Opinion
Case No. 5:19-cv-01977-LCB
2021-11-18
Roland EDGER, Plaintiff, v. Krista MCCABE, et al., Defendants.
Henry F. Sherrod, III, Henry F. Sherrod III PC, Florence, AL, for Plaintiff. C. Gregory Burgess, Lauren A. Smith, Stephanie Margaret Gushlaw, Lanier Ford Shaver & Payne, P.C., Huntsville, AL, for Defendants.
Henry F. Sherrod, III, Henry F. Sherrod III PC, Florence, AL, for Plaintiff.
C. Gregory Burgess, Lauren A. Smith, Stephanie Margaret Gushlaw, Lanier Ford Shaver & Payne, P.C., Huntsville, AL, for Defendants.
ORDER
LILES C. BURKE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
On June 10, 2019, Officers Krista McCabe and Cameron Perillat arrested and took to jail Mr. Roland Edger, a man who, by all appearances, committed no crime. Following his arrest, the City of Huntsville dismissed all the charges Officers McCabe and Perillat brought against him in the Huntsville Municipal Court, all but conceding that Edger was guilty of no offense.
The Huntsville Police Department's mission statement calls on officers to "serve [their] community by protecting life, liberty, property, and defending the constitutional rights of all people with compassion, fairness, integrity, and professionalism." Officers are reminded of this mission each day when they set out on patrol by the phrase emblazoned on their vehicles: "To serve and to protect."
See Huntsville Police: Police Mission, Vision & Values, (available at: https://www.huntsvilleal.gov/residents/public-safety/huntsville-police/police-operations/police-mission-vision-values/) (last visited 27 September 2021).
As detailed below, Defendants McCabe and Perillat unnecessarily escalated their interaction with Plaintiff Roland Edger prior to his arrest–an escalation that was captured on bodycam.
The Court has pored over that footage, time and again, with the most critical eye permitted in accordance with law and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. And, the Court has concluded after each viewing, that Officers McCabe and Perillat didn't meet the standards set out in the Huntsville Police Department's mission statement. Those failings notwithstanding, that same bodycam footage shows that there's no genuine issue of material fact in this case. While Edger certainly committed no crime, Officers McCabe and Perillat had arguable –and only arguable–probable cause to arrest him as to one offense. As such, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. But just by a hair's breadth.
For the reasons set out below, the Court DENIES Edger's Motion for Partial-Summary Judgment and GRANTS Defendants’ McCabe, Perillat and City of Huntsville's Motions for Summary Judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Mr. Edger is a mechanic at Auto Collision Body Shop. On June 9, 2019, Kajal Ghosh called Edger, and asked him to look at his wife's red Toyota Camry and to fix any issue that he found with it. (Doc. 28–5 at 12). Ghosh told Edger that the car was parked at Progressive Union Missionary Baptist Church in Huntsville, Alabama where Ghosh's wife worked as a teacher. (Doc. 28–5 at 11). The car keys were left in the church office, and Ghosh gave Edger permission to drive the car to Auto Collision if necessary. (Doc. 28–5 at 12).
On June 10, 2019, at around 2:00 p.m., Edger drove to the church to check on Mrs. Ghosh's car. (Doc. 28–1 at 62). Edger picked up the keys left for him in the church office; they were in an envelope with his name on it. (Doc. 28–1 at 62). After getting the keys and starting the car, Edger realized the car wouldn't steer properly, so he returned to Auto Collision. There, Edger asked Justin Nuby to go to the church with him to fix the tire on Mrs. Ghosh's car and to bring the car back to the shop if necessary. (Doc. 28–6 at 9). Nuby agreed. Id. The two arrived at the church in Edger's black hatchback. (Doc. 28–6 at 9–10).
At 8:05 p.m., Kendraus Turner, the church's on-duty security guard, called 9-1-1. He reported to the dispatcher that that he'd seen two Hispanic males on church grounds while on foot patrol. Specifically, Turner reported that the men were "messing with an employee's car that was left on the lot" and that they had removed one of the car's wheels.
I. Officers McCabe and Perillat's Contact with Edger
At approximately 8:36 p.m., Officer McCabe arrived at the church and made contact with Edger and Nuby. When Officer McCabe arrived, Edger was laying on the ground on the passenger side of Mrs. Ghosh's car, jacking it up. Nuby was standing by the front passenger side of the car. Noticing Officer McCabe, one of the men asked her how she was doing, and she replied that she was "good" and asked how they were doing. McCabe then exited her vehicle and approached them. The following exchange – captured on bodycam footage – then occurred:
McCabe: What are ya'll doing?
