Opinion
5:21-CV-0003-JKP
04-07-2022
CHARLES EDGE, et al, Plaintiffs, v. TLW ENERGY SERVICES, LLC, and TROY WATKINS, Defendants.
ORDER DENYING MOTION
JASON PULLIAM, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration or, Alternatively, for Certificate of Appealability & to Stay (ECF No. 29). Plaintiff Charles Edge brings the motion individually and on behalf of Adam Vara, Braden Glasson, Dakota Maness, Colton Newman, Lorenzo Rodriguez, Michael Cuellar, Ben Forrest, Mason Frakes, and Thomas Gonzales, requesting that the Court reconsider its order denying plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment as to liability. For the reasons below, the Court denies the motion.
A Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) motion “must clearly establish either a manifest error of law or fact or must present newly discovered evidence.” T. B. ex rel. Bell v. Nw. Indep. Sch. Dist., 980 F.3d 1047, 1051 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 863-64 (5th Cir. 2003)). Such a motion is for that “narrow purpose” only and courts “sparingly” use the “extraordinary remedy” to reconsider “a judgment after its entry.” Def. Distributed v. U.S. Dep't of State, 947 F.3d 870, 873 (5th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). Courts, nevertheless, “have ‘considerable discretion in deciding whether to reopen a case under Rule 59(e).'” Id. (quoting Edward H. Bohlin Co. v. The Banning Co., 6 F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1993)).
On March 3, 2022, finding that Plaintiffs failed to meet their summary judgment burden when they did not present evidence that showed they were paid an illegal day rate, this Court denied Plaintiff Charles Edge's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Liability (ECF No.22). ECF No. 27. The order nonetheless granted one final opportunity to support their arguments with evidence by directing Plaintiffs to file a motion for default judgment no later than thirty days after the Clerk's Entry of Default in this case. The Clerk of Court entered default on February 25, 2022. ECF No. 28.
Rather than timely filing a motion for default judgment and attaching evidentiary support or moving for an extension of time to do so, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion arguing:
As Edge explained, daily rates of pay cannot build in or include any overtime. (See, Pl.'s Mot. P. Summ. J. (Doc. 22) pp. 10-17.) In fact, in Hewitt v. Helix, 15 F.4th 289 (5th Cir. 2021), the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc-as well as the Sixth and Eigth Circuits and the U.S. Department of Labor-recently explained that day-rate workers are entitled to overtime. See, id. at 294-96. In an earlier case, the Fifth Circuit expressly held that 29 C.F.R. 778.112 requires the payment of overtime to workers paid on a day-rate basis. Dufrene v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 207 F.3d 264, 267-69 (5th Cir. 2000). For these reasons, the Court should reconsider its denial of Edge's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 22) and, after doing so, grant the motion.ECF No. 29 at 4.
An allegation that a defendant pays an illegal day rate may generally be sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Summary judgment requires more. In the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff Edge pointed to an excel spreadsheet, Defendant TLW's responses to interrogatories and its responses to requests for admissions, a statement of facts, and a copy of a brief by the U.S. Secretary of Labor, filed in the Fourth Circuit. ECF Nos. 22 at 7; 22-1 through 5. As noted in the order denying the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs' argument that the day rate in this case is an illegal “blended rate” appears to be based on Defendants' interrogatory response that “Plaintiff was paid an hourly rate that was then used to calculate a day rate based on a 24-hour day (comprised of straight time and overtime)” and an incomplete spreadsheet. “Day rate” as a term of art does not relieve the Court of its responsibility to determine whether the alleged day rate scheme was illegal. The Court explained the necessity of additional information in its order denying the motion for summary judgment. The motion for reconsideration provides nothing more than what was submitted with the motion for summary judgment, e.g., no paystubs, affidavits, or deposition testimony. In short, Plaintiffs presented nothing to show that the alleged pay scheme was illegal. Instead, they rest on Defendants' use of the term “day rate”-full stop. Consequently, the Court finds the request to reconsider lacks merit and denies the motion.
As an alternative to finding in their favor, Plaintiffs suggest the Court certify an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The Court denied the motion for summary judgment not due to any difference of opinion about the law but because Plaintiffs failed to present evidence that supported their grounds for summary judgment. Consequently, interlocutory appeal under § 1292(b) is not appropriate.
For these reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration or, Alternatively, for Certificate of Appealability & to Stay (ECF No. 29).
In its order denying the motion for summary judgment the Court observed that the motion was not clear as to whether it was brought only by Plaintiff Edge or by all Plaintiffs in the case. The Court therefore directed that the motion for default judgment be clear as to whether it is on behalf of all joined plaintiffs, some set of them, or Edge alone. ECF No. 27. As noted above, Plaintiffs did not file a motion for default judgment, instead opting to file the motion for reconsideration. The motion for reconsideration makes clear that it is brought on behalf of all Plaintiffs in this case. As the Court's analysis in its memorandum opinion and order denying the motion for summary judgment applies to each Plaintiff, this order resolves all claims. This action is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.
It is ORDERED.