Thus, Section 4406(f), which governs checks with “unauthorized signatures,” applies where a bank honors checks lacking one of two required signatures. Edward Fineman Co. v. Super. Ct. of L.A. Cnty., 66 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1117, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 478 (1998) (“[C]hecks lacking ... a second required signature fall within the classification of items that must be discovered and reported pursuant to section 4406, subdivision (f) .... within the prescribed one-year period.”). .Section 340(c), which imposes a one-year statute of limitations only for causes of action by “a depositor against a bank for the payment of a forged or raised check, or a check that bears a forged or unauthorized endorsement” does not apply in such situations.

First, Chase argued that claims arising from 34 of the stolen checks were time-barred under the applicable three-year statute of limitations. (See Edward Fineman Co. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1117-1118, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 478 ( Edward Fineman ) [individual checks are subject to summary adjudication].) Severin did not contest the argument, and the trial court found it meritorious.

Finally, in Hindin , supra , 118 Cal.App.4th at pages 1258 through 1259, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 668, the court determined that the trial court had improperly granted summary adjudication where the action for malicious prosecution asserted only a single cause of action, based on a single primary right, even though the underlying lawsuit breached that primary right in two ways. In contrast, the court in Edward Fineman Co . v . Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1116-1118, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 478 ( Fineman ), determined that each of 23 unauthorized checks paid by the defendant bank constituted a "separate and distinct alleged obligation or claim" ( id . at p. 1118, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 478 ) for purposes of summary adjudication, even though the plaintiff's complaint aggregated the 23 claims into a single cause of action. As applied here, Hindin is inapposite, because this case is not a malicious prosecution action in which the underlying litigation involved different primary rights.

Appellant argued that section 340(c) does not apply because Arturo Pertierra’s signature was not an “unauthorized endorsement” under that section. Appellant argued that, as set forth in Edward Fineman Co. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1110 (Fineman), the applicable statute is Commercial Code section 4111, which provides for a three-year statute of limitations. The trial court denied appellant’s request for reconsideration, and on February 22, 2007, adopted respondent’s proposed order as the order of the court.

However, the legislature declared that the 1993 amendments to Division 3 (Article 3 of the UCC), and related amendments to Division 1 and Division 4 (UCC Articles 1 and 4) are to be interpreted and applied in accordance with the Official Comments of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See Edward Fineman Co. v. Superior Court, 66 Cal.App.4th 1110, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 478, 484 (1998).         In this case no employee forged an indorsement purporting to be that of McMullen.

California has not formally adopted the official comments to the UCC. However, the legislature declared that the 1993 amendments to Division 3 (Article 3 of the UCC), and related amendments to Division 1 and Division 4 (UCC Articles 1 and 4) are to be interpreted and applied in accordance with the Official Comments of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See Edward Fineman Co. v. Superior Court, 66 Cal.App.4th 1110, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 478,484 (1998). In this case no employee forged an indorsement purporting to be that of McMullen.

(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) Both the denial and grant of a motion for summary judgment are subject to de novo review. ( Edward Fineman Co. v. SuperiorCourt (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1116 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 478].) "As well, issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation raise pure questions of law, subject to independent appellate review.

In 1992, the Legislature amended section 3403, subdivision (b) so that it "explicitly defines an `unauthorized signature' to include checks lacking a required signature." ( Edward Fineman Co. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1116 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 478].) Section 3403, subdivision (b) now provides: "If the signature of more than one person is required to constitute the authorized signature of an organization, the signature of the organization is unauthorized if one of the required signatures is lacking."

We review an order denying a motion for summary judgment de novo. ( Edward Fineman Co. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1116 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 478].) Summary judgment is properly granted when the papers show there is no triable issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o)(2).)

As such, section 4111 applies to broad categories of claims and actions, and establishes a uniform statute of limitations where none clearly existed. (See Edward Fineman Co. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1124-1125 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 478] [The enactment of section 4111 establishes the time within which an action to enforce an obligation, duty or right under division 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code — Bank Deposits and Collections must be filed].)(12) Moreover, a specific statutory provision relating to a particular subject controls over a more general provision.