Opinion
Civil Action No. 05-540 (RMC).
June 30, 2008
Armin Ulrich Kuder, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.
Daniel M. Barish, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Sibel Edmonds brought this suit against her former employer, the United States (the "Government"), alleging intentional conversion under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671- 2680 (the "FTCA"). The Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") employed Ms. Edmonds as a civilian linguist. She accused another employee of misconduct, and she complained of alleged security breaches. The FBI subsequently terminated Ms. Edmonds's employment. Ms. Edmonds alleges that when she was fired she was not permitted to retrieve her personal property and thus the Government improperly retained (intentionally converted) three family photographs belonging to her. The Government has conceded liability, but contests damages.
The original complaint in this matter [Dkt. # 1] included other claims that were dismissed by the Court in a Memorandum Opinion and Order [Dkt. ## 22 23] filed June 27, 2006, 436 F.Supp.2d 28. On July 27, 2006, Ms. Edmonds filed an Amended Complaint [Dkt. # 24] alleging a single count of intentional conversion.
The issue of damages was tried to the Court on May 20, 2008. Based on the entire record including the parties' pretrial and post-trial briefs, the parties' exhibits and stipulations, and the testimony of the sole witness, Ms. Edmonds, the Court concludes that the Government must pay damages to Ms. Edmonds to compensate for the special value of the first two missing photographs and to compensate for the nominal value of the third photograph. Judgment will be entered in favor of Ms. Edmonds in the amount of $5,005.00.
I. FINDINGS OF FACT
Id. Id. See Id. see Id. See Edmonds v. FBI, See
"Tr." refers to the unofficial transcript of the May 20, 2008 bench trial.
The nature of Ms. Edmonds's job and the circumstances of her termination are not relevant to this lawsuit.
The Amended Complaint designated the photo of Ms. Edmonds's father at the time of his high school acceptance as photograph two, but Ms. Edmonds in her testimony at trial designated this photo as Photograph One, and the Court adopts this designation.
The Amended Complaint designated the photo of Ms. Edmonds's father receiving a medal as photograph one, but Ms. Edmonds in her testimony designated this photo as Photograph Two, and the Court adopts this designation.
The Amended Complaint misidentifies Photograph Three as a photo of Ms. Edmonds's immediate family in Istanbul, Turkey.
In addition to this lawsuit, Ms. Edmonds pursued other suits arising from the circumstances of her dismissal by the FBI. First, she filed a case under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552, seeking documents. Edmonds v. FBI, No. 02-1294 (D.D.C. filed June 27, 2002) ( "Edmonds I"). In that case, the court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the FBI, holding that certain documents were exempt from disclosure under FOIA's classified information exemption. Edmonds v. FBI, 272 F.Supp.2d 35, 46-47 (D.D.C. 2003). Subsequently, the parties settled Edmonds I. Edmonds I, Stipulation for Compromise Settlement [Dkt. # 77] (D.D.C. Jan. 24, 2006). Second, Ms. Edmonds brought suit against the Department of Justice alleging violations of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a et seq., the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-52, 701-06, and the First and Fifth Amendments. Edmonds v. Dep't of Justice, No. 02-1448 (D.D.C. filed July 22, 2002) ( "Edmonds II"). The court dismissed Edmonds II, finding that the Government had properly invoked the state secrets privilege. Edmonds v. Dep't of Justice, 323 F.Supp.2d 65 (D.D.C. 2004), aff'd, 161 Fed.Appx. 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (affirming for reasons stated in district court's opinion). Third, Ms. Edmonds filed a FOIA suit against the Department of Justice. Edmonds v. Dep't of Justice, No. 04-1623 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 22, 2004) ( "Edmonds III"). As in Edmonds I, the Edmonds III court granted partial summary judgment, finding certain documents exempt from disclosure. Edmonds v. Dep't of Justice, 405 F.Supp.2d 23 (D.D.C. 2005). The parties then voluntarily dismissed Edmonds III. Edmonds II, Notice of Voluntary Dismissal [Dkt. #24] (D.D.C. Jan. 24, 2006).
The Government moved to strike these experts, arguing that their testimony was not relevant and would not be helpful. The Court denied the motion because this matter was to be tried to the bench; thus, the Court could determine the weight to give the evidence and there was no risk of jury confusion. See Order [Dkt. # 46] filed Apr. 7, 2008 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)). At trial, the parties submitted excerpts from the depositions of the experts as exhibits, and the Court admitted the exhibits into evidence. See Def.'s Exs. 17 18.
The Government requested at least twice that Ms. Edmonds produce a copy of the manuscript. See Def.'s Mot. to Strike Experts [Dkt. # 43], Exs. G H.
On April 7, 2008, the Court ordered Ms. Edmonds to produce a copy of her manuscript marked "counsel eyes only" to counsel for the Government. See Order [Dkt. # 46].