Edger: Huh?
McCabe: What are ya'll doing?
Edger: Getting the car fixed.
McCabe: Is this your car?
Edger: Yea. Well, it is one of my customer's.
McCabe: One of your customer's?
Edger: Ghosh Patel, yep. I was over here earlier.
McCabe: Whose car is that?
Edger: That's mine.
McCabe: The black one?
Edger: Yea.
(Doc. 28–1 at 78; Doc. 28–9 at 6).
The bodycam footage shows a long pause followed this interaction, during which time Edger continued to try to jack up Mrs. Ghosh's car. During Edger's efforts, however, Mrs. Ghosh's car fell off the jack. McCabe then reengaged with Edger:
McCabe: Alright. Take a break for me real fast and do ya'll have driver's license or IDs on you?
Edger: I ain't going to submit to no ID right now. Listen, you call the lady right now. Listen, I don't have time for this. I don't mean to be mean, rude, or ugly, but
McCabe: Okay. No, you do need to give me your ID or driver's license ...
Edger: I don't mean to be ... No I don't. Listen, I don't want you to run me in for nothing.
McCabe: Are you refusing me, are you refusing to give me your ID or driver's license?
Edger: I'm telling you that if you will call this lady that owns this car ...
McCabe: Step over that way.
(Doc. 28–1 at 78–79).
The bodycam footage unequivocally shows that McCabe first asked Edger for his license or ID at 8:37:33. McCabe asked for Edger's ID again at 8:37:43. (Doc. 28–9 at 6). Finally, McCabe asked if Edger was refusing to give her his ID at 8:37:50. Id. Officers McCabe and Perillat then arrested Edger at 8:37:54. Id. Only 21 seconds elapsed between McCabe's first request for Edger's identification and his arrest.
Footage taken from Officer Perillat's bodycam confirms this account of events. (Doc. 28-9 at 7). When Officer Perillat arrived on the scene, Mr. Edger and Officer McCabe were in conversation. Id. Six seconds after Officer Perillat arrived, McCabe asked Edger, "Are you refusing me – are you refusing to give me your ID or driver's license?" Edger responded, and three seconds later, Perillat placed Edger in handcuffs. When doing so, Officer Perillat scolded Edger, stating "we [Officers Perillat and McCabe] don't have time for this" and again chided him when adjusting his handcuffs, asking "will you shut up?"
About five minutes after taking Edger into custody, and while waiting for the results of Nuby and Edger's license scans, Officer Perillat told Nuby that "[w]hat we don't like, and what we can actually do is exactly what we just did," referring to Edger's arrest. (Doc. 28-9 at 7). Later, minutes before she departed with Edger in the back of her patrol car, Officer McCabe explained to Nuby that Edger wouldn't "get away with stuff like that – acting the way that he did." Id.
To be sure, Edger's attitude and demeanor towards Officers McCabe and Perillat was unnecessarily argumentative, contrary, and disrespectful. It clearly contributed to his arrest. This seems especially clear since Officer McCabe certainly wanted to make sure that Edger knew he couldn't act "the way that he did." In sum, Edger was clearly frustrated. The automobile he was called to repair had just slipped off the jack and fallen to the pavement. But had the two officers simply asked a few more questions instead of rushing to take Edger into custody, they would've quickly discovered that he was guilty of no crime. Instead, they just arrested him.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate only when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A fact is "material" if its resolution "may affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Bibb Cnty. , 495 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc. , 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997) ). A dispute is "genuine" if, under the evidence, "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. (citing Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ. , 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996) ). In deciding whether there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact, a court must presume the nonmovant's evidence to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant's favor. Allen , 495 F.3d at 1314 (citing Shotz v. City of Plantation, Fla. , 344 F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 2003) ). "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict." Strickland v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. , 692 F.3d 1151, 1154 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ). Cross-motions for summary judgment have a standard of review that do
"not differ from the standard applied when only one party files a motion, but simply requires a determination of whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law on the facts that are not disputed."
