Opinion
01 Civ. 2695 (SAS) (AJP), 00 Civ. 8990 (SAS) (AJP)
July 15, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I have duly considered plaintiff's objections, dated May 23, 2002, to the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck, dated May 14, 2002 ("R R"). Editions Musicales et Cinematographique Pouchenel, S.P.L.R. ("Pouchenel"), along with its principal, Madame Jacques Brel, object to Magistrate Judge Peck's recommendation that they must pay attorneys' fees to their attorneys, the Sukin Law Group ("Sukin"), for their work on the above-captioned matters.
Pouchenel and Brel first object to the award because they allegedly received no "affirmative recovery" from the settlement. I disagree. "`[Tihe district court has a responsibility to protect its own officers in such matters as fee disputes.'" Silva Run Worldwide Ltd. v. Gaming Lottery Corp., No. 96 Civ. 3231, 2000 WL 502864, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2000) (quoting Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 140 F.3d 442, 444 (2d Cir. 1998) (additional citations and quotation marks omitted)). When a litigant's attorney is owed fees from the litigant, a court may order such compensation so long as: (1) "the fee dispute was related to the main action"; and (2) "the court was familiar with the amount and quality of the work performed by [the attorneys] ." Brenner Assoc., Inc. v. Starmaker Entm't, Inc., 82 F.3d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing cases). While these qualifications are discussed in more detail below, I note that they do not require a showing of any "affirmative recovery." Even if there were such a requirement, Sukin could easily demonstrate a benefit to Pouchenel and Brel from the settlement. Pouchenel and Brel sought to end defendants' production of their play and regain the sole rights to that play. They received this relief, although it will be delayed for a number of years. This objection is without merit.
Pouchenel and Brel next object to the Magistrate Judge's determination of Sukin's fees "without a hearing on the disputed issue." Pouchenel and Brel's Objections to the R R (the "Objections"). ¶ 3. A court is not required to hold a hearing on fees if the facts presented "`are sufficiently detailed to provide an award, and if the material facts necessary to calculate the award are not genuinely in dispute.'" Crescent Publ'g Group, Inc. v. Playboy Enter., Inc., 246 F.3d 142, 147 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Sablan v. Dept. of Fin, of N. Mariana Isl., 856 F.2d 1317, 1322 (9th Cir. 1988)) (emphasis in original). The Magistrate Judge was "familiar with the work involved in this case from [his] supervision of the litigation." R R at 3. Pouchenel and Brel do not dispute that the facts used by the Magistrate Judge to calculate the fee award were specific and accurate. Indeed, many of the disputed fees were resolved in favor of Pouchenel and Brel. See id. Thus, the objection to the lack of a hearing is without merit.
Pouchenel and Brel further argue that "Brel was not a party to the litigation" and, as a result, the Court lacks jurisdiction over her. Objections ¶ 4. Brel, however, paid the majority of Sukin's legal fees over the course of the litigation. In fact, the Magistrate Judge notes that Brel was the only party to whom Sukin's bills were addressed, and she was directly involved with each step of the litigation and settlement process. See R R at 2-3. Brel's actions as a "principal of Pouchenel" reflect a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the Court. Sukin's Response to the Objections ("Response") ¶ 4. Cf. Chase ManhattanBank. N.A. v. Celotex Corp., 56 F.3d 343, 345-46 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that a non-party "can be bound by [a] judgment "if one of the parties to the suit is so closely aligned with his interests as to be his virtual representative'") (quoting Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 719 (5th Cir. 1975)). This objection, too, is without merit.
Pouchenel and Brel make a number of objections to the alleged imposition of a "charging lien." Objections ¶ 5. However, the Magistrate Judge levied no such lien. See R R at 1. Sukin correctly notes that its "application was for attorney's fees" only. Response ¶ 5. The objections are, once again, meritless.
Pouchenel and Brel's objection to the Magistrate Judge's jurisdiction over this issue lacks merit. I referred this matter to the Magistrate Judge, pursuant to section 636(b)(1)(B) of Title 28 of the United States Code. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). I review the recommendation of a Magistrate Judge de novo when a party files objections within ten days. See 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). The Court may, in its discretion, "exercise supplemental jurisdiction" to decide "fee disputes between litigants and their attorneys when the dispute relates to the main action." Alderman v. PanAm World Airways, 169 F.3d 99, 101-02 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Because Pouchenel and Brel do not dispute that Sukin's fees directly relate to the litigation settled by the Magistrate Judge, I adopt the findings of the R R. These objections are thus without merit.
I initially referred this matter orally to Judge Peck when I received Sukin's motion. A written order was issued nunc pro | tunc on July 12, 2002.
Accordingly, I hereby accept and adopt the thoughtful and thorough R R in full. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close these cases.