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Under D.C. law, conversion is defined as an intentional tort — "an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other full value of the chattel." Fed. Fire Protection Corp. v. J.A. Jones/Tompkins Builders, Inc., 267 F.Supp.2d 87, 92 n. 3 (D.D.C. 2003). The Government has conceded liability for conversion, but it contests damages.In order to determine the value of the photos, under D.C. law the Court must determine "the fair market value of the property in question at the time of the conversion." Maalouf v. Butt, 817 A.2d 189, 190 (D.C. 2003); Bowler v. Joyner, 562 A.2d 1210, 1213 (D.C. 1989). Although the D.C. Court of Appeals has not addressed the issue of whether damages for conversion can be based on sentimental value, the Restatement (Second) Torts and the majority of courts in other jurisdictions hold that sentimental value is not recoverable. Section 911 of the Restatement provides that "value" means exchange value or the value to the owner where this is greater than the exchange value. Restatement (Second) Torts § 911 (1979) (emphasis added). Comment e to the Restatement provides:
In the past, the D.C. Court of Appeals has adopted the Restatement when statutory or case law is silent on the relevant issue. See, e.g., Wright v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc., 394 F.Supp.2d 27, 33 (D.D.C. 2005).
If the subject matter cannot be replaced, however, as in the case of a destroyed or lost family portrait, the owner will be compensated for its special value to him, as evidenced by the original cost, and the quality and condition at the time of loss. . . . In these cases, however, damages cannot be based on sentimental value. Compensatory damages are not given for emotional distress caused merely by the loss of such things.
Restatement (Second) Torts § 911 Cmt. e. In sum, when the lost item is a family portrait, the owner may be compensated for "special value" to her — as evidenced by the original cost and the quality and condition at the time of loss — but may not be compensated for sentimental value. Accord Kondaurov v. Kerdasha, 271 Va. 646, 629 S.E.2d 181, 187 n. 5 (2006) (citing C O Ry. Co. v. May, 120 Va. 790, 92 S.E. 801, 803 (1917) (owners of lost family portraits not entitled to recover sentimental value)); Robinson v. United States, 175 F.Supp.2d 1215, 1232-33 (E.D.Cal. 2001) (personal memorabilia such as trophies and yearbooks are subject to a rational, not a sentimental, valuation).
Despite the limitation on compensation for sentimental value, a minority of courts in other jurisdictions have valued property based on the "feelings" of the owner. Ms. Edmonds argues that the Court should follow the minority. Pl.'s Trial Mem. at 3. In Mieske v. Bartell Drug Co., 92 Wash.2d 40, 593 P.2d 1308, 1311 (Wash. 1979), the court explained:
What is sentimental value? The broad dictionary definition is that sentimental refers to being governed by feeling, sensibility or emotional idealism. . . . Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1963). Obviously that is not the exclusion contemplated by the statement that sentimental value is not to be compensated. If it were, no one would recover for the wrongful death of a spouse or a child. Rather, the type of sentiment which is not compensable is that which relates to indulging in feeling to an unwarranted extent or being affectedly or mawkishly emotional.Id. at 1311; accord Bond v. A.H. Belo Corp., 602 S.W.2d 105, 109 (Tex.Civ.App. 1980) (correct measure of damages for lost family papers and photos was reasonable special value of such articles to the owner taking into consideration the owner's feelings); see also Campins v. Capels, 461 N.E.2d 712, 721 (Ind.App. 4 Dist. 1984) (in cases dealing with lost family photos and the like, sentimental value should be considered).
The Court will follow the Restatement and the majority of courts, and apply the rule that in the case of missing family photos, special value to the owner can be recovered, but sentimental value cannot. While Ms. Edmonds does not assert any special value with regard to Photograph Three, she demonstrated that Photographs One and Two had special value to her. When she was not permitted to retrieve her personal belongings upon her termination by the FBI, she immediately sought to recover the photos. Tr. at 32-33. She complained to the Office of Professional Responsibility and hired attorneys to assist her in recovering the photos. Id. at 33-34. Although Photographs One and Two came into Ms. Edmonds's possession at no cost to her, see Stip. # 7, they were in good condition when they were lost and they were irreplaceable. See Tr. 54-55. There appear to be no other photos in existence of Ms. Edmonds's deceased father during his high school years. Id. at 30-31 52-53. The photos had special significance to Ms. Edmonds because they were pictures of her father at critical moments in his life. Id. at 31-32 41. Photograph One pictured Dr. Deniz when he was accepted into a special high school for gifted but poor children, and Photograph Two depicted Dr. Deniz when he received a track medal, which provided him a college scholarship. Ms. Edmonds was close to her father, and she has modeled her life after his. Id. at 32. Accordingly the Court finds that Photographs One and Two should be valued at $2,500.00 each. Ms. Edmonds did not attach any special value to Photograph Three; thus, the Court awards nominal damages of $5.00 for the loss of Photograph Three.
