrer, Edwards filed a second amended complaint for a single cause of action for promissory estoppel. In his prayer for relief, he sought, among other things, "all CTB benefits that he was promised."
The EDD filed a motion for summary judgment alleging, among other things, that Edwards failed to file a timely government liability claim and that he did not exhaust his judicial remedy of filing a section 1094.5 petition for writ of mandate.
The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment and entered a judgment dismissing Edwards's action with prejudice.
DISCUSSION
In reviewing a summary judgment, we independently examine the record to determine whether the party moving for summary judgment "is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) "There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof." (Id. at p. 850.)
Edwards claims that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment. We disagree for the reasons set forth below.
I. Exhaustion of Judicial Remedies
Edwards contends that after receiving an unfavorable CUIAB decision on his claim for unemployment benefits, he was entitled to: 1) sue the EDD for damages for misrepresenting the unemployment insurance benefits he was entitled to receive, and 2) obtain a judgment for the amount of unemployment benefits he should have received without pursuing an administrative mandamus writ. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5.)
The Attorney General responds that Edwards waived all claims for damages for unemployment benefits allegedly promised by failing to exhaust his judicial remedies under Unemployment Insurance Code section 410. He notes that Edwards failed to timely file an administrative mandamus action to review the CUIAB decision. The Attorney General is correct.
The California Unemployment Insurance Code provides a comprehensive appeals process for unemployment insurance applicants who are dissatisfied with EDD administrative actions. After a denial of benefits, or unfavorable EDD action, a claimant may appeal and receive an evidentiary hearing before an ALJ of the CUIAB. (Unemp. Ins. Code, §§ 407, 408, 1328, 1331.) If dissatisfied with that decision, the claimant may appeal to the CUIAB. (Id., §§ 409, 410, 1334.) Finally, an appellant may review a CUIAB decision by filing a superior court administrative mandamus action within six months of the CUIAB decision. (Id., § 410; Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5.)
The California Supreme Court has held that this administrative appeals process fulfills "every requisite of due process of law." (Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 291.) This procedure envisions that parties to these appeals will complete the process and not evade it by filing actions not authorized by the Unemployment Insurance Code. (Ibid.) Courts have prohibited parties from making any procedural "end run" around the requirement that they must file a timely mandamus review of the CUIAB decision. (Du Four v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 863, 866, fn. 2; Abelleira, at p. 291.)
Here Edwards filed ALJ appeals after being denied unemployment benefits. After receiving unfavorable decisions, he appealed to the CUIAB which denied his claim on January 9, 2006. It advised Edwards that he had six months to file a "Petition for Writ of Mandate pursuant to section 1094.5" to review its decision.
But Edwards never filed that section 1094.5 petition. Instead, on June 13, 2007, he filed a complaint for damages against the EDD. This action was untimely, and by not filing the section 1094.5 mandate petition, Edwards failed to exhaust his Unemployment Insurance Code judicial remedies. (Unemp. Ins. Code, § 410; Johnson v. City of Loma Linda (2000) 24 Cal.4th 61, 70.)
Edwards claims he was exempt from this exhaustion requirement because he is seeking only damages, not unemployment insurance benefits. But in his original and amended complaints, he prays for "all CTB benefits that he was promised" by the EDD. (Italics added.) Because he is seeking unemployment benefits, he was required to timely file the section 1094.5 writ. His failure to do so bars all relief for those benefits through his untimely current action. (Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, supra, 17 Cal.2d at p. 291; see also Johnson v. City of Loma Linda, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 70; Patrick Media Group, Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 592, 606, 613, 617 [plaintiff's damage action was barred where it failed to file a section 1094.5 writ of mandate within the statute of limitations period].)
Edwards claims the prior administrative appeals are irrelevant because: 1) his current case involves the EDD's misstatement about his eligibility for benefits, 2) the unemployment administrative proceedings did not involve that issue, and 3) his current case involves estoppel, an issue which may not be raised in administrative appeals. We disagree.
