Opinion
No. TTD CV 07 6000260
October 19, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The defendants move to dismiss this negligence action based on a lack of personal jurisdiction. The motion was timely filed under Practice Book § 10-30.
The facts relevant to this motion are uncontroverted. At the time of the motor vehicle accident which lies at the core of the plaintiff's claims and up to the present, all parties were and are residents of Massachusetts. The accident happened on Interstate 91 in Enfield, Connecticut.
The defendants contend that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over them would violate their due process rights. The defendants concede that the undisputed facts bring them within the appropriate longarm statute, General Statutes § 52-59b(a)(2), because the tort of negligence allegedly occurred in Connecticut. They also acknowledge service of process in compliance with General Statutes § 52-62(a), which deemed the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to be their agent for service of civil process.
The absence of personal jurisdiction is properly raised by a motion to dismiss. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Fairfield Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 180 Conn. 223, 226 (1980). The motion to dismiss admits all well-pleaded facts, and the complaint is construed most favorably toward sustaining jurisdiction. American Laundry Machinery, Inc. v. State, 190 Conn. 212, 217 (1983). However, once a defendant attacks the acquisition of personal jurisdiction on the ground of a breach of due process, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving compliance with the dictates of due process. Knipple v. Viking Communications, Ltd, 236 Conn. 602, 607 (1996).
State courts may exercise "specific" personal jurisdiction over a defendant "whenever a cause of action `arises out' of the defendant's contacts with the forum." Thomason v. Chemical Bank, 234 Conn. 281, 287 (1995). The defendants' contacts with Connecticut are the operation of a motor vehicle on the public highways of this State. Clearly, the plaintiff's cause of action for negligent operation of that vehicle on our highways "arises out" of that contact. The meaning of "arises out" in the context of due process analysis merely requires "some sort of causal connection between the defendant's forum contacts and the plaintiff's injuries." Id. The court finds that specific, personal jurisdiction exists over the defendants in this case.
The alleged acts of negligence and the claimed injuries which proximately flowed from those acts all occurred in Connecticut. The motor vehicle laws of Connecticut governed the parties at the time of the accident. Just as a nonresident who operates a motor vehicle on our highways would reasonably expect to answer charges of violations of any motor vehicle laws in a Connecticut criminal court, such a driver or owner ought to expect to be haled into our courts to respond to civil suits.
The defendants place great emphasis on the non-residence of the plaintiff. The plaintiff's foreign residence is immaterial to the question of whether a foreign defendant can be compelled to face civil consequences consistent with due process requirements. The claim of a violation of due process is different from a forum non conveniens motion to dismiss where the residence of all parties is a factor for consideration. The plaintiff's Massachusetts residence is inconsequential.
Commendably, the defendants' counsel has candidly alerted the court to precedent which weakens the defense argument in this regard. In Fine v. Wencke, 117 Conn. 683 (1933), our Supreme Court rejected the contention of a nonresident defendant that the foreign residence of the plaintiff deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to adjudicate a motor vehicle accident negligence case. The Court observed that "[o]ur public policy is not adverse to our courts taking jurisdiction of actions between nonresidents brought here in good faith." Id., 684. "When the plaintiff came into this State and instituted his action here he brought within our jurisdiction the subject-matter of that action, his right to recover damages for personal injuries suffered by reason of the negligence of the defendant." Id., 683-84.
For these reasons, the motion to dismiss is denied.