Opinion
C. A. 3:22-514-MGL-SVH
03-18-2022
Raquel Edmond, Plaintiff, v. Windsor Lake d/b/a The Preserve at Windsor Lake; Southwood Realty; and Dentsville Magistrate Judge Phillip Newsom, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Shiva V. Hodges, United States Magistrate Judge
Raquel Edmond (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of her federal rights by defendants Windsor Lake d/b/a The Preserve at Windsor Lake (“Windsor”), Southwood Realty (“Southwood”), and Dentsville Magistrate Judge Phillip Newsom (“Judge Newsom”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge.
Although the complaint also lists Matthew P. Edmond as a plaintiff, only one signature is provided, and the court considers Raquel Edmond as the sole plaintiff. See Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (“[T]he competence of a layman representing himself [is] clearly too limited to allow him to risk the rights of others.”); C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting while a non-attorney may represent himself, he has no authority to appear as an attorney for others).
I. Factual and Procedural Background
In her statement of the claim in her amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges:
Defendant(s) increased rent costs on DISABLED person; illegal in the state of SC. Also, Defendant(s) refused payment(s). Defendant(s) filed and are proceeding with eviction. This has and is causing grave hardship and damage![ECF No. 10 at 5 (emphasis in original)]. In the space for Plaintiff to list the basis for jurisdiction, she states: “Raising rent price on DISABLED person. *and* refusing rent payments.” Id. at 3.
Plaintiff alleges the assistant property manager agreed to “work with us, ” but later “changed her story in court.” [ECF No. 10 at 5]. Plaintiff's original complaint attached a motion to stay from a state case related to the same facts. [ECF No. 1-2].
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Plaintiff filed her complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss a case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Analysis
1. Judicial Immunity
Judge Newsom should be dismissed based on judicial immunity. Although Plaintiff's amended complaint does not state any allegations against Judge Newsom, it is clear from the attachments to the original complaint that Judge Newsom is involved with the state court case against Plaintiff. [ECF No. 1-1]. It is well-settled that judges have immunity from claims arising out of their judicial actions. Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991). Judicial immunity is a protection from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages, and such immunity is not pierced by allegations of corruption or bad faith. See Mireless, 502 U.S. at 11; see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (“A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.'”) (citation omitted). As Plaintiff's claims against Judge Newsom relate to his judicial actions, he is entitled to absolute immunity. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against Judge Newsom are subject to summary dismissal.
Even if Judge Newsom were not protected by judicial immunity, Plaintiff has failed to show he violated her constitutional rights.
2. No Jurisdiction Against Windsor and Southwood
Plaintiff has not provided any independent jurisdiction for claims against Windsor and Southwood. Although Plaintiff indicated she was filing in this court based on a federal question, she lists no statutes on which her claim is based. [ECF No. 10]. The amended complaint's only allegations related to Windsor and Southwood is that they increased rent despite one of the tenants being disabled. [ECF No. 1 at 5]. These facts are insufficient to state a federal claim. Therefore, Windsor and Southwood are subject to summary dismissal.
3. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Bars this Case
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this court may not review findings or rulings made by state courts. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983) (holding that a federal district court lacks authority to review final determinations of state or local courts); Jordahl v. Democratic Party, 122 F.3d 192, 199 (4th Cir. 1997). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine extends not only to issues actually decided by a state court, but also to those that are “inextricably intertwined with questions ruled upon by a state court.” Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1997). A federal claim is “inextricably intertwined” with a state court decision if “success on the federal claim depends upon a determination that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.” Safety-Kleen, Inc. (Pinewood) v. Wyche, 274 F.3d 846, 857-58 (4th Cir. 2001). This prohibition includes constitutional challenges. Curley v. Adams Creek Associates, 409 Fed.Appx. 678 (4th Cir. 2011).
The Supreme Court clarified the scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005):
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine . . . is confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by statecourt losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.Id. at 284; see also Davani v. Va. Dep't of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 713 (4th Cir. 2006) (“Exxon requires us to examine whether the state-court loser who files suit in federal district court seeks redress for an injury caused by the statecourt decision itself. If he is not challenging the state-court decision, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply.”). To the extent the claims in Plaintiff's complaint challenge rulings made by a state judge, these claims should be summarily dismissed.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends this matter be dismissed. As Plaintiff has had an opportunity to amend her complaint, the undersigned recommends the dismissal be with prejudice.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).