Ectore Realty Co., Inc., v. Manufacturers Tr. Co.

12 Citing cases

  1. Hoff Research & Development Laboratories, Inc. v. Philippine National Bank

    426 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1970)   Cited 28 times

    Instead, in a case of undiscovered actual fraud the pre-CPLR law looked to discovery alone as the relevant event which launched the running of the statute. See, e.g., Ectore Realty Co. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 250 App. Div. 314, 294 N YS. 96 (1st Dept. 1937). Thus CPA § 48(5) in effect allowed suit within six years after either accrual or discovery, in the event that the two were not simultaneous and covered both cases by stating that the cause was not "deemed to have accrued" at all until discovery.

  2. RIIS v. MFRS. HANOVER TRUST CO.

    632 F. Supp. 1098 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)   Cited 10 times
    Applying fraud statute of limitations to fraudulent concealment claim

    When the victim of the alleged frauds knows sufficient facts from which the inference of fraud flows, the statute of limitations begins to run. Klein v. Bower, 421 F.2d 338, 343-44 (2d Cir. 1970); Ectore Realty Co., Inc. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 250 A.D. 314, 294 N.Y.S. 96, 100 (1st Dep't 1937); Sielcken-Schwarz v. American Factors, 265 N.Y. 239, 246, 192 N.E. 307 (N.Y. 1934). Riis' pleadings in this action and her submissions in the Norwegian actions against DnC and O-U show that she not only should have discovered MHT's alleged fraudulent intent but also that she in all probability actually knew of these facts in 1982.

  3. Government of India v. Cargill, Inc.

    445 F. Supp. 714 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)   Cited 5 times
    Granting motion for leave to amend complaint where amended complaint only amplified the allegations in the original complaint and in "no material way alter[ed] the basic charges leveled against [defendant]" and defendant failed to make a showing that the amendments would prejudice its defense

    "[W]hen facts are known from which the inference of fraud flows, there is a discovery of the facts constituting the fraud within the terms of the statute." Ectore Realty Co., Inc. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 250 App. Div. 314, 318, 294 N.Y.S. 96, 100 (1937); see Klein v. Bower, 421 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1970); Rickel v. Levy, 370 F. Supp. 751 (E.D.N Y 1974). N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 203(f) provides:

  4. Mittendorf v. J.R. Williston Beane Incorporated

    372 F. Supp. 821 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)   Cited 28 times
    Stating that "only the essence of a point need be disclosed, not the minute details"

    Klein v. Bower, 421 F.2d 338, 343 (2d Cir. 1970); see Sielcken-Schwarz v. American Factors Ltd., 265 N.Y. 239, 245-246, 192 N.E.2d 307, 310 (1934); Augstein v. Levey, 3 A.D.2d 595, 598, 162 N.Y.S.2d 269, 273 (1st Dep't. 1957), aff'd mem., 4 N Y2d 791, 173 N.Y.S.2d 27, 149 N.E.2d 528 (1958); Ectore Realty Co. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 250 App. Div. 314, 318, 294 N.Y.S. 96, 100 (1st Dep't. 1937). Although most Courts confronted with the problem have, without discussion, selected an applicable state statute of limitations in federal securities litigation predicated on Rule 10b-5, the question of what period of limitation to apply is one of federal law.

  5. Finn v. Empire Trust Co.

    121 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1950)   Cited 2 times

    Thus even if plaintiff had succeeded in proving that Barber wrongfully charged or overcharged Childs Company by means of fraudulent misrepresentations the applicable Statute of Limitations, N.Y.C.P.A., § 48(5), began running in 1929 and would now bar this action. Dumbadze v. Lignonte, 244 N.Y. 1, 8-9, 154 N.E. 645; Ectore Realty Co. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 250 A.D. 314, 294 N.Y.S. 96; Sheehan v. Municipal Light & Power Co., D.C., 54 F.Supp. 169, 175, affirmed, 2 Cir., 151 F.2d 65.         The third cause of action accordingly must also be dismissed.