Ness v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. , 257 F. Supp. 3d 1280, 1287 (M.D. Fla. 2017) (citing Am. Bankers Ins. Group v. United States , 408 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 2005) ). "The Court must consider each motion on its merits, resolving all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration." Id. As explained by the Eleventh Circuit, " ‘[c]ross-motions for summary judgment will not, in themselves, warrant the court in granting summary judgment unless one of the parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not genuinely disputed.’ " Ness , 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1287 (citing United States v. Oakley , 744 F.2d 1553, 1555 (11th Cir. 1984) ) (quoting Bricklayers Int'l Union, Local 15 v. Stuart Plastering Co. , 512 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1975) ).
Alabama Space Science Exhibit Commission v. Markel American Insurance Company , No. 5:19-cv-594-LCB, 557 F.Supp.3d 1199 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 30, 2021).
DISCUSSION
The parties have submitted cross motions for summary judgment. Each argues the converse position on whether probable cause supported Edger's arrest. For his part, Edger asks the Court for summary judgment and a finding that Officers McCabe and Perillat are liable for false arrest in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 23 at 3). Edger argues that no reasonable jury could find that Officers McCabe and Perillat had actual or arguable probable cause to arrest him for any crime. (Doc. 23 at 10). In their Joint Brief, Officers McCabe and Perillat and the City argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on all of Edger's claims.
I. The Fourth Amendment & 42 U.S.C. § 1983
"Under the Fourth Amendment, an individual has a right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures." Skop v. City of Atlanta, GA , 485 F.3d 1130, 1137 (11th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up). There are generally three types of encounters between police and citizens: (1) consensual encounters, (2) brief seizures and investigatory detentions, and (3) arrests. United States v. Jordan , 635 F.3d 1181, 1185–86 (11th Cir. 2011). Officers involved in consensual encounters "need no suspicion because the Fourth Amendment is not implicated." United States v. Knights , 989 F.3d 1281, 1286 (11th Cir. 2021) (first citing Florida v. Bostick , 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) and then citing United States v. Perez , 443 F.3d 772, 777–78 (11th Cir. 2006) ). In other words, "[t]he encounter will not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny unless it loses its consensual nature." Fla. v. Bostick , 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991). However, "officers need reasonable suspicion if an encounter becomes an investigatory stop." United States v. Knights , 989 F.3d 1281, 1286 (11th Cir. 2021) (first citing Bostick , 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382 and then citing United States v. Jordan , 635 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 2011) ).
To determine whether Edger was falsely arrested, the Court must compare his interactions with Officers McCabe and Perillat to the categories of citizen-officer encounters noted above and determine into which category(ies) it fits.
Edger argues that his initial encounter with Officers McCabe and Perillat was consensual, but he subsequently was seized when they asked for his identification. Contrariwise, Officers McCabe and Perillat agree that their first interactions with Edger were consensual and further contend that they had reasonable suspicion to stop Edger based on Turner's (the church security guard) 9-1-1 call. Specifically, Officers McCabe and Perillat contend that their reasonable suspicion to stop Edger was supported by Officer McCabe's observations upon arrival: she noticed two men that matched Turner's description, and their behavior was consistent with the behavior Turner reported. (Doc. 38 at 14).
A. The Investigatory Stop
Under the Fourth Amendment, "an officer may ... conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot." Jackson v. Sauls , 206 F.3d 1156, 1165 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow , 528 U.S. 119, 120, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) ). "While reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop." Jordan , 635 F.3d at 1186 (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow , 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) ).
To determine if reasonable suspicion exists, the Court looks at the totality of circumstances surrounding the parties’ interaction. Jordan , 635 F.3d at 1186–87 (citing United States v. Williams , 619 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)). "The ‘reasonable suspicion’ must be more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.’ " United States v. Acosta , 363 F.3d 1141, 1145 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Powell , 222 F.3d 913, 917 (11th Cir. 2000) ). However, officers are not required to observe criminal conduct but may form "reasonable suspicion of criminal activity ... by observing exclusively legal activity." United States v. Gordon , 231 F.3d 750, 754 (11th Cir. 2000).
When Officer McCabe was dispatched to the church, she was told that a caller had reported that two suspicious males had taken a wheel off a vehicle in the church parking lot, that the men were Hispanic, and that they appeared to be in their 30's. (Doc. 28–3 at 37). Officer McCabe was also told that one of the men was dressed in a white shirt and blue jeans, while the other was dressed in a white shirt and camo green pants. Officer McCabe observed two men that fit the dispatcher's description, and they were attempting to use a jack to lift a red Toyota Camry. (Doc. 28-3 at 41).
