Edgar v. Shave

12 Citing cases

  1. In re J.C.W.

    A11A2054 (Ga. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2012)

    The issue before us in Snyder was whether a pending deprivation proceeding precluded a superior court from exercising jurisdiction over the adoption and termination petition. Additionally, the Snyder court relied upon a decision, Edgar v. Shave, 205 Ga. App. 337 (422 SE2d 234) (1992),issued at a time when the superior court had exclusive rather than concurrent jurisdiction over termination petitions filed in connection with adoption. Snyder, 276 Ga. App. at 427.

  2. Dunbar v. Ertter

    312 Ga. App. 440 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011)   Cited 5 times
    In Dunbar v. Ertter, 312 Ga.App. 440, 718 S.E.2d 350 (2011), the Court of Appeals, employing the principle of priority jurisdiction, answered the question in the negative; we granted the petition for a writ of certiorari and now answer the question in the affirmative.

    The juvenile court awarded “legal custody and control” of A.L. to Dunbar, making Dunbar the child's temporary legal custodian. See generally Edgar v. Shave, 205 Ga.App. 337, 338–339(2), 422 S.E.2d 234 (1992) (holding that deprivation order had conveyed to party status of temporary legal custodian and noting that OCGA § 15–11–2(5) defines “custodian” to include a person to whom legal custody of the child has been given by order of a court). Under the juvenile court's order, the court's role over the remaining years of A.L.'s minority would be to receive a report every 36 months regarding Dunbar's continued qualification to care for her. Such a monitoring role would exist in any grant of temporary custody under OCGA § 15–11–58(i).

  3. Long v. Long

    303 Ga. App. 215 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 20 times
    Discussing broad discretion of superior court to determine matters of custody, including modifying custodial orders, during pendency of divorce action

    Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Par. I. See Snyder v. Carter, 276 Ga. App. 426, 427-428 ( 623 SE2d 241) (2005); Edgar v. Shave, 205 Ga. App. 337, 338 (1) ( 422 SE2d 234) (1992). The trial court had jurisdiction over the temporary custody of Long's children.

  4. Snyder v. Carter

    276 Ga. App. 426 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 15 times

    See In the Interest of D.L.N.Edgar v. Shave, 205 Ga. App. 337 ( 422 SE2d 234) (1992). OCGA § 15-11-5 (a) (1) (C) was the predecessor to OCGA § 15-11-28 (a) (1) (C), which provides: "Except as provided in subsection (b) of this Code section, the [juvenile] court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over juvenile matters and shall be the sole court for initiating action . . . [c]oncerning any child . . . [w]ho is alleged to be deprived."

  5. In re J. W. H

    245 Ga. App. 468 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 11 times
    Holding that a parent may not avoid a scheduled termination of parental rights hearing by surrendering parental rights to the foster parents or proposing an adoption as a mere subterfuge to thwart the termination case

    The juvenile court did not exceed its jurisdiction by discussing the likely success of the foster parents' adoption petition. 205 Ga. App. 337, 338 (1) ( 422 S.E.2d 234) (1992). 3. The third enumeration of error assumes that the extension order approves DFACS's plan to end reunification services.

  6. Perrin v. Stansell

    533 S.E.2d 458 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 5 times

    The record clearly shows that, although the appellee's temporary custody of B. S. apparently was extended at least once since the original January 1997 "shelter care" order, the appellee has never acquired permanent custody or legal guardianship. SeeEdgar v. Shave, 205 Ga. App. 337, 338-339(2) ( 422 S.E.2d 234) (1992). To recognize such relationship as sufficient to apply the provisions of OCGA § 19-7-3 would essentially encourage a "race to the courthouse," whereby one grandparent can preclude a child's visitation with another grandparent simply by being the first to file a petition for temporary custody.

  7. In re Stroh

    240 Ga. App. 835 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 11 times
    Affirming the trial court's denial of an adoption on the grounds that the petitioners were not residents of Georgia under Georgia Code Ann. § 19–8–3, but nevertheless holding that the trial court erred in refusing to place custody of the child with the petitioners

    However, the superior court has exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over the adoption, as well as concurrent jurisdiction over the termination of parental rights, which was in connection with the adoption. OCGA §§ 15-11-5 (a) (2) (C) (prior to its amendment, which was effective July 1, 1997, the statute also gave the superior court exclusive jurisdiction over terminations which were in connection with adoptions); 19-8-2 (a); H.C.S. v. Grebel, supra at 406 (1); In the Interest of D.L.N., 234 Ga. App. 123 ( 506 S.E.2d 403) (1998); In the Interest of B.G.D., 224 Ga. App. 124, 125 (1) ( 479 S.E.2d 439) (1996); Edgar v. Shave, 205 Ga. App. 337, 338 (1) ( 422 S.E.2d 234) (1992); see also Division 3, infra. Therefore, this Court finds that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant the appellants custody of T.M.G. while they pursue an Alabama adoption.

  8. Smalls v. Blueprint Development

    230 Ga. App. 556 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 18 times

    Relying on Kissun v. Humana, Inc., 267 Ga. 419 ( 479 S.E.2d 751) (1997), plaintiffs argue for the first time on appeal that the trial court's refusal to pierce the corporate veil should not have precluded a further inquiry into whether sufficient evidence existed to support a claim of apparent agency or joint venture liability. However, unlike the plaintiffs in Kissun who asserted their alternative theories of liability in the court below, our review of the record shows that plaintiffs are raising these additional theories of liability for the first time on appeal. It is well settled that arguments not asserted in the trial court below will not be considered for the first time on appeal. Edgar v. Shave, 205 Ga. App. 337, 339 (3) ( 422 S.E.2d 234) (1992). Accordingly, this enumeration is without merit.

  9. In the Interest of A. L. L

    211 Ga. App. 767 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 26 times

    The issue before it was whether or not the children were deprived. "The juvenile court had exclusive original jurisdiction over the deprivation proceedings, OCGA § 15-11-5 (a) (1) (C), and it had the authority to order disposition best suited to the needs of the children, [including the transfer of temporary legal custody] OCGA § 15-11-34 (a) (2) (A)." Edgar v. Shave, 205 Ga. App. 337, 338 (1) ( 422 S.E.2d 234) (1992). 3. Lankford contends the court erred in finding him in contempt and fining him $50 for his violation of the rule of sequestration "in the midst of the case in chief."

  10. Handy v. Speth

    435 S.E.2d 623 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 3 times

    See Chadwick v. Miller, supra. The plaintiff also argues that application of the jury charge on accident in this case violated her right to equal protection of the law, but we may not consider that contention because it was raised for the first time on appeal. Edgar v. Shave, 205 Ga. App. 337 (3) ( 422 S.E.2d 234) (1992). 2.