The rule of recognition and acquiescence may be the means of determining the corner or boundary, but it is separate and distinct from establishment by adverse possession. Edmunds v. Sughrow, 233 Mich. 400, 206 N.W. 309. One may not assert a cause of action under a special statute and make proof under another. The plaintiff alleges in her petition that defendant's predecessor in title, Roy Hampton, and plaintiff's predecessor in title, Thomas B. Augustine, during the year 1925 or 1926, orally agreed to the boundary line between Lots 16 and 17 and that, pursuant to such agreement Hampton planted a row of trees and a hedge on such agreed-upon boundary line.
The court apparently failed to take into account the difference between principles applicable to acquiescence and to adverse possession. They are by no means the same though the terms are not infrequently used as if synonymous. 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession, section 1; Edmunds v. Sughrow, 233 Mich. 400, 206 N.W. 309. While we have not so held in express terms, our cases recognize the distinction. See Patrick v. Cheney, 226 Iowa 853, 285 N.W. 184. The case before us is not bottomed on adverse possession and we are under no necessity of analyzing authorities cited to that question.