As Officer McCabe exited her vehicle, Nuby asked her how she was doing, to which she replied "good." Neither man appeared anxious about Officer's McCabe's presence, nor did they stop working on the car. It's clear from Officer McCabe's bodycam footage that the men were replacing a tire. There's nothing in the video that gives rise to any suspicion of criminal activity. When asked if the car he was working on belonged to him, Edger replied "Yea, [w]ell, it is one of my customer's."
To support a finding of reasonable suspicion, McCabe contends that Edger and Nuby matched the description of the men she was sent to investigate and that she's not required to look for innocent explanations for Edger's presence at the church. (Doc. 38 at 14).
While it appears obvious from the bodycam footage that the Edger and Nuby were replacing a tire, one could validly argue that an officer just-arriving on the scene could've reasonably believed that the men could've been doing something criminal. e.g., stealing tires. This suspicion is further buoyed by the fact that the men fit the description of the men that Officer McCabe was sent to investigate, and that McCabe was made aware that the car did not belong to the men working on it. On these facts the Court finds Officer McCabe had at least an arguable reasonable suspicion to engage Edger in a Terry stop. B. The Arrest
Because Officer McCabe had at least an arguable reasonable suspicion to engage Edger in a Terry stop, the Court must determine if Officers McCabe and Perillat had probable cause (actual or arguable) to arrest him. "An arrest without a warrant and lacking probable cause violates the Constitution and can underpin a § 1983 claim, but the existence of probable cause at the time of arrest is an absolute bar to a subsequent constitutional challenge to the arrest." Morris v. Town of Lexington Alabama , 748 F.3d 1316, 1324 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Brown v. City of Huntsville , 608 F.3d 724, 734 (11th Cir. 2010) ).
In this case, Officer McCabe was the first officer on the scene, but Officer Perillat also took part in the arrest. Under the "fellow officer" rule, "the collective knowledge of the investigating officers to be imputed to each participating officer." Terrell v. Smith , 668 F.3d 1244, 1252 (11th Cir. 2012). Further, there exists a legal fiction "that allows one officer to develop probable cause based on another officer's observations, even if the first officer never communicated with the second." Taylor-Williams v. Rembert , 712 Fed. Appx. 960, 962 (11th Cir. 2017). This allows the Court to impute Officer McCabe's probable cause, if any, to Officer Perillat.
Now, "[w]hether an arresting officer possesses probable cause or arguable probable cause naturally depends on the elements of the alleged crime and the operative fact pattern." Morris , 748 F.3d at 1324 (quoting Skop v. City of Atlanta , 485 F.3d 1130, 1137–38 (11th Cir. 2007) ). Defendants contend that probable cause supported Edger's arrest for both obstructing government operations under Ala. Code § 13A-10-2(a) and a violation of § 32-6-9.
1. No evidence supports Officers McCabe and Perillat's position that they had actual probable cause to arrest Edger for violating Ala. Code §§ 13A-10-2(A) or 32-6-9.
A person violates Ala. Code § 13A-10-2(A) if, "by means of intimidation, physical force or interference or by any other independently unlawful act, he: (1) Intentionally obstructs, impairs or hinders the administration of law or other governmental function; or (2) Intentionally prevents a public servant from performing a governmental function." Ala. Code § 13A-10-2 (1975). A government function is "[a]ny activity which a public servant is legally authorized to undertake on behalf of a government ...." Ala. Code § 13A-10-1(3). A municipal police officer is included in the definition of a public servant." Id. at § 13A-10-1(2), (7).
