Opinion
Case No. C-2-99-1226
March 7, 2001
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs assert violation of their rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and state law, based on defendants' unauthorized entry onto plaintiffs' real property. Defendants move to dismiss (Docs. 7 and 8). For the reasons that follow, the Court grants defendants' motions.
I. Facts A. Background
For purposes of ruling on defendants' motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true the well-pleaded facts set forth in the complaint.
Plaintiffs are individuals who own real property in Coshocton County, Ohio. Defendants are the Director of the Ohio Department of Transportation ("ODOT"), John Doe employees of ODOT, and the Coshocton County Commissioners.
This action concerns defendants' work on Linton Township Road 108 Bridge 1 over Wills Creek, which is located on or near plaintiffs' property. The bridge was closed in October 1998 after a truck accident rendered the bridge unstable.
Defendants began building a new bridge over Wills Creek on April 5, 1999, using an existing easement on plaintiffs' property. Plaintiffs notified defendants that they did not have permission to go outside the existing casement. Defendents, however, entered plaintiffs' property on April 12, 1999, without serving notice as required under Ohio Rev. Code § 163.03, and began placing construction equipment on plaintiffs' property. Plaintiffs objected to defendants' presence on their property, and informed them that they were trespassing. Defendants, however, continued to occupy about eight acres of plaintiffs' land.
On September 30, 1999, defendant Director Proctor filed two petitions in the Coshocton County Common Pleas Court to appropriate property and fix compensation.
B. Procedural History
On October 29, 1999, plaintiffs filed the instant action in the Coshocton County Common Pleas Court, asserting four claims for relief:
Count One — Injunctive relief
Court Two — Common law trespass
Count Three — violation of plaintiffs' rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Count Four — violation of plaintiffs' rights under the Ohio Constitution
Defendants removed the action to this Court on November 12, 1999. The state defendants moved to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings on March 14, 2000 (Doc. 7), on grounds of Eleventh Amendment immunity, qualified immunity, statutory immunity under Ohio Rev. Code § 9.86, and that plaintiffs in any event fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The County Commissioners filed their own motion to dismiss on March 23, 2000 (Doc. 8) asserting the same arguments with the exception of Eleventh Amendment immunity.
The state defendants supplemented their motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings on September 22, 2000 (Doc. 12). The gist of the state defendants' supplemental memorandum is to inform this Court, and to ask this Court to take judicial notice of, the fact that plaintiffs settled with the state defendants in the state appropriation and compensation actions. The settlement provides, inter alia, for a payment of $10,000 by ODOT to plaintiffs for additional permanent easements, as well as for property taken temporarily during the bridge construction project.
II. Motion to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim "should not be granted unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief" Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). All well-pleaded allegation must be taken as true and be construed most favorably toward the non-movant.Schuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). A 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is directed solely to the complaint and any exhibits attached to it. Roth Steel Products v. Sharon Steel Corp., 705 F.2d 134, 155 (6th Cir. 1983). The merits of the claims set forth in the complaint are not at issue on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Consequently, a complaint will be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) only if there is no law to support the claims made, or if the facts alleged are insufficient to state a claim, or if on the face of the complaint there is an insurmountable bar to relief. See Rauch v. Day Night Mfg. Corp., 576 F.2d 697, 858 (6th Cir. 1976). Rule 12(b)(6) must be read in conjunction with Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) which provides that a pleading for relief shall contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." 5A Wright Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (1990). The moving party is entitled to relief only when the complaint fails to meet this liberal standard. Id.
On the other hand, more than bare assertions of legal conclusions is required to satisfy the notice pleading standard. Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988). "In practice, a complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory." Id. (emphasis in original, quotes omitted).
"[w]e are not holding the pleader to an impossibly high standard; we recognize the policies behind rule 8 and the concept of notice pleading. A plaintiff will not be thrown out of court for failing to plead facts in support of every arcane element of his claim. But when a complaint omits facts that, if they existed, would clearly dominate the case, it seems fair to assume that those facts do not exist."Id.