In his current case, Edwards alleges the EDD employees repeatedly and consistently misadvised him that his claim for benefits would be approved. Edwards raised that issue in his administrative appeals. But the CUIAB found that he "received conflicting advice and information from EDD representatives." (Italics added.) That finding was a rejection of one of the main factual assertions Edwards uses to support his current action against the EDD. If Edwards disagreed with the CUIAB, he could have timely filed a section 1094.5 writ and the court could have potentially made additional or different findings using its independent judgment. (Conrad v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 237, 243.) But because Edwards never attempted to set aside the CUIAB decision, he is bound by its findings. (Johnson v. City of Loma Linda, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 70.)
Edwards suggests that because administrative agencies are not courts, his current case is proper because he could not raise an estoppel issue in the unemployment insurance administrative hearings. But appellate courts have rejected this argument. (Manufactured Home Communities, Inc. v. County of San Luis Obispo (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 705, 716 [rent control board in administrative hearing could apply estoppel against mobilehome park owner because of alleged misrepresentations to tenants about nature of the lease]; Lentz v. McMahon (1989) 49 Cal.3d 393, 406 ["Decisions of our Courts of Appeal disclose that equitable estoppel has been routinely applied in administrative hearings"].) Whether the claim is for benefits or other monetary relief, "all potential issues" based on estoppel should initially be raised in the administrative hearing designated by statute as the forum for his unemployment insurance claims. (Id. at p. 404.)
Moreover, Edwards could have raised his estoppel issue in a superior court section 1094.5 mandamus petition. (Canfield v. Prod (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 722, 733 [estoppel applied against state benefit department director]; Amaro v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1977) 65 Cal.App.3d 715, 720 [unemployment insurance claimant raised equitable estoppel in section 1094.5 administrative mandamus proceeding].) He also could have joined any other causes of action with that section 1094.5 writ had he done so within the six-month statute of limitations in Unemployment Insurance Code section 410. (Hensler v. City of Glendale (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1, 14; Gales v. Superior Court (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1596, 1603; Du Four v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., supra, 49 Cal.App.3d at p. 866, fn. 2; Hatch v. Bank of America (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 206, 210.)
The Attorney General argues that even had Edwards exhausted his judicial remedies, he could not prevail on an estoppel claim because he was ineligible for the unemployment benefits. The CUIAB ruled that he was ineligible and Edwards has not challenged that ruling which is now final and binding on him. Plaintiffs who lack "substantive" eligibility usually cannot assert an estoppel to obtain monetary benefits from state public benefit agencies. (Lentz v. McMahon, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 402.) Even many eligible recipients may not plead an estoppel for lost benefits based on erroneous eligibility information from agency employees. (Schweiker v. Hansen (1981) 450 U.S. 785, 788-789.)
Edwards argues that he should be allowed to proceed against the EDD on a contract claim. But he failed to make an adequate showing on the issues of offer, acceptance, eligibility and statutory authority. "[N]o contractual obligation may be enforced against a public agency unless it appears the agency was authorized by the Constitution or statute to incur the obligation.... " (Air Quality Products, Inc. v. State of California (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 340, 349.) The EDD has no statutory authority to pay benefits to ineligible applicants. (Unemp. Ins. Code, § 1251.) Edwards was ineligible. Moreover, the CUIAB's findings about his receipt of "conflicting" information undermine a contractual claim which can only be based on a clear and unambiguous promise. (US Ecology, Inc. v. State of California (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 887, 901.)
Courts have also ruled that government public assistance agencies are not liable for damages where their employees gave mistaken oral advice to applicants before the agency issued its official written decision on the benefit application. (Schweiker v. Hansen, supra, 450 U.S. at pp. 788-789; Leimbach v. Califano (8th Cir. 1979) 596 F.2d 300, 305.) Edwards claims the EDD is liable for Johnson's June 9th and June 14th remarks. But the EDD did not issue its written decision on his application until June 16th. In his complaint Edwards alleged that he demanded a written decision from the EDD. He decided, however, to take action before he received the official June 16th eligibility decision on his entitlement to CTB benefits (form DE 3100, Decision of Potential Training Benefits Entitlement).
But the contract and estoppel issues aside, Edwards's action still cannot proceed because it may not be used as a substitute for a section 1094.5 writ. (Castillo v. City of Los Angeles (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 477, 486; Logan v. Southern California Rapid Transit Dist. (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 116, 123-124; Du Four v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., supra, 49 Cal.App.3d at p. 866, fn. 2; Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, supra, 17 Cal.2d at p. 291.) "'[T]o allow parties to circumvent the system of review provided under section 1094.5 would, in effect, undermine the authority and integrity of the hearing procedures which the administrative agencies are presently required to render.'" (Patrick Media Group, Inc. v. California Coastal Com., supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 613.)