(a) Intimidation or Physical Interference
Alabama Courts have found that " § 13A–10–2 [requires] that the interference be physical interference and that words alone fail to provide culpability under § 13A–10–2." D.A.D.O. v. State , 57 So. 3d 798, 806 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009). In short, there's no evidence that Edger physically interfered with or obstructed the Officers’ operations; nor did he intimidate them. The bodycam footage shows–unequivocally–that Edger neither did nor said anything that could be construed as "intimidating." He simply stood up (he had previously been kneeling) and answered Officer McCabe's question. While Officer McCabe certainly didn't like Edger's response, there was no threat behind his answer or his body language. Therefore, the Court must consider whether there were independently unlawful acts that hindered or obstructed Officer McCabe's governmental operations. (b) Independently Unlawful Acts
Defendants argue that Edger's refusal to show his identification was an independently unlawful act under § 13A-10-2(a). (Doc. 27 at 25). This argument hinges on one critical contention: that Edger's failure to show his ID violated Ala. Code § 15-5-30 or § 32-6-9. The former states, in pertinent part, the following:
A ... policeman of any incorporated city or town within the limits of the county or any highway patrolman or state trooper may stop any person abroad in a public place whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit a felony or other public offense and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his actions.
Ala. Code § 15-5-30 (emphasis added).
Importantly , Edger was never asked his name but only for his "driver's license or ID." Common sense and context make clear that Officer McCabe asked Edger for his license or another documentary form of identification. Not his name and address. Nothing in the language of § 15-5-30, however, required Edger to provide any documentary form of ID. If Edger was asked his name, address, or for an explanation of his actions and failed to provide that requested information, then he would perhaps have violated the statute. See Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nevada, Humboldt Cnty. , 542 U.S. 177, 185, 124 S.Ct. 2451, 159 L.Ed.2d 292 (2004) ("[T]he statute does not require a suspect to give the officer a driver's license or any other document. Provided that the suspect either states his name or communicates it to the officer by other means—a choice, we assume, that the suspect may make—the statute is satisfied and no violation occurs."). Therefore, Edger didn't violate § 15-5-30 when he failed to provide his license or another form of ID. Thus, any alleged actual violation of this section didn't constitute an independent unlawful act supporting Edger's arrest.
As noted by late comedian Norm Macdonald, the abbreviation "ID" is short for "identification." The "I" stands for "I" and the "D" stands for "dentification." (Available at: https://youtu.be/mFjEvl43zYY) (last visited 27 September 2021).
Likewise, Edger's refusal to provide his driver's license when McCabe requested it was not an independently unlawful act under § 32-6-9(a). Under Alabama law, "[e]very licensee shall have his or her license in his or her immediate possession at all times when driving a motor vehicle and shall display the same, upon demand of ... a peace officer ..." Ala. Code § 32-6-9(a). Defendants argue that Edger was a driver under that section, even though he wasn't seen operating the vehicle, because he had actual physical control of the vehicle. See Ala. Code § 32-1-1.1(14). Specifically, Defendants argue that Edger could've had actual physical control over two vehicles: his black car and Ghosh's red Camry.
Alabama courts defined "actual physical control" as the "exclusive physical power, and present ability, to operate, move, park, or direct whatever use or non-use is to be made of the motor vehicle at the moment." Davis v. State , 505 So. 2d 1303, 1305 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (quoting Key v. Town of Kinsey , 424 So. 2d 701, 703 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982) ). "Actual physical control is determined by a totality-of-the-circumstances test." Id. (citing Cagle v. City of Gadsden , 495 So. 2d 1144 (Ala. 1986) ).
While Officer McCabe was on the scene, Edger was changing a tire on Mrs. Ghosh's car. To reiterate: the car had no front passenger tire. Considering Mrs. Ghosh's car was immobilized and on a jack, Edger certainly lacked the ability to operate it. But Edger's black hatchback was in the church parking lot, too. Edger had the ability to drive the black hatchback insofar as he had the keys to his vehicle. Defendants rely heavily upon that fact as well as the Cantu v. City of Dothan decision. Relying upon the latter, Defendants insist that an officer could require an individual to produce his driver's license under § 32-6-9, even if another officer didn't see that same individual driving. However, Cantu ’s facts differ markedly from Edger's arrest because, unlike the Cantu appellant, Edger wasn't sitting in his vehicle at any point during his interaction with Officer McCabe. Nor did he walk towards his vehicle as if he was about to drive it. See Cantu v. City of Dothan , Alabama , 974 F.3d 1217, 1223 (11th Cir. 2020).
The Court rejects the proposition that anyone with keys to a vehicle that's near him or her meets the statutory definition of a driver under Alabama law. To decide otherwise would extend the statute farther than Alabama courts have done thus far.
Considering the above, Officer McCabe lacked actual probable cause to arrest Edger for obstruction of governmental operations based on Edger's failure to provide an ID. Nor did she did not have actual probable cause for an arrest of Edger for a violation of § 32-6-9 for a failure to provide his license or ID.