D.C. law governs this suit. Under D.C. choice of law rules, the law of the jurisdiction with the most substantial interest in the matter applies. Nelson v. Insignia/Esg, Inc., 215 F.Supp.2d 143, 150 (D.D.C. 2002); Jaffe v. Pallotta TeamWorks, 374 F.3d 1223, 1227 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Under this test, the Court must balance the competing interests of the two jurisdictions and apply the law of the jurisdiction with the more substantial interest. Id. The Court must consider (1) the place where the injury occurred; (2) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (3) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties; and (4) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. Herbert v. Dist. of Columbia, 808 A.2d 776, 779 (D.C. 2002); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 (1971). Even though Ms. Edmonds lives in Virginia, D.C. law controls because the parties' relationship was centered in the FBI's Washington, D.C. field office and the conversion occurred in that office. Moreover, D.C. and Virginia law do not conflict regarding valuation of personal property. As explained above, the District of Columbia would apply the Restatement, and the Restatement rule is the same as that set forth in Virginia case law. Compare Restatement (Second) Torts § 911 Cmt. e with Kondaurov, 629 S.E.2d at 187 n. 5.
Ms. Edmonds's evidence that she paid substantial attorney fees in order to attempt to recover the photos does not establish the value of the missing photos but does serve as some evidence that the photos meant a great deal to her. Ms. Edmonds testified that she paid the Kohn firm $30,000, 25% of which ($7,500) was attributable to her efforts to retrieve the photos and that she paid the Krieger firm $18,569, 50% of which ($9,284.50) was attributable to her efforts to retrieve the photos. Tr. at 36-38. In a settlement in another suit, the FBI agreed to pay the Kohn firm $65,000 in full satisfaction of Ms. Edmonds's claims and attorney fees in that case. See Def.'s Trial Ex. 21, Stipulation for Compromise Settlement in Edmonds v. FBI, No. 02-1294 (D.D.C. Jan. 24, 2006). Thus, Ms. Edmonds already received substantial compensation for her attorney fees.
Ms. Edmonds also presented expert testimony in support of her claim that the missing photos would have increased the value of a book she is in the process of writing and plans to publish. While the Court denied the Government's motion to strike the experts, see Order [Dkt. # 46] (denying motion to strike experts), and admitted portions of the experts' deposition testimony, see Def.'s Exs. 17 18, the Court gives the expert testimony no weight as it is wholly based on speculation. "Expert testimony that rests solely on `subjective belief or unsupported speculation' is not reliable." Groobert v. President and Dirs. of Georgetown Coll., 219 F.Supp.2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2002); see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (expert's opinion must be based on more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation). Ms. Edmonds does not have a book contract or any prospective offers of a book contract. Stip. # 29. Thus, her contention that the photos would have increased the value of her book is based on the hope that she will one day complete writing a book, obtain a contract to publish a book, and find a publisher who wants to include photos and who would have paid more for publication rights if it had photos of Dr. Deniz's high school years. The experts did not put a value or a range of values on the missing photos. Stip. # 30. The Government asked Ms. Levine, "Why is it that you can't really say on a specific basis [that] this particular photo would add this amount of value to a book deal?" Ms. Levine answered, "I don't think there's any way to measure that exactly." Def.'s Ex. 17 at 23. Mr. Lawrence indicated, "The way that I see they have value [is] . . . within the context of a proposal and manuscript that we submit to a publisher and hopefully establish a deal. But I can't pin it down further than that, no." Def.'s Ex. 18 at 142. Accordingly, the Court finds the experts' testimony to be unreliable.
The qualifications of Ms. Edmonds's experts is questionable. Prior to this case, Ms. Levine and Mr. Lawrence have never provided formal opinions regarding the monetary value of photographs for book contracts. Stip. # 37. Further, they have never received any training on valuing photographs for book contracts. Stip. # 39.
It should also be noted that Ms. Edmonds did not afford the Government the opportunity to cross examine her experts with regard to her draft because she improperly withheld production of the manuscript until the end of trial when she finally turned over a copy of the manuscript in compliance with the Court's contempt order.
Further, the experts provided no methodology or principles upon which they based their opinions that the missing photos would enhance the value of the book Ms. Edmonds may publish. The Government asked Mr. Lawrence, "Is some of this subjective in terms of determining the value of a photograph?" He answered, "I believe the entire process is subjective." Def.'s Ex. 18 at 112. Similarly, the Government asked Ms. Levine if there is any methodology for valuing a photo for use in a book. Ms. Levine responded, "You know, it's a kind of immeasurable thing." Def.'s Ex. 17 at 24.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, judgment will be entered in favor of Ms. Edmonds in the amount of $5,005.00. This Memorandum Opinion is accompanied by a memorializing order.