II. A Timely Claim for Damages Against the EDD?
Edwards claims that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment because it incorrectly ruled that he did not timely file a governmental claim for damages against the EDD. We disagree.
The trial court found that Edwards's "cause of action for promissory estoppel accrued no later than 6/14/05, when EDD's employee, Robert Johnson, informed Mr. Edwards, who had already enrolled at ITT, that he would not be receiving the promised California Training Benefits ('CTB') to attend the Institute." The court added, "[Edwards's] second-amended complaint alleges that Mr. Edwards sustained damages from the time of his enrollment, onward.... Thus, [he] needed to present his claim by 6/14/06, which he failed to do." The court noted that Edwards did not file a government liability claim until June 13, 2007.
The trial court correctly found that Edwards's governmental claim was untimely and its findings are consistent with the undisputed facts in the record. Edwards alleged in his second amended complaint that the "EDD retracted its promise" on June 14, 2005. That was the event which triggered the running of the claims period. (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 397.) Edwards had only one year from the accrual of his cause of action for promissory estoppel to file the claim. (Gov. Code, § 911.2, subd. (a); Yari v. Producers Guild of America, Inc. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 172, 182.) His failure to do so precludes him from pursing his action. "[A] plaintiff must timely file a claim for money or damages with the public entity. ([Gov. Code, ] § 911.2) The failure to do so bars the plaintiff from bringing suit...." (State v. Superior Court (Bodde) (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1237.)
Edwards contends the EDD is estopped to argue that he did not comply with the claims statute. But from this record he has not shown that to be the case. "A public entity may be estopped from asserting noncompliance with the claims statutes where its agents or employees have deterred the filing of a timely claim by some 'affirmative act.'" (Christopher P. v. Mojave Unified School Dist. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 165, 170.) But here nothing prevented Edwards from timely filing a claim. He knew precisely when the EDD determined he was not eligible because it notified him of that fact. He was not induced to defer filing the claim because of any act or representation by the EDD.
Edwards claims that after he filed his government liability claim he never received an adequate late claim notice under Government Code section 911.3. Government Code section 911.3 refers to Government Code section 911.2, which pertains to actions for death, injury to person or property, or growing crops. An untimely claim requires the public entity involved to give the claimant notice within 45 days of the presentation of the claim that the claim is untimely. Edwards argues that his promissory estoppel action is still viable because the failure to give that notice waived the untimeliness. His claim does not involve injury to person, property or crops. Moreover, section 911.3 does not apply to claims based on promissory estoppel. (Westcon Construction Corp. v. County of Sacramento (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 183, 199; Yari v. Producers Guild of America, Inc., supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 182.)
Moreover, as the Attorney General notes, the doctrine of substantial compliance, which is used to provide relief for those who filed defective claims before commencing litigation, does not apply here. Edwards did not file any claim before he filed this action. "[T]he substantial compliance doctrine has application only when there is a defect in form but the statutory requirements have otherwise been met." (Nguyen v. Los Angeles County Harbor/UCLA Medical Center (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 729, 733.) Here there was no compliance with the statutory claims procedure before filing this action. (City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 738.)
In an apparent attempt to excuse the untimeliness, Edwards alleged in his complaint that the EDD "sent the entire application to the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board. The Board ultimately decided to deny the CTB benefit." But the suggestion that the EDD initiated the appeals process from its own decision is factually inaccurate and legally impossible. The EDD gave Edwards the option to appeal its decision in the written determination it made on June 16, 2005. Edwards elected to appeal. Only he could initiate the appeals process from the unfavorable EDD determination. (Unemp. Ins. Code, §§ 407-410.) Edwards did not show that the claims filing period was tolled during the administrative appeals. But, as the trial court correctly found, even had he shown such tolling, "the 1-year period to file a claim would still have expired by 1/07."
We have carefully reviewed Edwards's remaining contentions and we conclude that he has not shown error.
The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded in favor of the respondent.
We concur: YEGAN, J., PERREN, J.