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Echostar Satellite L.L.C. v. Channel One TV, Inc.

United States District Court, D. Colorado
Feb 21, 2007
Civil Action No. 05-cv-00467-WYD-PAC (D. Colo. Feb. 21, 2007)

Opinion

Civil Action No. 05-cv-00467-WYD-PAC.

February 21, 2007


ORDER


THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff EchoStar Satellite L.L.C.'s Motion for Costs, Expenses, and Reasonable Attorney Fees [# 40], filed on January 18, 2007. By way of background, Plaintiff's motion was filed after I granted Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on January 2, 2007. Plaintiff's motion asserts that attorney fees are appropriate pursuant to the parties Affiliation Agreement which awards cost, expenses and reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party in any action to enforce or interpret the agreement. Plaintiffs have requested a total of $77,192.50 as the fair and reasonable amount of attorney fees and $17,304.45 in total costs and expenses in litigating this matter. Additionally, Plaintiff submitted detailed affidavits in support of its motion. It should be noted that the Defendant never responded to Plaintiff's motion.

I first address the law concerning the reasonableness of fees and then provide my recommendation. The first issue to address, according to the Supreme Court in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), is whether the plaintiff was a prevailing party. Plaintiff is a prevailing party where he "succeed[s] on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the part[y] sought in bringing suit." Id. at 433. Where the plaintiff was a prevailing party, the Court then turns to the reasonableness of the attorney fees sought. "The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." Id. "This calculation provides an objective basis on which to make an initial estimate of the value of a lawyer's services." Id.

To determine the reasonableness of a fee request, a court must begin by calculating the so-called `lodestar amount' of a fee, and a claimant is entitled to the presumption that this lodestar amount reflects a `reasonable' fee. Robinson v. City of Edmond, 160 F.3d 1275, 1281 (10th Cir. 1998) (quotations omitted); see also United Phosphurus, Ltd. v. Midland Fumigant, Inc., 205 F.3d 1219, 1234 (10th Cir. 2000) (when attorneys fees are awarded, courts often calculate the "lodestar amount," which is the reasonable number of hours spent on the case times a reasonable hourly rate). "The lodestar calculation is the product of the number of attorney hours `reasonably expended' and a `reasonable hourly rate.'" Robinson, 160 F.3d at 1281 (quotation omitted). "A district court should approach this reasonableness inquiry `much as a senior partner in a private law firm would review the reports of subordinate attorneys when billing clients.'" Id. (quoting Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 545, 555 (10th Cir. 1983)). "However, `[t]he record ought to assure [the appellate court] that the district court did not eyeball the fee request and cut it down by an arbitrary percentage.'" Id. (quotation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The party seeking an award of fees should submit evidence supporting the hours worked and rates claimed." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. "Where the documentation of hours is inadequate, the district court may reduce the award accordingly." Id.; see also Robinson, 160 F.3d at 1281 ("a district court may discount requested attorney hours if the attorney fails to keep `meticulous, contemporaneous time records' that reveal `all hours for which compensation is requested and how those hours were allotted to specific tasks'") (quoting Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 545, 555 (10th Cir. 1983)). "The district court also should exclude from this initial fee calculation hours that were not `reasonably expended.'" Id. at 434 (quotation omitted). Counsel are expected to exercise their "billing judgment", "mak[ing] a good faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary." Id. at 434, 437. "The Ramos court suggested that among the factors to be considered were (1) whether the tasks being billed `would normally be billed to a paying client,' (2) the number of hours spent on each task, (3) `the complexity of the case,' (4) `the number of reasonable strategies pursued,' (5) `the responses necessitated by the maneuvering of the other side,' and (6) `potential duplication of services' by multiple lawyers. Roberts, 160 F.3d at 1281 (quoting Ramos, 761 F.2d at 554). "In this analysis, [the court should] ask what hours a reasonable attorney would have incurred and billed in the marketplace under similar circumstances." Id. The Tenth Circuit in Brown v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 838 F.2d 451 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 822 (1988), also articulated the factors the Court must consider in determining the reasonableness of attorneys fees sought:

To determine reasonableness, federal courts have relied heavily on the factors articulated by the Fifth Circuit in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974) in calculating and reviewing attorneys' fees awards. . . . Because these factors measure the attorney's contributions, they are also appropriate in setting and reviewing percentage fee awards in common fund cases. The Johnson factors are: (1) the time and labor involved; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) any prearranged fee — this is helpful but not determinative; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys; (10) the undesirability of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.
Id. at 454-55. It is rare that all the factors are met. Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 9 F.3d 849, 853 (10th Cir. 1993).

After reviewing Plaintiff's motion and supporting documentation, I find that Plaintiff's request for attorney fees and expenses is reasonable under the controlling law. Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that Plaintiff EchoStar Satellite L.L.C.'s Motion for Costs, Expenses, and Reasonable Attorney Fees [# 40] is GRANTED. It is

FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is awarded attorney fees in the amount of $77,192.50. It is

FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is awarded costs and expenses in the amount of $17,304.45.


Summaries of

Echostar Satellite L.L.C. v. Channel One TV, Inc.

United States District Court, D. Colorado
Feb 21, 2007
Civil Action No. 05-cv-00467-WYD-PAC (D. Colo. Feb. 21, 2007)
Case details for

Echostar Satellite L.L.C. v. Channel One TV, Inc.

Case Details

Full title:ECHOSTAR SATELLITE L.L.C., a Colorado limited liability company, f/k/a…

Court:United States District Court, D. Colorado

Date published: Feb 21, 2007

Citations

Civil Action No. 05-cv-00467-WYD-PAC (D. Colo. Feb. 21, 2007)