III. Discussion
The Court could spend considerable time discussing and ruling on defendants' individual grounds for dismissal. For example, the state defendants' Eleventh Amendment argument raises a difficult and significant issue that neither side presented or briefed, namely, whether the Eleventh Amendment even applies to Fifth Amendment claims of taking without just compensation. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 314-17 (1987); Parella v. R.I. Employees' Retirement System, 173 F.3d 46, 56 n. 6 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting existence of issue and citing cases); Esposito v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 939 F.2d 165, 173n3 (4th Cir. 1991) (dissenting opinion by Hall, J.) (stating that Eleventh Amendment must yield to Fifth Amendment Just Compensation Clause in light of First English); Unix System Laboratories. Inc. v. Berkeley Software Design. Inc., 832 F. Supp. 790, 803-04 (D.N.J. 1993) (assuming that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar a Fifth Amendment claim for just compensation); Fallon Meltzer, New Law. Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1731, 1825 (1991) (citing First English as establishing that Seventh Amendment does not bar Takings Clause claims).
The Court will, however, cut to the chase instead. The Court takes judicial notice of the outcome of the state appropriation and compensation proceedings. Fed.R.Evid. 201(d); Rodic v. Thistledown racing Club. Inc., 615 F.2d 736, 738 (6th Cir. 1980). Plaintiffs do not contest the accuracy of the judgment and settlement defendants submit with their supplemental memorandum. Rather, plaintiffs merely argue that the settlement was not intended to be a release of plaintiffs' federal claims. The state defendants acknowledge that the settlement was not a release of plaintiffs' civil rights claims, but maintain that the Court should consider the settlement in determining the legal sufficiency of plaintiffs' claims, although defendants do not attempt to cast this request in the form of a legal theory, such as accord and satisfaction or mootness.
In any event, as defendants suggest, plaintiffs cannot avoid the effect of the settlement, regardless of whether it expressly releases any federal claims. The Court finds as a matter of law that in light of the settlement, plaintiffs have been fully compensated for whatever damage or taking occurred as a result of defendants' incursion upon their property, and that as a result plaintiffs no longer have a viable claim for damages under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. As a corollary to the principle that a plaintiff cannot be compensated twice for the same injury, plaintiffs cannot, on the one hand, accept the fruits of a settlement of a state compensation proceeding designed to make them whole as a result of any taking of their property, and at the Same time continue to seek additional damages based upon the same taking. Stated otherwise, plaintiffs cannot obtain relief for a taking without just compensation unless they have unsuccessfully attempted to obtain compensation through available state procedures. Williamson Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985). Here, plaintiffs successfully obtained compensation through the state procedure. Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim, Count Three, will therefore be dismissed.
The settlement also indicates that plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief, Count One, which is based at least in part on federal law, is moot. Plaintiffs have never moved for a temporary restraining order, or a preliminary injunction, and have not, in the face of the settlement, argued that defendants have continued their unauthorized entries onto plaintiffs' land. In the absence of any indication to the contrary, the Court finds that plaintiffs' federal claim for injunctive relief is moot, and will therefore be dismissed.
Given that plaintiffs' federal claims are subject to dismissal, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state law claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(3), and remands the state law claims to the Coshocton County Common Pleas Court.
IV. Disposition
Based on the above, the Court GRANTS defendants' motions to dismiss (Doc. 7 and Doc. 8).
The Clerk shall enter final judgment in favor of defendants, and against plaintiffs, dismissing plaintiffs' federal claims with prejudice, and remanding plaintiffs' state law claims to the Coshocton County, Ohio Court of Common Pleas.
The Clerk shall remove this case from the Court's pending cases and motions lists.
The Clerk shall remove Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 from the Court's pending motions list.
IT IS SO ORDERED.