An ALJ may rely on inconsistencies in the medical record and in statements to reject testimony. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4); see Farlow v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 485, 489 (9th Cir. 2022); see also Eblen v. Saul, 811 Fed.Appx. 417, 420 (9th Cir. 2020) (ALJ properly discounted testimony based on inconsistent statements); Jack S. v. Saul, 2020 WL 6044547, at *4 (D. Or. Oct. 13, 2020) (ALJ properly discounted statements based on inconsistencies about how injury occurred). Initially, Plaintiff reported that “eight boxes” fell on her, causing neck and back injuries.
The Ninth Circuit has held that it is appropriate to discount a claimant's testimony based on inconsistencies with, among other things, "the objective medical evidencef.]" Eblen v. Saul, 811 Fed.Appx. 417, 420 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039). However, an ALJ may not reject a claimant's pain testimony merely because the testimony appears disproportionate to the objective medical evidence. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2005) ("[A]n ALJ may not reject a claimant's subjective complaints based solely on a lack of medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity of pain.").
As the ALJ may validly discount a claimant's testimony based upon inconsistencies in statements made by the claimant and record, the Court affirms the ALJ's finding. See Eblen v. Saul, 811 Fed.Appx. 417 (9th Cir. 2020). The ALJ also discounted Plaintiff's testimony for other reasons.
The Ninth Circuit has held that it is appropriate to discount a claimant's testimony based on inconsistencies with, among other things, “the objective medical evidence[.]” Eblen v. Saul, 811 Fed.Appx. 417, 420 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039).
. The Ninth Circuit has held that it is appropriate to discount a claimant's testimony based on inconsistencies with, among other things, “the objective medical evidence[.]” Eblen v. Saul, 811 Fed.Appx. 417, 420 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039).
(See Tr. 20, finding that Plaintiff's symptoms are "not entirely consistent with the medical evidence"). The Ninth Circuit has held that it is appropriate to discount a claimant's testimony based on inconsistencies with, among other things, "the objective medical evidence[.]" Eblen v. Saul, 811 F. App'x 417, 420 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039). However, an ALJ may not reject a claimant's pain testimony merely because the testimony appears disproportionate to the objective medical evidence. SeeBurch, 400 F.3d at 680 ("[A]n ALJ may not reject a claimant's subjective complaints based solely on a lack of medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity of pain.").
(See Tr. 22, finding that Plaintiff's statements are "inconsistent with . . . the medical evidence"; see also Def.'s Br. at 5-6, arguing that the medical record "contradicted the stated severity of Plaintiff's symptoms"). The Ninth Circuit has held that it is appropriate to discount a claimant's testimony based on inconsistencies with, among other things, "the objective medical evidence[.]" Eblen v. Saul, 811 F. App'x 417, 420 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039). However, an ALJ may not reject a claimant's pain testimony merely because the testimony appears disproportionate to the objective medical evidence. SeeBurch, 400 F.3d at 680 ("[A]n ALJ may not reject a claimant's subjective complaints based solely on a lack of medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity of pain").
See Corthion v. Colvin, No. CV-15-00837-PHX-GMS, 2017 WL 68910, at *4 (D. Ariz. Jan. 6, 2017) ("The bulk of case law deals with conservative treatment vis-à-vis claimant credibility, rather than the weight due a treating physician's report, but the Ninth Circuit has discussed conservative treatment in the context of a treating physician's report's weight as recently as 2016, albeit in an unpublished case.") (citing Hanes v. Colvin, 651 F. App'x 703, 705 (9th Cir. 2016) ("In addition, the ALJ reasonably relied on his findings regarding Hanes's daily activities, her conservative treatment, and her positive response to that treatment to conclude that the assessments of Dr. Hawkins and Dr. Pena were inconsistent with the objective evidence in the record.")); see also Eblen v. Saul, 811 F. App'x 417, 419 (9th Cir. 2020) ("The ALJ properly gave little weight to Dr. Steven Maness's opinion that Eblen was disabled because it was inconsistent with the objective medical evidence, including Dr. Maness's own treatment notes, and because the record indicated that Dr. Maness had recommended conservative treatment."). Finally, the Court also considers the support provided by the State agency physicians to the ALJ's overall analysis of the evidence of Plaintiff's mental impairments.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the ALJ did not err in discounting Plaintiff's symptom testimony based on his inconsistent statements. See, e.g., Eblen v. Saul, 811 F. App'x 417, 420 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that the ALJ met the clear and convincing reasons standard, stating that the ALJ appropriately discounted the claimant's testimony based on his inconsistent statements, and noting that there were "inconsistencies between statements [the claimant] made to his providers and statements he made in support of his long-term disability insurance application"). ///