  6. Forest Grove Brick v. Strickland

    277 Or. 81 (Or. 1977)   Cited 56 times
    Stating that rule

    The exact point has been defined as: "[W]here circumstances are such as to suggest to a person of ordinary intelligence the probability that he has been defrauded" (Warner v. Republic Steel Corp., 103 F. Supp. 998, (S.D.N.Y. 1952)); "when facts are known from which the inference of fraud flows." (Ectore Realty Co. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 250 App. Div.. 314, 294 N.Y.S. 96 (1937); "evidential facts leading to a belief in the fraud" (Davison v. Hewitt, 6 Wn.2d 131, 106 P.2d 733 (1940)). It may be that here the failure of the pump over a long period of time called for such an inquiry.

  7. Augstein v. Levey

    3 A.D.2d 595 (N.Y. App. Div. 1957)   Cited 28 times

    From the time of such discovery, the statute begins to run." ( Ectore Realty Co. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 250 App. Div. 314, 318.) The cases relied on by plaintiffs are inapposite; they relate to conduct which forestalled discovery of the basic facts.

  8. Kelly v. City of New York

    276 App. Div. 540 (N.Y. App. Div. 1950)   Cited 4 times

    That leaves for consideration plaintiff's claim that he did not discover the facts constituting the fraud in connection with his dismissal from the service in 1934, until 1945. It is made clear by documentary evidence, however, that by June 16, 1934, when plaintiff instituted a proceeding to be restored to his position, he asserted the claim, and purported to have the knowledge, that his dismissal from the service was not made in good faith but was based solely upon a predetermined purpose to dismiss him from the service on false charges. While some of the details of the fraud as now asserted were not, according to plaintiff's present claim, discovered until 1945, what this court said in Ectore Realty Co. v. Manufacturers Trust Co. ( 250 App. Div. 314, 318) is applicable — "when facts are known from which the inference of fraud flows, there is a discovery of the facts constituting the fraud within the terms of the statute". The opinion in that case also quoted apposite language from the decision in Sielcken-Schwarz v. American Factors, Ltd. ( 265 N.Y. 239, 245) that "A new cause of action for fraud does not accrue each time a plaintiff discovers new elements of fraud in a transaction or new evidence to prove such fraud".

  9. Purvin v. Grey

    275 App. Div. 688 (N.Y. App. Div. 1949)   Cited 1 times

    The matters upon which the examination was to be had were not specified in the stipulation; none of the books, records, minutes or reports was produced upon the examination; and the deposition appears to have been taken primarily in support of plaintiff's own case. Defendant is entitled to a full examination, with the production of all the specified books, records and documents, in order to aid him in establishing his affirmative defense of the Statute of Limitations. ( Higgins v. Crouse, 147 N.Y. 411, 415-416; Sielcken-Schwarz v. AmericanFactors, Ltd., 265 N.Y. 239, 243-244; Dyckman v. Dyckman, 230 App. Div. 288, 289; Ectore Realty Co. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 250 App. Div. 314, 318.) Defendant, through no fault of his, has not had such an examination.

  10. Matter of Rosenfield

    36 Misc. 2d 284 (N.Y. Misc. 1962)   Cited 1 times

    The prior adjudication as to the nature of the transaction between the decedent and the jeweler and the rights of the decedent and his wife against each other may not be disregarded on this item of so-called newly discovered evidence relating to the controversy long since determined adversely to the claimant. A new cause of action for fraud does not arise every time a new item of evidence is discovered bearing on a litigation determined many years before ( Sielcken-Schwarz v. American Factors, 265 N.Y. 239; Ectore Realty Co. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 250 App. Div. 314; Kelly v. City of New York, 276 App. Div. 540, affd. 302 N.Y. 589). The court determines that objection No. 5 is insufficient as a matter of law. Accordingly, such claim is disallowed and objection No. 5 is dismissed.