2. There Was Arguable Probable Cause That Edger Violated Ala. Code § 13A-10-2(A).
Despite McCabe lacking actual probable cause to arrest Edger, she and Officer Perillat may escape liability for an illegal seizure if she had arguable probable cause to arrest Edger. This is the safety net qualified immunity provides. Alston v. Swarbrick , 954 F.3d 1312, 1318 (11th Cir. 2020).
To receive qualified immunity's shield of protection, a public official must show that "he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred." Lee v. Ferraro , 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Courson v. McMillian , 939 F.2d 1479, 1487 (11th Cir. 1991) ). There is no question that the officers were acting in their discretionary authority when they arrested Edger.
Since Officers McCabe and Perillat were acting within the scope of their discretionary authority, the burden shifts to Edger to show that qualified immunity is inappropriate. Manners v. Cannella , 891 F.3d 959, 968 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Lee , 284 F.3d at 1194 ). The Court employs a two-prong test to determine the inappropriateness of qualified immunity. First, the Court examines the plaintiff's allegations to determine if they establish a constitutional violation. Next the Court asks if those same allegations show that the violation was of a clearly established right. Payton v. City of Florence, Ala. , 413 Fed. Appx. 126, 131 (11th Cir. 2011). The Court, however, may analyze the two prongs in whichever order is most appropriate for the case. Id. Failure to establish both prongs of this test will preserve a finding of qualified immunity for Officers McCabe and Perillat. Id.
To receive qualified immunity on a false arrest claim, an officer need only show that arguable probable cause existed. Brown , 608 F.3d at 734. "Arguable probable cause exists where reasonable officers in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the Defendants could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff." Brown , 608 F.3d at 734 (quotations omitted).
It's worth noting again that whether an officer has arguable probable cause to arrest a defendant depends upon the elements of the alleged crimes. See Morris v. Town of Lexington Alabama , 748 F.3d 1316, 1324 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Skop , 485 F.3d at 1137–38 ). Based on the undisputed facts, the Court finds that a reasonable officer in Officer McCabe's position could have believed probable cause existed to arrest Edger in accordance with Ala. Code § 13A-10-2(A).
As noted supra, a person violates Ala. Code § 13A-10-2(A) when he obstructs a governmental operation "by means of intimidation, physical force or interference or by any other independently unlawful act." No reasonable officer could've looked at Edger's behavior and found that he was physically interfering with the officers’ operations or that was he intimidating them. Therefore, the Court looks to whether Officer McCabe mistakenly, but reasonably, believed that she had probable cause to make an arrest based on the independently unlawful act prong of § 13A–10–2.
The undisputed bodycam footage makes clear that McCabe didn't ask Edger for his name, and Edger didn't refuse to explain his actions according to § 15-5-30. However, a reasonable but mistaken officer could've believed that Edger's failure to provide his driver's license violated Ala. Code § 15-5-30. Edger's failure to comply with McCabe's request for identification could provide additional justification for an officer's belief (albeit mistaken) that Edger was obstructing a governmental operation. Therefore, McCabe had arguable probable cause and qualified immunity attaches to her actions, and by extension, Officer Perillat's.
II. State Law Claims
Edger's state law claims also fail because McCabe and Perillat had arguable probable cause to arrest him. And the City isn't liable for the state law claims under Ala. Code § 6–5–338. That section provides that peace officers "shall have immunity from tort liability arising out of his or her conduct in performance of any discretionary function within the line and scope of his or her law enforcement duties." As police officers, McCabe and Perillat qualify as a peace officers under § 6–5–338. See Borders v. City of Huntsville , 875 So. 2d 1168, 1178 (Ala. 2003). "To come within the protection of § 6–5–338, a municipal police officer must be engaged in a discretionary function with respect to the incident in question." Id. It's generally agreed that an arrest falls in the category of a discretionary function for an officer. Id. The Eleventh Circuit has applied the arguable probable cause standard to determine if the officer is entitled to the immunity in § 6–5–338 for a false-arrest claim. Id. Because the Court has found that arguable probable cause existed, the state law claims are also dismissed due to discretionary function immunity.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, Edger's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 23) is DENIED. The Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment are GRANTED. (Docs. 24–26). Edger's claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE .
DONE and ORDERED this November 18, 2021.